Questions the role of military power in deterring would-be aggressor nations

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Contents

Preface - vii

Abbreviations - xi

1. Introduction - 1

Soviet Gains

2. Soviet Lessons from the Vietnam War: A Crucial Case for Deterrence Theory . . . Which It Does Not Pass - 35

3. Soviet Lessons from Angola, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan: The "Arc of Crisis" as a Crucial Case - 61

4. Soviet Lessons from Iran and Nicaragua: Deterrence Theory Fails Another Easy Test - 117

Soviet Losses

5. Grenada 1983: Sufficient, but Unneccessary and Inferior - 153

6. The Middle East, 1967-80: A Boon for Deterrence, but Proof of the Need for an Expansion of the Theory - 163

7. Ghana 1966: The Deterrent Case That Didn't Bark - 209

8. Conclusion: Deterrence Theory Revised - 233

Appendixes - 243

Bibliography - 255

Index - 305

Description

This book challenges the classical Cold War assumption that aggressive military force was necessary to project resolve against Soviet expansionism. By analyzing historical data from geopolitical flashpoints, Hopf demonstrates that military interventions were frequently counterproductive, whereas non-military mechanisms like diplomacy and economic statecraft were far more effective.

Ted Hopf is Assistant Professor of Political Science; Faculty Associate, Center for Russian and East European Studies; and Assistant Research Scientist, Center for Political Studies, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan.