

ONLINE APPENDIX MATERIAL FOR THE LATIN AMERICAN VOTER

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APPENDIX MATERIAL FOR CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION TO THE LATIN AMERICAN VOTER

By Ryan E. Carlin, Matthew M. Singer, and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister

In the text (page 17) we describe the programmaticness index that Kitschelt and Freeze (2010) develop based on the DALP project. Because this index may not be familiar to our readers, we explain it in more detail here and provide the components of that index for the reader. We are grateful to Kitschelt and Freeze for making their data available to us and we assume all responsibility for any errors in our description of their methods. We encourage the reader to read their paper and to go to the DALP website (<https://web.duke.edu/democracy/>) to see the codebook and to download the data.

Kitschelt and Freeze call their programmaticness index *CoSalPo* recognizing the 3 ingredients that they and others have identified as key to programmatic competition: cohesive positions within a party, issues being a salient part of parties' appeals, and parties taking distinct positions from each other (operationalized as polarization). They measure each of these components for each issue area in the survey. Cohesion (Co) is the standard deviation of expert scores for each issue each party. Salience (Sal) is the percentage of valid answers from experts for each issue each party. Polarization (Po), as discussed in the text, is the mean distance of a focal party's position on the issue from the positions of each of the other parties in the system, with each dyad's distance weighted by the relative size of the two parties whose distance is being compared. The three components are then normalized between 0-1 and multiplied to create the CoSalPo scores for each issue by each party. The summary programmaticness measure (called *cosalpo_4* in the DALP dataset) is constructed by averaging three of the five common issue scales (d1-d5) that have the highest CoSalPo scores, but no more than two of them may be economic and then one more question, either the highest scoring country-specific issue, or one of the remaining d1-d5 issue scores, provided the latter has a higher CoSalPo score than the customized national questions.

For the 18 Latin American countries, the issues in Table OA1.1 are included in the programmaticness score with the question wording below the table. All countries' index scores include the question on tradeoffs between cultivating a national identity and accommodating minority rights and on attitudes toward traditional values. Then it includes at least one purely economic question and then the question from all others one the questionnaire with the highest programmaticness score. Table OA1.2 contains the components of the COSALPO index for each country.

Table OA1.1: Dimensions Included in the COSALPO Index for Each Country

Country	Economic Issue	Additional Issue
Argentina	State Role in Governing the Economy	Value of Democracy
Bolivia	Social Spending on the Disadvantaged	Free Trade with U.S.
Brazil	Public Spending	Nationalism
Chile	State Role in Governing the Economy	Liberalization vs. State-owned enterprises
Colombia	State Role in Governing the Economy	Economic protectionism vs. Openness and economic integration
Costa Rica	State Role in Governing the Economy	Anti-U.S. Rhetoric
Dominican Republic	Public Spending	Social Spending on the Disadvantaged
Ecuador	Public Spending	Free Trade with the United States
El Salvador	State Role in Governing the Economy	Economic protectionism vs. Openness and economic integration
Guatemala	Public Spending	Poverty reduction vs. Citizen security and safety
Honduras	Public Spending	Anti-U.S. Rhetoric
Mexico	State Role in Governing the Economy	Liberalization vs. State-owned enterprises
Nicaragua	State Role in Governing the Economy	Free Trade with U.S.
Panama	State Role in Governing the Economy	Value of Democracy
Paraguay	State Role in Governing the Economy	Liberalization vs. State-owned enterprises
Peru	State Role in Governing the Economy	Taxes versus Social Spending
Uruguay	State Role in Governing the Economy	Nationalism
Venezuela	Public Spending	Taxes versus Social Spending

The following two questions are included in all measures of the index:

National identity [1] Party advocates toleration and social and political equality for minority ethnic, linguistic, religious, and racial groups and opposes state policies that require the assimilation of such groups to the majority national culture. [10] Party believes that the defense and promotion of the majority national identity and culture at the expense of minority representation are important goals.

Traditional authority, institutions, and customs [1] Party advocates full individual freedom from state interference into any issues related to religion, marriage, sexuality, occupation, family life, and social conduct in general. [10] Party advocates state-enforced compliance of individuals with traditional authorities and values on issues related to religion, marriage, sexuality, occupation, family life and social conduct in general.

The index also includes at least one of the following three economic issue questions:

Social spending on the disadvantaged [1] Party advocates extensive social spending redistributing income to benefit the less well-off in society. [10] Party opposes extensive social spending redistributing income to benefit the less well-off in society.

State role in governing the economy [1] Party supports a major role for the state in regulating private economic activity to achieve social goals, in directing development, and/or maintaining control over key services. [10] Party advocates a minimal role for the state in governing or directing economic activity or development.

Public spending [1] Party supports extensive public provision of benefits such as earnings-related pension benefits, comprehensive national health care, and basic primary and secondary schools for everyone. [10] Party opposes an extensive state role in providing such benefits and believes that such things as health insurance, pensions, and schooling should be privately provided or that participation in public social insurance programs should be voluntary.

Finally, the survey included a large battery of questions on other issues. Kitschelt and Freeze identified the one which had the largest programmatic score. The following questions make that list in at least one country.

Nationalism [1] Party uses nationalist rhetoric. [10] Party doesn't use nationalist rhetoric.

Anti-U.S. Rhetoric [1] Party uses anti-U.S. rhetoric. [10] Party doesn't use anti-U.S. rhetoric.

Free Trade with U.S. [1] Party supports local/regional trade agreements. [10] Party supports trade within NAFTA or with U.S.

Poverty reduction vs. Citizen security and safety [1] Party supports poverty reduction at the expense of citizen security. [10] Party supports citizen security at the expense of poverty reduction.

Taxes vs. Social policies [1] Party supports lower taxes at the expense of social policies. [10] Party supports social policies, even when this leads to higher taxes.

Economic protectionism vs. Openness and economic integration [1] Party supports economic protectionism. [10] Party supports openness and economic integration.

Value of Democracy [1] Party values democracy according to substantive accomplishments. [10] Party values democracy independently of substantive accomplishments.

Liberalization vs. State-owned enterprises [1] Party supports liberalization of state-owned monopolies. [10] Party opposes liberalization of state-owned monopolies.

Table OA1.2 Components of the Programmatic Index

	Economic Issue				Minority Rights				Traditional Values				Remaining Issue				Overall Programmaticness Index (Average of 4 CoSalPo scores)
	Co	Sal	Po	CoSalPo	Co	Sal	Po	CoSalPo	Co	Sal	Po	CoSalPo	Co	Sal	Po	CoSalPo	
Argentina	0.39	0.91	0.23	0.08	0.38	0.91	0.10	0.03	0.37	0.91	0.17	0.06	0.64	0.91	0.32	0.19	0.09
Bolivia	0.59	0.88	0.57	0.30	0.24	0.88	0.13	0.03	0.37	0.64	0.17	0.04	0.69	1.00	0.76	0.52	0.22
Brazil	0.48	0.89	0.43	0.19	0.48	0.48	0.40	0.09	0.42	0.70	0.35	0.10	0.34	0.99	0.54	0.18	0.14
Chile	0.26	1.00	0.55	0.14	0.27	1.00	0.38	0.10	0.37	1.00	0.58	0.22	0.61	1.00	0.88	0.53	0.25
Colombia	0.36	0.93	0.29	0.10	0.23	0.89	0.29	0.06	0.46	0.90	0.70	0.29	0.49	0.97	0.78	0.37	0.20
Costa Rica	0.34	0.98	0.54	0.18	0.56	0.31	0.19	0.03	0.40	0.97	0.16	0.06	0.67	1.00	0.92	0.62	0.22
Dominican Republic	0.50	0.86	0.17	0.07	0.55	0.66	0.29	0.11	0.54	0.89	0.00	0.00	0.46	0.83	0.13	0.05	0.06
Ecuador	0.53	0.96	0.52	0.26	0.50	0.93	0.63	0.30	0.40	0.83	0.24	0.08	0.45	1.00	0.65	0.29	0.23
El Salvador	0.28	0.96	0.64	0.17	0.43	0.85	0.46	0.17	0.51	0.98	0.34	0.17	0.65	1.00	0.80	0.52	0.26
Guatemala	0.66	0.97	0.40	0.25	0.65	0.95	0.44	0.27	0.56	0.73	0.21	0.09	0.67	0.97	0.46	0.30	0.23
Honduras	0.68	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.53	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.57	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.39	1.00	0.41	0.16	0.04
Mexico	0.38	0.94	0.44	0.16	0.52	0.84	0.44	0.19	0.37	0.80	0.56	0.17	0.57	0.89	0.74	0.37	0.22
Nicaragua	0.32	0.88	0.65	0.18	0.59	0.88	0.00	0.00	0.05	0.98	0.00	0.00	0.56	1.00	0.48	0.27	0.11
Panama	0.32	0.91	0.28	0.08	0.51	0.89	0.16	0.07	0.85	0.89	0.00	0.00	0.29	1.00	0.40	0.12	0.07
Paraguay	0.36	0.99	0.36	0.13	0.35	0.94	0.16	0.05	0.52	0.97	0.37	0.18	0.53	0.89	0.55	0.26	0.16
Peru	0.38	0.97	0.43	0.16	0.27	0.94	0.19	0.05	0.52	0.95	0.23	0.11	0.59	0.97	0.75	0.44	0.19
Uruguay	0.52	1.00	0.57	0.30	0.50	0.75	0.15	0.06	0.66	1.00	0.27	0.18	0.60	1.00	0.72	0.43	0.24
Venezuela	0.73	0.98	0.16	0.11	0.43	0.84	0.00	0.00	0.57	0.88	0.29	0.14	0.53	1.00	0.25	0.13	0.10


APPENDIX MATERIAL FOR CHAPTER 2:

WHO IS THE LATIN AMERICAN VOTER?

By Ryan E. Carlin and Gregory J. Love

As referenced in footnote 12, Figure OA2.1 summarizes the model fit for each block of the turnout model for each country in the sample.

Figure OA2.1 Distribution of Model Fit by Country



Countries with enforced compulsory voting.

Countries with high party system polarization (< 1 std. dev. above mean).

APPENDIX MATERIAL FOR CHAPTER 3:
THE LEFT AND MOBILIZATION OF CLASS VOTING IN LATIN AMERICA

By Scott Mainwaring, Mariano Torcal, and Nicolás M. Somma

As referenced on page 74, online appendix table OA3.1 shows the distribution of the mean household wealth variable by country.

Table OA3.1. Mean Household Wealth by Country

	Per capita GDP, 2010	Mean household wealth, 2006	Mean household wealth, 2008	Mean household wealth, 2010	Number in 2006
Argentina	NA	NA	1.3	1.3	1487
Bolivia	4,350	-1.0	-1.0	-0.9	2976
Brazil	10,093	0.7	0.5	0.8	1487
Chile	14,520	1.3	1.3	1.3	1517
Colombia	8,479	0.1	-0.0	0.0	1491
Costa Rica	10,453	1.6	1.3	1.3	1500
Dominican Republic	8,387	-0.2	-0.4	-0.2	1516
Ecuador	7,655	0.1	-0.1	-0.0	3000
Guatemala	4,297	-0.6	-1.0	-0.9	1498
Honduras	3,519	-0.7	-0.9	-1.0	1585
Mexico	12,481	0.7	0.6	0.6	1560
Nicaragua	3,249	-1.4	-1.5	-1.7	1762
Panama	12,639	NA	0.3	0.1	1510
Paraguay	4,626	-0.5	-0.4	-0.2	1160
Peru	8,555	-0.5	-0.4	-0.4	1500
El Salvador	5,978	-0.6	-0.4	-0.7	1729
Uruguay	12,642	1.2	1.0	1.2	1200
Venezuela	10,973	1.1	0.8	1.1	1510

Note: The country means for household wealth and the number of survey respondents include individuals who were not categorized by our revamped Erikson-Goldthorpe class. Because by definition the mean household wealth for all individuals in the region equals exactly 0 for each year, improvements for the region as a whole are not registered. The number of observations is for the 2008 survey for Argentina and Panama; there was no survey in Argentina in 2006, and we found some minor problems in the original data for household wealth for Panama 2006.

Source for per capita GDP in 2010: World Bank, *World Development Indicators*, Purchasing Parity Power, constant 2005 international dollars.

Source for mean household wealth: AmericasBarometer 2006.

As referenced on page 75, Appendix Table OA3.2 shows the statistically significant ($p < .10$, two-tailed) results for the 2006, 2008, and 2010 AmericasBarometer surveys, using only the survey that immediately followed a given presidential election.¹ Although we included all candidates in the regressions, to save space and focus attention on the most important results, we list only the candidates who obtained at least 10% of the valid vote according to survey responses. The “Change in probabilities” column is based on simulations produced from the estimated models. It shows the percentage change in the probability that a very wealthy respondent compared to a very poor respondent (as we shift from the lowest to the highest value for household wealth in a given country) would vote for a given candidate as opposed to the conservative reference candidate. A positive value indicates that wealthier voters were more likely than poor voters to prefer the more progressive candidate after controlling for age, sex, and size of the city of residence. A negative value shows that wealthy individuals were less likely than poor voters to support the more progressive of the two candidates.

¹ Argentina and Venezuela were not part of the 2006 survey. We did not include Panama 2006 because of some minor problems with the variables used to create our household wealth variable or Bolivia 2006 because the question about population size where the respondent lives was not asked.

Table OA3.2: Household Wealth and Presidential Vote

Country and election year	Year of LAPOP survey	Candidate and percentage of vote in survey	Change in voting probabilities from poorest to wealthiest voters	Pseudo R-Square	N
Argentina 2007	2008	Cristina E. Fernández de Kirchner (FPV) (38.5%)	-0.57	0.05	
		Elisa M.A. Carrio (CC) (27.1%)			
		Roberto Lavagna (UNA) (Reference) (18.8%)			
Weighted change			-0.34		719
Bolivia 2005	2008	Evo Morales (MAS) (60.3%)	-0.48	0.06	
		Jorge Quiroga (PODEMOS) (Reference) (21.9%)			
Weighted change			-0.48		1271
Bolivia 2009	2010	Evo Morales (MAS) (69.9%)	-0.36	0.04	
		Manfred Reyes (Plan Progreso para Bolivia) (Reference) (21.1%)			
Weighted change			-0.36		1636
Brazil 2006	2006	Luiz I. Lula da Silva (PT, PCdoB, PRB) (69.5%)	-0.51	0.08	
		Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (Reference) (20.6%)			
			-0.51		850

Chile 2005	2006	Michelle Bachelet (Partidos por la Concertación) (60.7%) Sebastián Piñera (RN) (21.4%) Unión Demócrata Independiente (Reference) (14.5%)		0.02	
			0		883
Chile 2009	2010	Eduardo Frei (Partidos por la Concertación) (33.7%) Marco Enríquez-Ominami (Partido Progresista) (13.1%) Sebastián Piñera (RN-UDI) (Reference) (49.2%)		0.01	
Weighted change			0		866
Colombia 2006	2006	Carlos Gaviria Díaz (Polo Democrático Alternativo) (15.8%) Partido Liberal (Reference) (74.6%)	+0.14	0.04	
Weighted change			+0.14		819
Costa Rica 2006	2006	Otton Solís (PAC) (37.3%) Partido Liberación Nacional (PLN) (Reference) (46.3%)	+0.37	0.04	
			+0.37		984

Dominican Rep. 2004	2006	Hipólito Mejía (PRD) (26.8%) Partido de la Liberación Dominicana (Reference) (64.7%)		0.02	
Weighted change			0		1026
Dominican Rep. 2008	2010	Miguel Vargas Maldonado (PRD) (26.4%)		0.01	
		Leonel Fernández (PLD) (Reference) (69.8%)			
Weighted change			0		1027
Ecuador 2002	2006	Lucio Edwin Gutiérrez (Partido Sociedad Patriótica 21 Enero) (59.9%) Partido Renovador Institucional Acción Nacional (PRIAN) (Reference) (19.8%)		0.03	
			0		2035
Ecuador 2006	2008	Rafael Correa (PAIS) (74.6%)		0.01	
		Alvaro Noboa (PRIAN) (Reference) (12.1%)			
Weighted change			0		2082
Ecuador 2009	2010	Rafael Correa (PAIS) (73.8%) Lucio Edwin Gutiérrez Borbua (PSP) (Reference) (13.4%)		0.01	
Weighted change			0		2070
El Salvador 2004	2006	Schafik Hándal (FMLN) (37.5%) Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (ARENA) (Reference) (54.1%)	+0.24	0.07	
			+0.24		819

El Salvador 2009	2010	Mauricio Funes (FMLN) (69.8%)		0.01	
		Rodrigo Ávila (ARENA) (Reference) (28.9%)			
Weighted change			0		971
Guatemala 2003	2006	Frente Republicano Guatemalteco (11.9%)	-0.07	0.02	
		Unidad Nacional de la Esperanza (UNE) (18.9%) Gran Alianza Nacional (GANA) (Reference) (53.8%)			
Weighted change			-0.04		688
Guatemala 2007	2008	Alvaro Colom (UNE) (59.8%)	-0.29	0.04	
		Otto Pérez (PP) (Reference) (22.1%)			
Weighted change			-0.29		718
Honduras 2005	2006	Manuel Zelaya (PLH) (58.4%)		0.02	
		Partido Nacional (Reference) (38.6%)			
Weighted change			0		1154
Honduras 2009	2010	Elvin Santos (PLH) (27.1%)		0.04	
		Porfirio Lobo Sosa (PN) (Reference) (66.0%)			
Weighted change			0		801
Mexico 2000	2006	Francisco Labastida (PRI) (28.7%)	-0.17	0.02	
		Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas (PRD)	-0.05		

		(10.4%) Alianza por el cambio (PAN/PVEM) (Reference) (60.9%)			
Weighted change			-0.14		900
Mexico 2006	2008	Roberto Madrazo (PRI/PVEM) (25.1%) Andrés Manuel López Obrador (PRD/PT/Converg) (24.1%) Felipe Calderón (PAN) (Reference) (48.5%)	-0.11	0.03	
Weighted change			-0.05		923
Nicaragua 2001	2006	Daniel Ortega (FSLN) (48.5%) Partido Liberal Constitucionalista (PLC) (Reference) (47.9%)		0.01	
			0		927
Nicaragua 2006	2008	Daniel Ortega (FSLN) (44.9%) Eduardo Montealegre (ALN) (25.3%) José Rizo Castellón (PLC) (Reference) (21.3%)	+0.28	0.02	
Weighted change			+0.10		850
Panama 2004	2008	Martín Torrijos (PRD) (59.2%) Guillermo Endara (PS) (19.8%) José Miguel Alemán (PA) (12.3%)	+0.09	0.01	

Weighted change			+0.06		844
Panama 2009	2010	Balbina Herrera (PRD) (28.5%) Ricardo Martinelli (CD) (66.2%)		0.00	
Weighted change			0		1000
Paraguay 2003	2006	Julio Cesar Franco (PLRA) (22.7%) Partido Colorado (Reference) (65.6%)		0.05	133 384
Weighted change			0		585
Paraguay 2008	2010	Fernando Lugo (APC) (69.0%) Blanca Ovelar (ANR/PC) (Reference) (18.6%)	-0.24	0.02	
Weighted change			-0.24		705
Peru 2006	2006	Ollanta Humala (Unión por el Perú (UPP) (35.5%) Alan García (Partido Aprista Peruano) (28.6%) Unidad Nacional (Reference) (22.7%)	-0.38 -0.08	0.04	
Average change			-0.25		1194
Uruguay 2004	2006	Tabaré Vázquez (Frente Amplio- Encuentro) (60.7%) Jorge Larrañaga (Partido Nacional) (27.8%) Partido Colorado		0.06	

		(Reference) (8.0%)			
Average change			0		
Uruguay 2009	2010	José Mujica (Frente Amplio-Encuentro Progresista) (63.7%)		0.03	
		Luis Alberto Lacalle (Partido Nacional) (Reference) (24.4%)			
Average change			0		1104
Venezuela 2006	2008	Hugo Chávez (MVR, PPT, PODEMOS, PCV) (71.7%)	-0.42	0.06	
		Manuel Rosales (Nuevo Tiempo, PJ, COPEI, MAS y otros) (Reference) (27.4%)			
Average change			-0.42		884

Source: AmericasBarometer 2006-2010.

Note: The total N includes all candidates including those not shown in Table A2; therefore, the total N is greater than the sum for the candidates shown in Table A2. The weighted average change includes only candidates shown in Table A2; it excludes minor candidates.

Table OA3.3 synthetically summarizes results for legislative voting in the same manner as Table 3.1 for presidential voting. The data come from the 2006 AmericasBarometer, the most recent year for which it asks about congressional voting. The survey question is “For which party did you vote for deputy in the last elections.” The final column arrays the nine countries from strongest to weakest class voting based on the weighted change in voting probabilities from the poorest to the wealthiest voters. The summary scores for these nine countries are extremely highly correlated ($r = .97$) with their scores in Table 3.1, showing great consistency in the results for presidential and legislative voting. There is again great variance across countries.

Table OA3.3. Predicting Congressional Voting with Household Wealth

Country	number of paired comparisons in which higher household wealth is associated with more conservative vote	number of paired comparisons in which higher household wealth is associated with more leftist vote	number of paired comparisons with no significant associations	weighted change in voting probabilities from poorest to wealthiest voters
Costa Rica	0	1	0	0.31
El Salvador	0	1	0	0.27
Mexico	1	0	1	-0.20
Nicaragua	0	1	0	0.10
Chile	2	0	2	-0.08
Peru	2	0	0	-0.07
Colombia	0	0	2	0.00
Ecuador	0	0	2	0.00
Guatemala	0	0	3	0.00
<i>Total</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>10</i>	

Source: AmericasBarometer 2006 survey.

In three comparisons including the two with the greatest change in probabilities, wealthy voters were more likely than the poor to support the more progressive party (i.e., reverse class voting). Consistent with our finding for the 2004 presidential election, the most

surprising result is that in El Salvador wealthier voters reported that they were more likely than poor voters (+27%) to support the leftist FMLN over the conservative ARENA. Also consistent with the findings for presidential elections, in Costa Rica, wealthier voters were much more likely (+31%) than poor voters to prefer the center-left Citizen Action Party over the centrist National Liberation Party in 2006. Finally, in Nicaragua, wealthier voters were relatively more likely than poor voters (+10%) to choose the leftist FSLN over the conservative PLC. Given the hostile relationship between business groups and the FSLN when it governed from 1979 to 1990, this finding is surprising. Ten paired comparisons of parties were statistically insignificant.

Moving to our second measure of class voting, Table OA3.4 shows the results for the Erikson-Goldthorpe schema for presidential candidates for whom at least 10% of survey respondents voted according to the survey. The six class variables are dummy variables. The reference class category in all comparisons is the petty bourgeoisie, traditionally seen as a class with conservative political preferences. We do not show results for the control variables and show only the statistically significant results ($p < .10$). We do not show results for Costa Rica (2006), the Dominican Republic (2006), Ecuador (2008 and 2010), El Salvador (2006), Honduras (2006), and Panama (2008) because none of the class coefficients was statistically significant.

A negative sign in the class cells indicates that a given class was disproportionately favorable to the more conservative (i.e., the reference) candidate. A positive sign means that the class voted disproportionately for the less conservative candidate. The number shows the change in the likelihood that a given class would vote for one candidate over another, relative to voting among the petty bourgeoisie. For example, in Argentina, controlling for age, sex, and residence size, unskilled workers were 27% more likely than the petty bourgeoisie to vote for Cristina Fernández de Kirchner rather than Roberto Lavagna, among unskilled workers and

petty bourgeois who voted for one of these two candidates.

On page 86 the text references a Table OA 3.5; that is a typographical error and the data are compiled based on the results in Table OA 3.4. We apologize for the mistake.

Table OA3.4. Predicting Presidential Vote with the Erikson-Goldthorpe Class Schema

Country and year of survey	Presidential candidate and percentage of vote in LAPOP survey	Service Class	Routine non-manual	Skilled Workers	Unskilled Workers	Poor self-employed	Pseudo R-Square	N
Argentina 2008	Cristina E. Fernández de Kirchner (FPV) (36.2%)				+ 0.27		0.04	200
	Elisa M.A. Carrió (CC) (25.5%)							146
	Roberto Lavagna (UNA) (Reference) (18.8%)							99
Bolivia 2008	Evo Morales (MAS) (54%)	-0.32				+0.14	0.05	560
	Poder Democrático Social (PODEMOS) (Reference) (19.6%)							200
Bolivia 2010	Evo Morales (MAS) 69.9%	-0.25				+0.16	0.06	
	Manfred Reyes (Reference) 21.1%							
Brazil 2008	Luiz I. Lula da Silva (PT, PCdoB, PRB) (73.5%)		+0.10		+0.12	+0.17	0.06	378
	Geraldo Alckmin (Partido da Socialdemocracia Brasileira) (Reference) (18.4%)							105
Chile 2006	Michelle Bachelet (Partidos por la Concertación) (58%)						0.05	536
	Sebastián Piñera (RN)			-0.22				189

	(20.4%)							
	Unión Demócrata Independiente (Reference) (13.8%)							128
Colombia 2006	Carlos Gaviria Díaz (Polo Democrático Alternativo) (15.2%)	+0.18			-0.09		0.06	129
	Alvaro Uribe (Reference) (72.2%)							611
Dominican Rep. 2010	Miguel Vargas Maldonado (PRD) (26.3%)	+0.15	+0.13				0.03	133
	Leonel Fernández (PLD) (Reference) (69.4%)							343
Guatemala 2006	Efraín Ríos Montt (Frente Revolucionario Guatemalteco) (11.5%)						0.04	54
	Alvaro Colom (Unidad Nacional de la Esperanza -UNE) (18.2%)			+0.32	+0.14	+0.16		81
	Leonel López (Partido de Avanzada Nacional) (9%)							36
	Oscar Berger (Gran Alianza Nacional -GANA) (Reference) (51.8%)							237
Guatemala 2008	Alvaro Colom (UNE) (58.5%)		+0.23		+0.21	+0.21	0.06	282
	Otto Pérez (PP) (Reference) (21.6%)							116
Mexico 2006	Francisco Labastida (PRI) (28.5%)						0.02	258

	Cuahtémoc Cárdenas (PRD) (10.4%)				+	+		94
	Alianza por el cambio (PAN/PVEM) (Reference) (60.5%)				0.03	0.04		548
Mexico 2008	Roberto Madrazo (PRI/PVEM) (24.9%)				+0.17		0.03	114
	Andrés Manuel López Obrador (PRD/PT/Converg) (23.8%)							112
	Felipe Calderón (PAN) (Reference) (48.1%)							87
Nicaragua 2006	Daniel Ortega (FSLN) (47.7%)	+0.24	+0.17		+0.17		0.04	444
	Enrique Bolaños (Partido Liberal Constitucionalista-PLC) (Reference) (47.1%)							450
Nicaragua 2008	Daniel Ortega (FSLN) (44.1%)		+0.21		+0.15		0.04	183
	Eduardo Montealegre (ALN) (24.9%)				+0.01			93
	José Rizo Castellón (PLC) (Reference) (20.9%)							87
Paraguay 2006	Julio Cesar Franco (PLRA) (21.1%)	-0.21					0.08	133
	Nicanor Duarte (Partido Colorado) (Reference) (60.9%)							384
Peru 2006	Ollanta Humala (Unión por el Perú- UPP) (32.6%)	-0.13			+0.03	+0.16	0.06	431

	Alan García (Partido Aprista Peruano) (26.4%)				+0.09	+0.12		348
	Lourdes Flores (Unidad Nacional) (Reference) (20.9%)							276
Uruguay 2006	Tabaré Vázquez (Frente Amplio- Encuentro) (58.7%)		+0.13				0.07	564
	Jorge Larrañaga (Partido Nacional) (26.8%)		+0.06					258
	Guillermo Stirling (Partido Colorado) (Reference) (7.7%)							74
Venezuela 2008	Hugo Chávez (MVR, PPT, PODEMOS, PCV) (70.9%)	-0.37			+0.14		0.06	287
	Manuel Rosales (Nuevo Tiempo) (Reference) (27.1%)							121

Note: Totals in Column 2 do not equal 100% because of minor candidates not shown in the table.

APPENDIX MATERIAL FOR CHAPTER 4:
RELIGION AND THE LATIN AMERICAN VOTER

By Taylor Boas and Amy Erica Smith

Table AO4.1 contains the full results for the models summarized in figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4.

Table AO4.1: Religious Denomination and Left-Right Vote in Different Party Systems

	Coefficient	Standard error	p	Coefficient	Standard error	p
Protestant	-0.064	0.158	0.685	-0.063	0.190	0.742
Pentecostal	-0.459	0.258	0.075	-0.450	0.341	0.187
No Religion	0.450	0.218	0.038	-0.647	0.481	0.179
Frequency of Church Attendance	0.028	0.180	0.877	-0.263	0.136	0.054
<u>Level 2</u>						
Programmatic Index	-6.973	8.562	0.415			
Party Polarization				-1.716	0.645	0.008
<u>Cross-Level</u>						
Protestant * Programmatic Index	0.309	1.350	0.819			
Pentecostal * Programmatic Index	2.191	2.187	0.316			
No Religion * Programmatic Index	-6.449	2.153	0.003			
Church Attendance * Programmatic Index	0.977	1.381	0.479			
Protestant * Polarization				0.031	0.188	0.869
Pentecostal * Polarization				0.232	0.311	0.456
No Religion * Polarization				-0.023	0.216	0.917
Church Attendance * Polarization				0.341	0.119	0.004
Non-Christian	-0.488	0.327	0.135	-0.457	0.309	0.139
Latter-Day Saints/Jehovah's Witness	-0.095	0.290	0.744	-0.072	0.278	0.794
Female	0.194	0.130	0.136	0.195	0.130	0.135
Education	-0.339	0.306	0.268	-0.343	0.306	0.262
Household Wealth	0.273	0.131	0.036	0.266	0.131	0.043
Age	0.032	0.160	0.840	0.037	0.161	0.820
Size of Place of Residence	-0.122	0.220	0.578	-0.128	0.221	0.562
Indigenous	-0.722	0.258	0.005	-0.713	0.256	0.005
Black	0.054	0.111	0.624	0.056	0.109	0.606
Year 2010	0.392	0.618	0.525	0.549	0.650	0.398
Year 2012	0.721	0.735	0.326	0.891	0.775	0.250
Constant	12.045	1.861	0.000	13.015	1.529	0.000
	-			-		
Log pseudolikelihood	76030.679			76041.559		
Number of observations	48511			48511		
Number of countries	18			18		
Number of years	53			53		

APPENDIX MATERIAL FOR CHAPTER 5: ETHNICITY AND ELECTORAL PREFERENCES IN LATIN AMERICA

By Daniel E. Moreno Morales

Table 5.1 summarizes the results for the ethnicity variables from a series of models of left-right vote choice. This appendix contains the full results of those models, presented in graphical form.

Figure OA5.1 Pooled data set




Figure OA5.2 Argentina




Figure OA5.3 Brazil




Figure OA5.4 Bolivia




Figure OA5.5 Chile




Figure OA5.6 Colombia




Figure OA5.7 Costa Rica




Figure OA5.8 Dominican Republic




Figure OA5.9 Ecuador




Figure OA5.10 El Salvador




Figure OA5.11 Guatemala




Figure OA5.12 Honduras




Figure OA5.13 Mexico




Figure OA5.14 Nicaragua




Figure OA5.15 Panama




Figure OA5.16 Paraguay




Figure OA5.17 Peru




Figure OA5.18 Uruguay





Figure OA5.19 Venezuela



APPENDIX MATERIAL FOR CHAPTER 6: GENDER AND THE LATIN AMERICA

By Jana Morgan

Table OA6.1 contains the full results of the models summarized in Figure 6.3 (page 150).

Table OA6.1: Childhood and Adult Socialization and the Gender Gap in Vote Choice

	(1)	(2)
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL VARIABLES		
Female	−0.50** (.0.20)	0.39 (0.29)
Age	−0.27 (0.24)	−0.25 (0.27)
Church attendance	−0.40*** (0.13)	−0.31** (0.14)
Well-being	−0.35*** (0.13)	−0.50*** (0.14)
Less education	−0.42** (0.21)	0.02 (0.22)
Darker skin color	0.85*** (0.27)	1.03*** (0.28)
Mother's education	−0.97*** (0.28)	
Mother's education*Sex	0.31 (0.38)	
Parent		0.42** (0.17)
Parent*Sex		−0.78*** (0.24)
Married		0.01 (0.11)
Not working		−0.17 (0.11)
Household inequality		0.30 (0.29)
Pro-social policy		0.53** (0.24)
Pro-female employment		0.25* (0.13)
Pro-female politicians		0.09 (0.11)
Pro-abortion rights		−0.00 (0.09)
COUNTRY-LEVEL VARIABLES		
Gender Inequality Index	−16.23 (16.76)	−15.68 (16.53)
Secularism	4.97 (8.75)	4.73 (8.64)
Constant	−3.52 (8.11)	−5.47 (8.01)
VARIANCE COMPONENTS		
Sex, random effect	0.43 (0.18)	0.44 (0.20)
Country-level	12.06 (4.05)	11.74 (3.94)
Individual-level	15.07 (0.22)	13.16 (0.23)
Individual-N	8735	6538
Country-N	18	18

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Significance levels for variance components not shown.

Models calculated in Stata 11 using xtmixed, MLE option and unstructured covariance matrix.

Individual-level N is smaller in these models than in some reported in the text because some questions were only asked of half the sample.

**APPENDIX MATERIAL FOR CHAPTER 7:
POSITIONAL ISSUE VOTING IN LATIN AMERICA**

By Andy Baker and Kenneth F. Greene

As discussed in the text, the authors performed factor analyses for each country in the 1998 Latinobarometer and 2012 AmericasBarometer surveys. The syntax and results of these factor analyses are available in the replication files in the folder “Replication_files_Chapter_7” in the document “FACTOR ANALYSES Chapter 7.txt”.

APPENDIX MATERIAL FOR CHAPTER 8: LEFT-RIGHT IDENTIFICATIONS AND THE LATIN AMERICAN VOTER

By Elizabeth J. Zechmeister

Figure 8.1 summarizes the correlates of respondents' left-right position. Table OA8.1 summarizes the full results of the model.

Table OA8.1. Predictors of Left-Right Response in Latin America (see Chapter Figure 8.1)

	Coef.	Std. Err
Constant	-1.009*	(0.148)
Female	0.299*	(0.033)
Age	-0.027	(0.061)
Rural	0.196*	(0.055)
Wealth	-0.294*	(0.059)
Education	-0.951*	(0.096)
Political Interest	-0.935*	(0.062)
Efficacy	-0.606*	(0.062)
Guatemala	0.073	(0.168)
El Salvador	-0.408*	(0.162)
Honduras	0.498*	(0.159)
Nicaragua	-0.216	(0.158)
Costa Rica	1.271*	(0.154)
Panama	-0.491*	(0.191)
Colombia	0.522*	(0.174)
Ecuador	0.686*	(0.176)
Bolivia	0.685*	(0.160)
Peru	0.143	(0.167)
Paraguay	1.169*	(0.150)
Chile	0.832*	(0.176)
Uruguay	-0.264	(0.177)
Brazil	0.214	(0.170)
Venezuela	0.082	(0.178)
Argentina	0.712*	(0.178)
Dom. Republic	-0.060	(0.158)
Number of Obs	27632	
Prob > F	0.00	

Note: * $p < 0.05$, two-tailed. Logistic regression, accounting for survey design. Based on AmericasBarometer 2012 dataset (18 Latin American countries); Mexico is the baseline category for the country fixed effects. All independent variables are scaled 0 to 1. Replication code is available in the corresponding replication file for this chapter of the Latin American Voter.

APPENDIX MATERIAL FOR CHAPTER 9: PARTISANSHIP IN LATIN AMERICA

By Noam Lupu

Figure 9.2 illustrates the correlates of respondents' partisanship in Latin America. The full results of the model are in Table OA 9.1.

Table OA9.1. Multilevel probit models of mass partisanship in Latin America

Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)
Party polarization			0.049** (0.008)
Party age (logged)			0.251** (0.023)
Ethnic fractionalization			0.275** (0.121)
ENP			-0.048** (0.009)
Political information		0.114** (0.10)	0.114** (0.12)
Civic association		0.111** (0.008)	0.115** (0.009)
Media attention		0.099** (0.011)	0.101** (0.012)
Proximity	0.148** (0.017)	0.144** (0.017)	0.152** (0.017)
Extremism	0.248** (0.017)	0.243** (0.017)	0.246** (0.017)
Ideology (right)	-0.025** (0.007)	-0.023** (0.007)	-0.023** (0.007)
Democratic experience	0.004** (0.001)	0.005** (0.001)	0.005** (0.001)
Wealth	0.017** (0.005)	0.005 (0.006)	0.007 (0.006)
Education	0.108** (0.012)	0.052** (0.012)	0.050** (0.012)
Urban	-0.037 (0.020)	-0.039* (0.020)	-0.030* (0.021)
Age	0.010** (0.001)	0.009** (0.001)	0.009** (0.001)
White	-0.005 (0.016)	-0.001 (0.017)	-0.024 (0.017)
Female	-0.188** (0.011)	-0.103** (0.011)	-0.109** (0.011)
Constant	-2.094** (0.100)	-2.431** (0.151)	-3.504** (0.182)
Random effect	0.082** (0.005)	0.065** (0.004)	0.037** (0.003)
Observations	87,098	85,171	79,968
Surveys	66	66	62
ePCP	0.35	0.35	0.35
AIC	93340.59	90258.35	84427.32
BIC	93453.63	90398.63	84603.82

Notes: ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, two tailed. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Source: Americas Barometer, 2002-12

Figure 9.2 looks at the causal effect of partisanship on vote choice in Brazil. The full cross-lagged model is in Table OA9.2.

Table OA9.2. Cross-lagged structural equations models of partisanship and vote choice


Variable	(5) PT	(6) PSDB
Vote choice		
Prior partisanship	0.158** (0.015)	0.082** (0.013)
Prior vote choice	0.393** (0.016)	0.442** (0.016)
Household income	-0.049** (0.013)	0.031** (0.014)
Education	-0.030** (0.013)	-0.001 (0.012)
White	-0.051** (0.13)	0.041** (0.011)
Female	-0.028** (0.012)	0.008 (0.011)
Juiz de Fora	0.053** (0.013)	-0.117** (0.013)
Constant	0.529** (0.039)	0.405** (0.037)
Partisanship		
Prior partisanship	0.419** (0.018)	0.373** (0.032)
Prior vote choice	0.151** (0.014)	0.095** (0.015)
Household income	-0.035** (0.012)	0.025 (0.019)
Education	0.034** (0.012)	0.029** (0.014)
White	-0.008 (0.013)	-0.027** (0.013)
Female	-0.001 (0.012)	-0.043** (0.012)
Juiz de Fora	-0.017 (0.013)	0.069** (0.014)
Constant	0.117** (0.040)	0.017 (0.037)
Observations	5,234	5,231
Respondents	2,513	2,512
Log-likelihood	-78702.82	-69569.71

Notes: ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, two tailed. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by respondent.

Source: Brazil Two-City Panel Study, 2002-6

As discussed on page 237, Figure OA9.1 shows how partisanship structures political participation in Latin America.

Figure OA9.1. Mass partisanship and political participation in Latin America



Notes: Mass partisanship and political participation in Latin America. Values represent changes in the predicted probability that a respondent engages in each type of political participation, based on shifting each variable from its sample 25th to 75th percentile, with all other continuous variables held at their sample means and ordered variables held at their sample medians. Solid lines show the simulated 95 percent confidence interval. Black dots represent values that are significant at 95 percent confidence, white dots those that fall short of that threshold. These predicted values are based on the estimates from multilevel probit models available from author.

Source: AmericasBarometer, 2006-12.


APPENDIX MATERIAL FOR CHAPTER 10:
CLIENTELISM IN LATIN AMERICA: EFFORT AND EFFECTIVENESS

By Herbert Kitschelt and Melina Altamirano

1. Determinants of clientelistic targeting at the individual level

To explore the determinants of clientelistic targeting at the individual level as discussed on page 258, we estimate a logit model drawing upon the 2010 AmericasBarometer survey. The dependent variable is the vote-buying item in the survey, asking respondents whether they have been offered material goods in return for their vote. The model includes country fixed effects and observations are weighted. The reported independent variables intend to capture the targeting criteria discussed above. Figure 10A.1 below displays the mean and 95% confidence interval of the parameter estimates in the model.

Figure OA10.1: Correlates of Being Offered Something in Exchange for your Vote, 2010 AmericasBarometer.



Results are generally consistent with the arguments in the literature and the patterns emerging from the DALP data on party strategies. Respondents' household wealth has a negative and significant effect on the likelihood of being targeted with clientelistic offers. In contrast, individuals living in rural communities are more likely to be offered material benefits in exchange of their vote. Interestingly, those respondents who participate more actively in partisan organizations are more likely to report experiences related to vote-

buying attempts.² This finding resonates with arguments emphasizing political networks as mechanisms determining preferential access to certain goods, thus conditioning voters' expectations. Women and older people tend to report less experience with clientelistic practices, while education does not seem to have a significant effect on targeting. Individuals self-identifying as indigenous are no more likely to report vote-buying attempts in our model. But this effect might vary by country depending on the political salience of ethnic cleavages.

2. Robustness checks: Experts' judgment and ideological closeness

Table OA10.1 presents several robustness checks to the models in Table 10.1. The specific robustness tests are discussed on page 262 and include the introduction of controls for the level of confidence of experts in their own judgment of the parties and their level of ideological closeness to a given party.

Table OA10.1: HLM Model, Clientelistic Electoral Effectiveness

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
(Intercept)	2.12*** (0.32)	2.40*** (0.36)	2.41*** (0.36)	2.39*** (0.37)
Clientelistic party effort (b15)	0.10*** (0.01)	0.11*** (0.01)	0.11*** (0.01)	0.11*** (0.01)
Electoral support (p11)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)
Executive incumbency (p5_1)	0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)
Local party community (a2)	-0.16* (0.07)	-0.15* (0.07)	-0.15* (0.07)	-0.15* (0.07)
Ties to business groups (a8_2p)	0.04* (0.05)	0.04 (0.05)	0.04 (0.05)	0.04 (0.05)
Ties to religious groups (a8_3p)	0.12* (0.05)	0.12* (0.05)	0.12* (0.05)	0.12* (0.05)
Ties to ethnic groups (a8_4p)	0.21*** (0.06)	0.21*** (0.06)	0.21*** (0.06)	0.21*** (0.06)
Effectiveness of monitoring (c1)	-0.28*** (0.06)	-0.26*** (0.06)	-0.26*** (0.06)	-0.27*** (0.06)
Attracting loyalists only (b12_loy)	-0.04 (0.10)	-0.03 (0.10)	-0.03 (0.10)	-0.03 (0.10)
Attracting strategists only (b12_str)	-0.27 (0.14)	-0.28* (0.14)	-0.28* (0.14)	-0.27* (0.14)
Programmatic effort (cosalpo_4nwe)	-0.21 (0.25)	-0.43 (0.27)	-0.43 (0.27)	-0.45 (0.28)
Democratic experience	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

² The exact wording of this question is: I am going to read a list of groups and organizations. Please tell me if you attend their meetings at least once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never: Meetings of a political party or political organization? The scale was inverted so that higher values reflect more participation.

(demstock)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Absolute change in programmatic effort (absb7)	-0.13 (0.08)	-0.13 (0.07)	-0.12 (0.08)	-0.12 (0.08)
Authoritarian legacy parties (alpn)	-0.28 (0.21)	-0.28 (0.21)	-0.28 (0.21)	-0.29 (0.21)
Populist partisan rupture (pop1)	-0.60*** (0.11)	-0.56*** (0.11)	-0.56*** (0.12)	-0.55*** (0.12)
Political competitiveness (p63)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Confidence (experts)	0.04 (0.07)	0.03 (0.07)	0.03 (0.07)	0.03 (0.07)
Ideological Closeness (experts)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)
Average national clientelistic effort (b15nat)		-0.03 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)
Variance in national clientelistic effort (b15sd)			-0.01 (0.02)	0.03 (0.11)
b15nat*b15sd				0.00 (0.01)

*Significant at .05. **Significant at .01. ***Significant at .001

3. Mechanisms for party-level controls

As discussed on page 262, we include several party-level variables that are not the central interest of this chapter but which help explain variation across parties. Space constraints did not permit the full discussion of those mechanisms in the paper, so we outline their logic here.

1. One possibility is the construction of a *vast formal party organization* with offices and agents in every village and neighborhood that are embedded in the local setting and can monitor locals through informal and unobtrusive means.
2. Politicians may also rely on more *informal networks of local notables situated at the intersection of community communications networks* (e.g. teachers or pastors, barbers or general store owners, pawn shopkeepers and local bankers...). These notables are not necessarily card-carrying party members, but may socially feed into the entourage of elected politicians, communicate demands from the electoral constituency, and in return may assist politicians to mobilize support.
3. Politicians may also draw on *key operatives in an infrastructure of civic self-organizations*, configured around associations of business, labor, religion and churches, ethnic, women and neighborhood groups. If they have close contact to representatives of such networks, and are receptive to their concerns, politicians may “delegate” the task of mobilizing support and compliance with clientelistic exchange without having to build their own organizations.

4. Regardless of which organizational capabilities politicians rely on, they have *to put these capabilities to goal-oriented use*. It takes political will and skill, not just resources, as the proximate effective cause to hold the opportunism of clients at bay. We may therefore want to check the *direct effect of client monitoring*, in addition to, or in interaction with associational capabilities to restrict voter opportunism. Nevertheless, it should be clear that even the most skilled politicians cannot possibly mobilize the resources to stop the bucket of clientelism from leaking entirely.
5. Next, whether or not clientelistic inducements are effective or not may *depend on properties of the target voters*. Voters may be more or less receptive to clientelistic inducements, and they may feel closer or more distant from the party. Voters close to a party (“loyalists”) may choose between turning out for “their” party or staying home otherwise. So clientelism may be aimed primarily and in the short run at turnout buying (Nichter 2008). But voters may also be indifferent between several parties on other grounds than clientelistic inducements, more likely because they have no policy preferences and/or cannot discern between parties’ policy appeals (or discount their credibility), and more rarely because voters’ ideology places them between parties (“strategists”).³
6. Following up on this previous point, the final possibility is that if parties also adopt *programmatic policy appeals* with large-scale club and collective goods positions, their remaining efforts to provide clientelistic benefits may become electorally less effective. They may still serve some elements of their electoral support coalitions through clientelistic means, but the significance of this effort in the “linkage mix” of parties is modest. Hence politicians may tolerate some comparatively ineffective mechanisms to reach out to citizens. We conceive the dampening effect of programmatic effort on clientelistic effectiveness more as a control than as an intrinsically and theoretically interesting insight.

³ Is it more efficient to pay off “strategists” or “loyalists” with clientelistic benefits? The literature has taken rival views on this question (with the classics being Cox and McCubbins 1986; Dixit and Londregan 1996, although in both instances the alternatives do not quite capture the precise meaning of clientelism, as employed here). Of course, whether parties better pay off one or the other target group may be itself contingent upon partisan capabilities of coordination and communication, not just persuasion of voters (Cox 2009). And under some conditions it may be best for parties to differentiate their efforts across a range of political channels (Magaloni et al, 2007).

APPENDIX MATERIAL FOR CHAPTER 12:
THE VARYING TOLL OF CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS ON PRO-
INCUMBENT VOTE CHOICE IN LATIN AMERICA

By Luigi Manzetti and Guillermo Rosas

The full specification of the multilevel logit model in Table 12.2 is captured in the following statements:

$$\log \frac{\pi_i}{1 - \pi_i} = a_{j[i]} + b^0 X_i^0 + b_{j[i]}^1 X_i^1 + q_{j[i]} \text{Corruption Perception}_i$$

$$b_j^1 \sim N(0, S_{b_j}^2)$$

$$a_j \sim N(Z_j g_a, S_a^2)$$

$$q_j \sim N(Z_j g_q, S_q^2)$$


In these statements, π_i is the probability that citizen i will vote for the incumbent. We divide individual-level predictors in two sets. In the first set, we include predictors X^0 for which we estimate pooled effects that are not allowed to vary across surveys β^0 . The second set includes predictors X^1 for which we estimate random slope coefficients β_j^1 . These include the *pro-* and *anti-incumbent* behavior of voters in the previous election, as well as *income* and *bureaucratic bribery*. The distribution of these random coefficients is assumed normal, with variance parameters estimated from the data. Finally, we include modeled random coefficients α_j and θ_j for the intercept and the effects of *corruption perceptions*. The model for these parameters includes a number of predictors observed at the survey level (Z), as can be seen in the last two statements above. Among these predictors, we incorporate survey-level averages of all the individual-level variables in order to prevent heterogeneity bias (Mundlak 1978, Bartels 2008, Bafumi and Gelman 2010, Bell and Jones 2012). More importantly, we consider at the survey-level the potential effect of several contextual variables. We include these contextual variables one at a time in alternative specifications. The models are estimated via restricted maximum likelihood using the lmer package in R.



The tables that follow include data on the number of observations in the ordered logit models of what leads people to say their government is corrupt, the country-specific results about what factors are correlated with assessments of government corruption (Figure OA12.1) and personal corruption victimization (Figure OA12.2) as discussed on pages 303-305 and 305-306, and the results of the multi-level models summarized in Table 12.2 (Table OA12.2 and OA12.3).


Table OA12.1: Descriptive Statistics for Each Country-Year in the Models in Chapter 12

Survey	N	Full	Survey	N	Full	Survey	N	Full
Argentina 2008	1486	777	Dom. Rep. 2006	2518	0	Nicaragua 2004	1430	0
Argentina 2010	1410	866	Dom. Rep. 2008	1507	1024	Nicaragua 2006	1762	0
Argentina 2012	1512	827	Dom. Rep. 2010	1500	1141	Nicaragua 2008	1540	1194
Bolivia 2004	3073	0	Dom. Rep. 2012	1512	1132	Nicaragua 2010	1540	1231
Bolivia 2006	3008	0	Ecuador 2004	3000	0	Nicaragua 2012	1686	1347
Bolivia 2008	3003	1424	Ecuador 2006	2925	0	Panama 2004	1639	0
Bolivia 2010	3018	1905	Ecuador 2008	3000	2175	Panama 2006	1536	0
Bolivia 2012	3029	1967	Ecuador 2010	3000	2366	Panama 2008	1536	1195
Brazil 2006	1214	0	Ecuador 2012	1500	1173	Panama 2010	1536	1160
Brazil 2008	1497	1048	El Salvador 2004	1589	0	Panama 2012	1620	1052
Brazil 2010	2482	1856	El Salvador 2006	1729	0	Paraguay 2008	1166	852
Brazil 2012	1500	1158	El Salvador 2008	1549	1124	Paraguay 2010	1502	946
Chile 2006	1517	0	El Salvador 2010	1550	1290	Paraguay 2012	1510	1031
Chile 2008	1527	1044	El Salvador 2012	1497	1031	Peru 2006	1500	0
Chile 2010	1965	0	Guatemala 2004	1708	0	Peru 2008	1500	883
Chile 2012	1571	1042	Guatemala 2006	1498	0	Peru 2010	1500	1161
Colombia 2004	1479	0	Guatemala 2008	1538	862	Peru 2012	1500	1047
Colombia 2005	1487	0	Guatemala 2010	1504	1133	Uruguay 2006	1200	0
Colombia 2006	1491	0	Guatemala 2012	1509	1027	Uruguay 2008	1500	1092
Colombia 2007	1491	0	Honduras 2004	1500	0	Uruguay 2010	1500	1220
Colombia 2008	1503	1060	Honduras 2006	1585	0	Uruguay 2012	1512	1139
Colombia 2009	1493	1190	Honduras 2008	1522	974	Venezuela 2006	1510	0
Colombia 2010	1506	0	Honduras 2010	1596	1253	Venezuela 2008	1500	658
Colombia 2012	1512	1041	Honduras 2012	1728	1171	Venezuela 2010	1500	899
Costa Rica 2004	1500	0	Mexico 2004	1556	0	Venezuela 2012	1500	702
Costa Rica 2006	1500	0	Mexico 2006	1560	0			
Costa Rica 2008	1500	1100	Mexico 2008	1560	961			
Costa Rica 2010	1500	1015	Mexico 2010	1562	1084			
Costa Rica 2012	1498	910	Mexico 2012	1560	960			


Figure OA12.1: Unpooled Estimated Effects on Corruption Perceptions (continues over the next 4 pages)







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








Figure OA12.2: Unpooled Estimated Effects on Bureaucratic Bribery (Continues for the Next 4 Pages)










Table OA12.2. Survey-level predictors of individual-level random intercepts (estimate and standard error in parenthesis; significant coefficients in bold)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Main predictor is...	Growth	Growth (L1)	Inflation	Unemploy- ment	Govt Fractional	Checks	Capital openness	Trade openness
Coefficient main predictor	0.047 (0.02)	0.011 (0.02)	-1.069 (1.17)	0.12 (0.04)	0.453 (0.42)	-0.054 (0.10)	0.205 (0.09)	0.099 (0.09)
Intercept	-1.246 (0.10)	-1.314 (0.07)	-1.311 (0.07)	-1.346 (0.08)	-1.277 (0.09)	-1.276 (0.09)	-1.267 (0.09)	-1.273 (0.08)
Avg corruption perception	-1.145 (0.52)	0.041 (0.48)	0.214 (0.48)	-0.443 (0.65)	0.018 (0.64)	0.567 (0.66)	0.58 (0.59)	0.051 (0.63)
Avg education	-0.312 (0.07)	-0.259 (0.07)	-0.261 (0.07)	-0.17 (0.09)	-0.218 (0.08)	-0.231 (0.08)	-0.283 (0.08)	-0.227 (0.08)
Avg age	0.061 (0.04)	-0.044 (0.03)	-0.045 (0.03)	0.061 (0.05)	0.043 (0.05)	0.034 (0.05)	0.009 (0.05)	0.013 (0.05)
Avg income	-0.106 (0.09)	0.051 (0.07)	0.05 (0.07)	0.026 (0.11)	0.056 (0.11)	0.02 (0.11)	0.079 (0.11)	0.091 (0.12)
Prop female	-0.48 (5.03)	-1.957 (3.60)	-1.676 (3.61)	-4.722 (5.63)	-0.552 (6.37)	-2.385 (7.08)	-3.039 (5.94)	-3.663 (6.29)
Prop urban	-0.758 (0.74)	-2.368 (0.66)	-2.511 (0.69)	-0.606 (0.92)	-1.158 (0.82)	-1.846 (0.93)	-2.57 (0.92)	-1.322 (0.80)
Avg bribe victimization	10.185 (2.41)	3.216 (2.43)	3.035 (2.37)	5.388 (2.91)	5.559 (2.96)	4.538 (2.92)	5.512 (2.73)	2.546 (3.09)
Avg incumbent support	0.753 (0.82)	2.607 (0.74)	2.531 (0.74)	0.682 (0.98)	1.294 (1.03)	1.59 (0.98)	1.446 (0.91)	1.732 (0.94)
Avg vote against incumbent	-8.089 (1.18)	-1.239 (0.94)	-1.386 (0.94)	-3.175 (1.17)	-3.546 (1.41)	-4.613 (1.32)	-6.031 (1.41)	-3.753 (1.29)
	0.047	0.011	-1.069	0.12	0.453	-0.054	0.205	0.099

Table OA12.3. Coefficient estimates for individual-level covariates (estimate and standard error in parenthesis)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Main predictor is...	Growth	Growth (L1)	Inflation	Unemplo y-ment	Govt Fractional	Checks	Capital openness	Trade openness
Previous vote for the winner	2.035 (0.10)	1.998 (0.08)	2.000 (0.08)	2.050 (0.10)	2.052 (0.10)	2.032 (0.10)	2.050 (0.10)	2.053 (0.10)
Previous vote against winner	-0.982 (0.11)	-0.875 (0.08)	-0.872 (0.08)	-0.980 (0.11)	-0.975 (0.10)	-0.909 (0.10)	-0.982 (0.10)	-0.977 (0.10)
Income	0.015 (0.01)	0.012 (0.01)	0.012 (0.01)	-0.007 (0.00)	-0.011 (0.00)	-0.011 (0.00)	-0.011 (0.00)	-0.011 (0.00)
Education	-0.011 (0.00)	-0.011 (0.00)	-0.011 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)	-0.002 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)
Age	-0.002 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.021 (0.01)	0.019 (0.01)	0.015 (0.01)	0.019 (0.01)	0.019 (0.01)
Female	-0.008 (0.03)	-0.036 (0.02)	-0.036 (0.02)	-0.017 (0.03)	-0.009 (0.03)	-0.002 (0.03)	-0.008 (0.03)	-0.008 (0.03)
Urban environment	0.191 (0.03)	0.156 (0.02)	0.156 (0.02)	0.157 (0.03)	0.191 (0.03)	0.189 (0.03)	0.191 (0.03)	0.191 (0.03)
Bribe victim	-0.137 (0.07)	-0.135 (0.05)	-0.138 (0.05)	-0.129 (0.07)	-0.135 (0.06)	-0.108 (0.06)	-0.132 (0.07)	-0.133 (0.06)
N (surveys)	33	53	53	32	35	33	35	35
N (available respondents)	39520	60920	60920	36540	41163	39606	41163	41163
$\sigma_{\text{bribe victim}}$	0.24	0.13	0.14	0.21	0.20	0.19	0.21	0.20
σ_{income}	0.07	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07
$\sigma_{\text{against-winner}}$	0.55	0.54	0.54	0.57	0.54	0.50	0.54	0.54
$\sigma_{\text{pro-winner}}$	0.53	0.54	0.54	0.55	0.54	0.55	0.54	0.54
σ_{α}	0.08	0.10	0.10	0.07	0.06	0.08	0.08	0.07
σ_{θ}	0.08	0.10	0.10	0.07	0.06	0.08	0.08	0.07

APPENDIX MATERIAL FOR CONCLUSION

By Ryan E. Carlin, Matthew M. Singer, and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister

The appendix to chapter 14 contains three pooled models of vote choice across the hemisphere, each summarized graphically as a figure. Tables OA14.1, OA14.2, OA14.3, OA14.4, and OA14.5 present the full results of those models along with the country-specific fixed effects.

Table OA14.1: Model of Left-Right Vote Choice as a Function of Demographics, 2012 AmericasBarometer [Relates to Figure A14.1 in Conclusion Appendix in Printed Volume]

	β	(SE)
Wealth	1.119***	(0.176)
Church Attendance	0.239*	(0.107)
Mainline Protestant	-0.101	(0.140)
Evangelical Protestant	-0.163°	(0.095)
Mormon/Jehovah Witness	0.358	(0.333)
Non-Christian	-1.059**	(0.370)
No Religion	-0.605***	(0.117)
Female	0.286***	(0.062)
White	0.209**	(0.080)
Indigenous	-0.548***	(0.141)
Black	0.008	(0.156)
Mulatto	-0.040	(0.162)
Other Race	0.353	(0.273)
Education	-0.202	(0.144)
Size of Place of Residence	-0.150	(0.091)
Age 26-35	-0.099	(0.102)
Age 36-45	-0.170	(0.106)
Age 46-55	-0.178	(0.111)
Age 56-65	-0.176	(0.125)
Age 66+	0.013	(0.137)
Argentina	-5.659***	(0.189)
Bolivia	-7.818***	(0.176)
Brazil	-4.643***	(0.196)
Chile	-2.290***	(0.200)
Colombia	2.816***	(0.200)
Costa Rica	-1.813***	(0.192)
Dominican Republic	-2.639***	(0.184)
Ecuador	-7.531***	(0.181)
El Salvador	-5.793***	(0.202)
Guatemala	3.376***	(0.228)
Honduras	2.660***	(0.202)
Nicaragua	-5.687***	(0.194)

Panama	1.929***	(0.192)
Paraguay	-0.347°	(0.196)
Peru	-3.327***	(0.179)
Uruguay	-5.310***	(0.192)
Venezuela	-4.768***	(0.192)
Constant	13.021***	(0.207)
Number of Observations	15053	
F(37, 15015)	343.05	
R ²	0.458	
Root MSE	3.732	
OLS Regression, Standard Errors Adjusted for Survey Design Effects ° p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001		

Table OA14.2: Model of Left-Right Vote Choice as a Function of Issue Preferences and Demographics without Left-Right Self Placement, 2012 AmericasBarometer [Relates to Figure A14.2 in Conclusion Appendix in Printed Volume]

	[1]	(SE)	[2]	(SE)	[3]	(SE)
Larger Government Role in the Economy	-0.642***	(0.173)	-0.495*	(0.235)	-1.093***	(0.280)
Democracy Best System of Government	0.017	(0.082)	-0.163	(0.111)	0.266*	(0.134)
Fight Crime by Increased Punishment	0.218**	(0.070)	0.199*	(0.095)	0.161	(0.113)
Abortion Justified to save the Life of the Mother			0.018	(0.097)		
Approves of Same-Sex Marriage			-0.338*	(0.142)		
Trusts the United States					1.688***	(0.183)
Wealth	1.082***	(0.195)	1.220***	(0.269)	0.824**	(0.316)
Church Attendance	0.272*	(0.119)	0.185	(0.163)	0.462*	(0.191)
Mainline Protestant	-0.134	(0.157)	-0.203	(0.203)	-0.087	(0.258)
Evangelical Protestant	-0.107	(0.104)	-0.174	(0.145)	-0.080	(0.169)
Mormon/Jehovah Witness	0.248	(0.371)	-0.020	(0.547)	0.754	(0.540)
Non-Christian	-0.914*	(0.428)	0.048	(0.503)	-1.869***	(0.709)
No Religion	-0.508***	(0.129)	-0.283	(0.173)	-0.467*	(0.212)
Female	0.311***	(0.069)	0.431***	(0.096)	0.153	(0.113)
White	0.156°	(0.088)	0.217°	(0.124)	0.122	(0.143)
Indigenous	-0.488**	(0.157)	-0.376 °	(0.218)	-0.713***	(0.265)
Black	-0.138	(0.173)	0.164	(0.229)	-0.622*	(0.278)
Mulatto	-0.155	(0.180)	0.188	(0.220)	-0.524°	(0.289)
Other Race	0.341	(0.306)	0.772	(0.410)	0.311	(0.498)
Education	-0.153	(0.160)	-0.189	(0.222)	-0.164	(0.260)
Size of Place of Residence	0.092	(0.100)	0.038	(0.137)	0.114	(0.163)
Age 26-35	-0.040	(0.112)	0.092	(0.153)	-0.075	(0.177)
Age 36-45	-0.111	(0.117)	-0.054	(0.162)	-0.114	(0.184)
Age 46-55	-0.128	(0.122)	-0.013	(0.168)	-0.196	(0.193)
Age 56-65	-0.145	(0.138)	-0.019	(0.191)	-0.251	(0.221)

Age 66+	0.034	(0.153)	0.057	(0.212)	-0.289	(0.250)
Argentina	-5.567***	(0.211)	-5.731***	(0.308)	-5.025***	(0.336)
Bolivia	-7.694***	(0.198)	-8.042***	(0.287)	-6.967***	(0.307)
Brazil	-4.536***	(0.222)	-4.964***	(0.286)	-4.097***	(0.350)
Chile	-1.987***	(0.229)	-2.069***	(0.326)	-1.761***	(0.370)
Colombia	2.991***	(0.220)	2.811***	(0.320)	2.930***	(0.343)
Costa Rica	-1.655***	(0.209)	-1.741***	(0.310)	-1.779***	(0.320)
Dom. Rep.	-2.544***	(0.200)	-2.925***	(0.287)	-2.639***	(0.319)
Ecuador	-7.518***	(0.200)	-7.774***	(0.295)	-7.098***	(0.303)
El Salvador	-6.045***	(0.221)	-6.042***	(0.324)	-6.163***	(0.334)
Guatemala	3.337***	(0.249)	3.211***	(0.352)	3.047***	(0.419)
Honduras	2.679***	(0.223)	2.556***	(0.322)	2.515***	(0.353)
Nicaragua	-5.626***	(0.208)	-5.641***	(0.300)	-5.567***	(0.326)
Panama	2.073***	(0.208)	2.072***	(0.302)	1.524***	(0.330)
Paraguay	-0.279	(0.214)	-0.639*	(0.307)	0.001	(0.352)
Peru	-3.377***	(0.195)	-3.614***	(0.283)	-3.297***	(0.301)
Uruguay	-5.360***	(0.211)	-5.475***	(0.306)	-4.932***	(0.346)
Venezuela	-4.773***	(0.210)	-5.073***	(0.305)	-4.040***	(0.339)
Constant	13.154***	(0.289)	13.311***	(0.409)	12.511***	(0.467)
Number of Observations	12166		5962		4985	
F	263.35***		129.50***		95.53***	
R ²	0.465		0.479		0.442	
Root MSE	3.703		3.548		3.828	
OLS Regression, Standard Errors Adjusted for Survey Design Effects ° p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001						

Table OA14.3: Model of Left-Right Vote Choice as a Function of Issue Preferences and Demographics with Left-Right Self Placement, 2012 AmericasBarometer [Relates to Figure A14.2 in Conclusion Appendix in Printed Volume]

	[4]	(SE)	[5]	(SE)	[6]	(SE)
Left-Right Self Placement	2.940***	(0.119)	2.820***	(0.162)	2.769***	(0.193)
Larger Government Role in the Economy	-0.740***	(0.184)	-0.662**	(0.251)	-1.029***	(0.297)
Democracy Best System of Government	0.003	(0.088)	-0.159	(0.119)	0.195	(0.142)
Fight Crime by Increased Punishment	0.156*	(0.074)	0.163	(0.101)	0.111	(0.120)
Abortion Justified to save the Life of the Mother			0.064	(0.104)		
Approves of Same-Sex Marriage			-0.217	(0.150)		
Trusts the United States					1.484***	(0.196)
Wealth	1.114***	(0.208)	1.100***	(0.286)	0.891**	(0.336)
Church Attendance	0.231°	(0.127)	0.146	(0.173)	0.486*	(0.202)
Mainline Protestant	-0.015	(0.169)	-0.023	(0.220)	0.049	(0.279)
Evangelical Protestant	-0.020	(0.111)	-0.038	(0.154)	-0.045	(0.178)
Mormon/Jehovah Witness	0.128	(0.405)	0.088	(0.607)	0.447	(0.573)
Non-Christian	-0.550	(0.443)	0.193	(0.513)	-1.453*	(0.738)
No Religion	-0.329*	(0.137)	-0.180	(0.182)	-0.149	(0.223)
Female	0.274***	(0.074)	0.403***	(0.103)	0.119	(0.120)
White	0.127	(0.094)	0.160	(0.131)	0.160	(0.152)
Indigenous	-0.458**	(0.169)	-0.277	(0.234)	-0.641*	(0.279)
Black	-0.164	(0.184)	0.230	(0.244)	-0.682*	(0.287)
Mulatto	-0.140	(0.193)	0.221	(0.234)	-0.482	(0.307)
Other Race	0.492	(0.334)	1.108*	(0.447)	0.248	(0.519)
Education	-0.049	(0.170)	-0.070	(0.236)	-0.011	(0.273)
Size of Place of Residence	0.043	(0.107)	-0.032	(0.146)	0.145	(0.172)
Age 26-35	-0.068	(0.119)	0.075	(0.162)	-0.115	(0.186)
Age 36-45	-0.114	(0.125)	0.023	(0.171)	-0.168	(0.194)
Age 46-55	-0.116	(0.131)	0.006	(0.179)	-0.187	(0.204)

Age 56-65	-0.144	(0.148)	-0.029	(0.203)	-0.143	(0.236)
Age 66+	-0.054	(0.164)	0.097	(0.226)	-0.403	(0.267)
Argentina	-5.463***	(0.226)	-5.706***	(0.329)	-4.958***	(0.354)
Bolivia	-7.201***	(0.211)	-7.623***	(0.305)	-6.671***	(0.322)
Brazil	-4.454***	(0.234)	-4.972***	(0.302)	-4.101***	(0.366)
Chile	-1.963***	(0.243)	-1.933***	(0.344)	-2.093***	(0.387)
Colombia	2.660***	(0.232)	2.389***	(0.337)	2.557***	(0.357)
Costa Rica	-1.750***	(0.235)	-1.907***	(0.344)	-1.938***	(0.358)
Dom. Rep.	-2.677***	(0.208)	-3.152***	(0.301)	-2.778***	(0.329)
Ecuador	-7.323***	(0.212)	-7.592***	(0.313)	-7.062***	(0.322)
El Salvador	-5.965***	(0.228)	-6.110***	(0.336)	-6.051***	(0.342)
Guatemala	3.562***	(0.268)	3.372***	(0.379)	3.283***	(0.439)
Honduras	2.869***	(0.236)	2.722***	(0.344)	2.582***	(0.369)
Nicaragua	-5.082***	(0.217)	-5.149***	(0.313)	-5.216***	(0.338)
Panama	2.068***	(0.215)	1.930***	(0.315)	1.534***	(0.338)
Paraguay	-0.209	(0.235)	-0.557°	(0.334)	-0.060	(0.386)
Peru	-3.393***	(0.204)	-3.782***	(0.296)	-3.215***	(0.312)
Uruguay	-5.049***	(0.219)	-5.296***	(0.318)	-4.733***	(0.355)
Venezuela	-4.531***	(0.218)	-4.887***	(0.319)	-3.903***	(0.350)
Constant	11.620***	(0.314)	11.944***	(0.443)	10.981***	(0.502)
Number of Observations	10406		5162		4335	
F	238.22***		117.99***		88.77***	
R ²	0.485		0.498		0.465	
Root MSE	3.655		3.502		3.776	
OLS Regression, Standard Errors Adjusted for Survey Design Effects ° p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001						

Table OA14.4: Whom Respondent would Vote for if the Election were Held Today, 2012 AmericasBarometer

[Relates to Figure A14.3 in Conclusion Appendix in Printed Volume]

	Abstain	(SE)	Vote for the Opposition	(SE)	Blank Vote	(SE)
National Economy is Improving	-0.482***	(0.044)	-0.644***	(0.034)	-0.542***	(0.048)
Personal Finances are Improving	-0.168***	(0.044)	-0.168***	(0.034)	-0.101*	(0.048)
Neighborhood is Insecure	0.002*	(0.001)	0.002**	(0.001)	0.004***	(0.001)
Crime Victim	0.000	(0.001)	0.000	(0.001)	0.001	(0.001)
Corruption Among Government Officials is Common	0.003***	(0.001)	0.006***	(0.001)	0.003*	(0.001)
Corruption Victim	0.002***	(0.001)	0.002***	(0.001)	0.003***	(0.001)
Proximity to the President on the Left-Right Scale	-0.133***	(0.013)	-0.171***	(0.010)	-0.087***	(0.015)
Age	-0.052***	(0.009)	-0.016*	(0.007)	-0.012	(0.011)
Age ²	0.000***	(0.000)	0.000*	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)
Male	0.103°	(0.058)	0.114*	(0.045)	0.068	(0.064)
Married or Live Together	-0.063	(0.059)	-0.030	(0.046)	0.018	(0.066)
Mestizo	-0.046	(0.069)	-0.203***	(0.055)	-0.121	(0.081)
Indigenous	-0.091	(0.132)	-0.066	(0.103)	0.057	(0.147)
Black	0.027	(0.135)	-0.193°	(0.111)	0.199	(0.154)
Mulatto	-0.069	(0.154)	-0.308**	(0.116)	-0.087	(0.165)
Other	0.051	(0.277)	0.031	(0.204)	0.530	(0.268)
Amarela	-0.065	(0.797)	-0.420	(0.543)	0.649	(0.536)
Morena	-0.351	(0.313)	-0.180	(0.180)	0.000	(0.687)
Number of Children	-0.026	(0.016)	-0.017	(0.013)	-0.033°	(0.020)
Wealth	0.027	(0.021)	0.090***	(0.016)	0.041°	(0.023)
Education	0.003	(0.008)	0.032***	(0.006)	0.028***	(0.009)
Civil Society Membership	-0.010***	(0.002)	-0.002	(0.001)	0.000	(0.002)
Rural Area	-0.072	(0.064)	-0.067	(0.051)	-0.002	(0.074)

Attends Church	-0.001	(0.001)	0.001	(0.001)	-0.003**	(0.001)
Employed	-0.088	(0.061)	-0.072	(0.048)	-0.150*	(0.069)
Political Independent	-1.881***	(0.072)	-0.626***	(0.047)	-1.652***	(0.083)
Political Interest	-0.055***	(0.003)	-0.016***	(0.002)	-0.047***	(0.003)
Internal Efficacy	-0.230*	(0.098)	0.134°	(0.078)	-0.135	(0.113)
External Efficacy	-0.932***	(0.090)	-1.141***	(0.070)	-1.237***	(0.105)
Argentina	-0.613***	(0.186)	-0.632***	(0.122)	-0.326	(0.217)
Bolivia	-0.206	(0.164)	0.164	(0.108)	1.261***	(0.175)
Brazil	-0.930***	(0.199)	-1.167***	(0.135)	-0.012	(0.213)
Chile	1.018***	(0.174)	0.522***	(0.131)	0.825***	(0.213)
Colombia	0.478**	(0.164)	-0.521***	(0.124)	1.334***	(0.184)
Costa Rica	1.298***	(0.169)	-0.084	(0.135)	0.105	(0.240)
Dom. Rep.	0.671***	(0.167)	-0.054	(0.113)	-0.277	(0.237)
Ecuador	-0.879***	(0.192)	-0.997***	(0.126)	0.715***	(0.185)
El Salvador	0.256	(0.166)	-0.478***	(0.120)	0.210	(0.205)
Guatemala	0.314*	(0.161)	-0.669***	(0.123)	-0.568*	(0.222)
Honduras	2.290***	(0.164)	0.054	(0.134)	0.519*	(0.239)
Nicaragua	0.781***	(0.156)	-0.901***	(0.121)	-0.706**	(0.248)
Panama	1.983***	(0.170)	0.581***	(0.137)	1.193***	(0.216)
Paraguay	1.633***	(0.203)	1.114***	(0.146)	1.862***	(0.227)
Peru	-0.530**	(0.193)	0.265*	(0.117)	1.176***	(0.184)
Uruguay	-0.506*	(0.218)	-0.153	(0.124)	1.632***	(0.194)
Venezuela	-0.445*	(0.230)	-0.685***	(0.144)	-1.862***	(0.483)
Constant	2.392***	(0.273)	1.627***	(0.212)	0.284	(0.319)
Multinomial Logit with Standard Errors Adjusted for Survey Design N respondents=16,726, Pseudo R ² =0.195, $\chi^2=8362$ (p<0.001). ° p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001						

**Table OA14.5: Whom Respondent Would Vote for if the Election were Held Today, Results with Controls for Partisanship
[ONLINE]**

	Abstain	(SE)	Vote for the Opposition	(SE)	Blank Vote	(SE)
National Economy is Improving	-0.437***	(0.045)	-0.568***	(0.038)	-0.496***	(0.049)
Personal Finances are Improving	-0.136**	(0.045)	-0.110**	(0.038)	-0.068	(0.049)
Neighborhood is Insecure	0.002*	(0.001)	0.002*	(0.001)	0.004***	(0.001)
Crime Victim	-0.001	(0.001)	-0.001	(0.001)	0.000	(0.001)
Corruption Among Government Officials is Common	0.003**	(0.001)	0.005***	(0.001)	0.002°	(0.001)
Corruption Victim	0.002**	(0.001)	0.001*	(0.001)	0.003***	(0.001)
Proximity to the President on the Left-Right Scale	-0.085***	(0.014)	-0.101***	(0.012)	-0.039*	(0.016)
Government Partisan	-2.434***	(0.094)	-2.598***	(0.079)	-2.363***	(0.118)
Political Independent	-0.534***	(0.109)	1.314***	(0.072)	-0.159	(0.117)
Age	-0.051***	(0.009)	-0.015°	(0.008)	-0.011	(0.011)
Age ²	0.000***	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)
Male	0.069	(0.059)	0.065	(0.050)	0.036	(0.065)
Married or Live Together	-0.048	(0.060)	0.001	(0.051)	0.034	(0.068)
Mestizo	-0.020	(0.071)	-0.178**	(0.061)	-0.098	(0.083)
Indigenous	-0.053	(0.135)	-0.017	(0.112)	0.086	(0.150)
Black	0.065	(0.139)	-0.144	(0.126)	0.232	(0.158)
Mulatto	-0.039	(0.157)	-0.253*	(0.129)	-0.063	(0.167)
Other	0.045	(0.284)	0.049	(0.228)	0.514°	(0.277)
Amarela	-0.042	(0.795)	-0.407	(0.574)	0.651	(0.537)
Morena	-0.373	(0.320)	-0.191	(0.212)	-0.026	(0.691)
Number of Children	-0.023	(0.017)	-0.012	(0.014)	-0.030	(0.020)
Wealth	0.019	(0.021)	0.077***	(0.018)	0.034	(0.024)
Education	0.005	(0.008)	0.037***	(0.007)	0.030***	(0.009)
Civil Society Membership	-0.010***	(0.002)	-0.001	(0.002)	0.001	(0.002)
Rural Area	-0.084	(0.066)	-0.085	(0.057)	-0.014	(0.075)

Attends Church	-0.001	(0.001)	0.000	(0.001)	-0.003**	(0.001)
Employed	-0.068	(0.063)	-0.045	(0.053)	-0.132°	(0.070)
Political Interest	-0.055***	(0.003)	-0.016***	(0.002)	-0.048***	(0.003)
Internal Efficacy	-0.857***	(0.093)	-1.020***	(0.078)	-1.156***	(0.107)
External Efficacy	-0.253*	(0.100)	0.091	(0.086)	-0.162	(0.115)
Argentina	-0.603***	(0.189)	-0.643***	(0.134)	-0.319	(0.220)
Bolivia	-0.016	(0.168)	0.413***	(0.120)	1.455***	(0.178)
Brazil	-0.939***	(0.201)	-1.276***	(0.149)	-0.030	(0.215)
Chile	0.997***	(0.176)	0.482***	(0.141)	0.805***	(0.216)
Colombia	0.372*	(0.165)	-0.746***	(0.133)	1.218***	(0.185)
Costa Rica	1.544***	(0.176)	0.286°	(0.152)	0.359	(0.245)
Dom. Rep.	0.722***	(0.173)	-0.021	(0.134)	-0.226	(0.241)
Ecuador	-0.744***	(0.194)	-0.798***	(0.136)	0.853***	(0.187)
El Salvador	0.364*	(0.169)	-0.317*	(0.134)	0.323	(0.209)
Guatemala	0.473**	(0.163)	-0.445***	(0.132)	-0.407°	(0.224)
Honduras	2.401***	(0.170)	0.204	(0.152)	0.630**	(0.243)
Nicaragua	1.070***	(0.161)	-0.364**	(0.139)	-0.394	(0.252)
Panama	2.004***	(0.174)	0.635***	(0.150)	1.217***	(0.219)
Paraguay	1.604***	(0.210)	1.065***	(0.168)	1.826***	(0.234)
Peru	-0.525**	(0.195)	0.242°	(0.126)	1.180***	(0.187)
Uruguay	-0.418°	(0.223)	-0.053	(0.144)	1.725***	(0.200)
Venezuela	-0.334	(0.235)	-0.506**	(0.166)	-1.743***	(0.486)
Constant	2.001***	(0.280)	1.094***	(0.234)	-0.111	(0.326)
Multinomial Logit with Standard Errors Adjusted for Survey Design						
N respondents=16,726, Pseudo R ² =0.245, χ^2 =10,490 (p<0.001).						
° p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001						

REPLICATION FILES

We have worked to provide replication files for interested readers who wish to extend the analyses in this volume. Readers can download a zip folder “Latin American Voter Replication Files” from the book’s website (https://www.press.umich.edu/8402589/latin_american_voter) which contains all the replication files we received from the authors. This folder contains the do files and, in some cases, ancillary data to replicate the analyses in "The Latin American Voter." In most cases the survey data itself is not deposited but should be downloaded from the original sources. The replication files were provided by the authors and have not been independently checked by the editors. If issues arise in using the data, we encourage the interested reader to contact the authors directly for further information. We also ask that work which uses the replication files cite the original chapter and be shared with the authors of that chapter as well as the editors of the volume for our information.