

General Introduction

In educating students and edifying colleagues, political scientists repeatedly pose questions that bear upon the identity of political science itself. What is the discipline's purpose or mission? What theories, methods, standards, or disciplinary boundaries does the profession seek to establish? What civic roles, public policies, or educational programs should the discipline encourage? What, in short, should political science be, what should it do, and where should it go?

These and many other questions are often subsumed under a single broad one: What is the state of the discipline? This question has been asked by and of political scientists in the United States during periods of disciplinary self-reflection.¹ This question figures most prominently, perhaps, in the annual presidential addresses to the American Political Science Association and to the various regional associations. Programmatic essays that lay claim to new territory or that prescribe new directions to take often begin with this question. So, too, do numerous texts that canvas the scope and methods of the discipline or that advocate a new or renewed public role for political science. In attempting to answer this question, political scientists sometimes hail the progress and the promise of the discipline, usually as regards one tradition, program, or group within it. At other times, they applaud the discipline for its pluralism and openness, either within the liberal arts or in the service of a wider public. At still other times, they diagnose the crises of the discipline as instances of intellectual purposelessness, methodological fragmentation, professional overspecialization, or political irrelevance.

The history of the discipline is implicated in two general ways in connec-

1. To judge by recent volumes, we are currently in a period of considerable disciplinary self-reflection. Among the more general and prominent volumes, we would include Ada W. Finifter, ed., *Political Science: The State of the Discipline* (Washington, DC: American Political Science Association, 1983); Herbert Weisberg, ed., *Political Science: The Science of Politics* (New York: Agathon, 1986); and William J. Crotty, ed., *Political Science: Looking to the Future* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1991), 4 volumes. Somewhat more specialized collections include Naomi B. Lynn and Aaron Wildavsky, eds., *Public Administration: The State of the Discipline* (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1990); and Heinz Eulau, ed., *Crossroads of Social Science: The ICPSR 25th Anniversary Volume* (New York: Agathon, 1989).

tion with the practice of analyzing its present state. First, as a matter of logic, a political scientist must provide at least a sketch of the history of the discipline in order to explain or to judge the present progressiveness (or decline) of the discipline. Such a sketch might attend to the founding of the discipline in order to state how it is now foundering, or it might address today's successes by allusion to yesterday's failures. Although such a sketch may or may not go very far back into the past or dig very deeply into the historical record, it must surely draw upon the past if only in rough outline in order to portray the route or routes of the present.

Second, as a matter of fact, the practice of analyzing the state of the discipline goes back to the formative association of the profession in the United States in the opening years of this century. Indeed, the practice is even more time-honored than that, for it goes back to the nineteenth century when the discourse of a "science of politics" was finding an academic site in departments and curricula around the country. For a century and more, then, political scientists have, in fact, been analyzing the state of the discipline and, in doing so, have necessarily called up what they took to be their past.

Yet, the systematic probing of political science's past and the detailed narration of its history has varied considerably over this period of time. And it has varied not only from one political scientist to another but from one era to another. Indeed, it would appear that American political science has only recently emerged from an era—extending roughly from the mid-1950s to the mid-1980s—in which sustained investigations or reflections about the history of political science, at least as measured by books and monographs, were relatively rare. In one notable exception to this rule—*The Development of American Political Science: From Burgess to Behavioralism* (1967)—Albert Somit and Joseph Tanenhaus noted that "most American political scientists are largely unfamiliar with the origins and early evolution of the discipline. . . . An adequate history of the field has yet to be written, and the available literature . . . affords at best a fragmentary and partial account."²

By contrast, political scientists before the mid-twentieth century were

2. Albert Somit and Joseph Tanenhaus, *The Development of American Political Science: From Burgess to Behavioralism* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1967), p. 2. Other important exceptions during this period include Herbert J. Storing, ed., *Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1962); and Dwight Waldo, "Political Science: Tradition, Discipline, Profession, Science, Enterprise," in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., *Handbook of Political Science* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975), vol. 1: 1–130. Also see the more specialized studies of disciplinary founders as found in Paul F. Kress, *Social Science and the Idea of Process: The Ambiguous Legacy of Arthur F. Bentley* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1973); and Barry O. Karl, *Charles E. Merriam and the Study of Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974).

rather (though in many cases not exceptionally) more knowledgeable about the past when analyzing the state of the discipline. For those writing around the turn of the century, this was perhaps a consequence of their taking a more historical view of the scope and methods of political science. This was certainly the view of Francis Lieber in the 1850s, when he became the first officially named professor of political science in the United States, as well as of such scholars as John W. Burgess, Woodrow Wilson, and W. W. Willoughby, who followed Lieber in developing analytical or comparative-historical methods for political science. This was also Frederick Pollock's message in his *Introduction to the History of the Science of Politics* (1890) as well as J. R. Seeley's general motto: "History without Political Science has no fruit; Political Science without History has no root." Charles Merriam, whose work became somewhat less historical in the years after his 1903 classic, *History of American Political Theories*, nonetheless proposed in 1925 the adoption of several "new aspects of political science" against the backdrop afforded by "the recent history of political thinking." In the same year, but with a more distant past in mind, Robert H. Murray prefaced his *History of Political Science from Plato to the Present* with the observation that there was not "a single controversy of our day without a pedigree stretching into the distant ages." And in the 1930s, Anna Haddow provided pedagogical reflections of a systematically historical kind in her *Political Science in American Colleges and Universities, 1636–1900*.³

Even the opening salvos of the (second) "behavioral revolution" during the decade after World War II were fired in part by competing narratives of the history of political science. Most notably in *The Political System*, David Easton made his powerful brief in 1953 for behavioral systems theory (modeled on the assumptions of the natural sciences) by, among other things, diagnosing the malaise of political science "since the Civil War" and by sketching out "the decline of modern political theory." Three years later, Bernard Crick wrote a dissertation on the history of American political science—later published as *The American Science of Politics: Its Origins and Conditions* (1959)—criticizing these and similar views. Crick's principal theme was that behavioralist aspirations to "science" were neither new nor politically innocent nor much worth holding. "By scorning history and phi-

3. Frederick Pollock, *An Introduction to the History of the Science of Politics* (London: 1890); John R. Seeley, *Introduction to Political Science* (London: 1896), p. 3; Charles Merriam, *New Aspects of Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1925), ch. 3; Robert H. Murray, *The History of Political Science from Plato to the Present* (New York: Appleton, 1925), preface; Anna Haddow, *Political Science in American Colleges and Universities, 1636–1900* (New York: Appleton, 1939).

losophy,” Crick concluded, “the idea of a science of politics” showed itself to be but “a caricature of American liberal democracy.”⁴ Alongside contemporaries such as Easton and forbears such as Merriam, Crick dramatically underscored the point—already amply evident in presidential addresses and scope-and-methods texts—that in organizing “the facts” of the discipline’s past, a great variety of interpretations was possible and perhaps even inevitable.

The history of political science has lately recaptured the attention of scholars, in and outside the discipline. Exactly why this should be so is not entirely clear. But among the possible reasons might be the need of both newer and older generations of political scientists to come to grips with, and possibly to resolve, the crises that continue to beset the discipline, the recent revolution in historiography at last breaking upon political science, and the increasing historical self-awareness of the other social sciences. As a sign of the latter, consider the emergence or continuing viability of journals such as the *History of Sociology*, the *History of Anthropology*, the *History of Political Economy*, the *History of the Human Sciences*, and the *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences* (the catholicity of whose title fails to conceal the hegemony of psychology within). While political science does not yet have a similar journal, its history has nonetheless motivated the labors of a number of disciplinary historians. The variety of interpretations, so evident in the past, can once again be seen in David Ricci’s *The Tragedy of Political Science* (1984), Raymond Seidelman and Edward Harpham’s *Disenchanted Realists* (1985), Andrew Janos’s *Politics and Paradigms* (1986), and Dorothy Ross’s *The Origins of American Social Science* (1991). Ricci chronicles the moral contradictions of a science of democracy; Seidelman and Harpham, the repeated disenchantments of a tradition of liberal reformers; Janos, the diversified progress of theories of change; and Ross, the persistence of American exceptionalism in the very categories of political science. Along with the publication of a series of interviews with leading political scientists of the past and present in *Political Science in America: Oral Histories of a Discipline*, these works clearly suggest that we are in an era of heightened historical consciousness about the discipline.⁵

4. David Easton, *The Political System: An Inquiry into the State of Political Science* (New York: Knopf, 1953), p. 38 and chap. 10; Bernard Crick, *The American Science of Politics: Its Origins and Conditions* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959), p. 227. Also during this period, see Dwight Waldo, *Political Science in the United States: A Trend Report* (Paris: UNESCO, 1956).

5. David Ricci, *The Tragedy of Political Science: Politics, Scholarship, and Democracy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984); Raymond Seidelman with the assistance of Edward J. Harpham, *Disenchanted Realists: Political Science and the American Crisis, 1884–1984* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985); Andrew C. Janos, *Politics and Paradigms: Changing Theories of Change in the Social Sciences* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986);

Reflections upon these and other works have also served to deepen this historical consciousness by directing our attention to the methods or historiographical principles implicit in them. According to one set of reflections, Janos presents an example of “Whig” historiography because he tells a teleological story of progress in theories of change that led to the present state of the discipline. Ricci and Seidelman, on the other hand, proved to be “skeptics” because their histories are critical of the scientific or liberal democratic aspirations of political scientists in the discipline’s past and present.⁶ Another set of reflections seizes upon and criticizes the artificially constructed notion of “tradition” in Seidelman, the overly dramaturgical allusion to “tragedy” in Ricci, and the borrowed philosophical idea of “paradigm” in Janos.⁷ The ground for these different methodological reflections—particularly the reference to “paradigms”—was laid in earlier debates in the history and philosophy of science, especially over the work of Thomas Kuhn and its applicability to political science.⁸ The ground for these reflections—particularly the reference to “traditions”—had also been laid in more recent debates over the interpretation of the history of political thought, especially over the contextualist work of Quentin Skinner and J. G. A. Pocock.⁹ The historiography of

Dorothy Ross, *The Origins of American Social Science* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Michael A. Baer, Malcolm E. Jewell, and Lee Seligman, eds., *Political Science in America: Oral Histories of a Discipline* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1991). Further signs of a heightened historical consciousness about political and social science may be found, for example, in Stefan Collini, Donald Winch, and John Burrow, *That Noble Science of Politics: A Study in Nineteenth Century Intellectual History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); JoAnne Brown and David van Keuren, eds., *The Estate of Social Knowledge* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991); Gabriel Almond, *A Discipline Divided* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1990); and David Easton, John G. Gunnell, and Luigi Graziano, eds., *The Development of Political Science: A Comparative Survey* (New York: Routledge, 1991).

6. John S. Dryzek and Stephen T. Leonard, “History and Discipline in Political Science,” *American Political Science Review* 82 (1988): 1245–60. See also the subsequent controversy, James Farr et al., “Can Political Science History Be Neutral?” *American Political Science Review* 84 (1990): 587–607. The reference to “Whig” historiography originates with Herbert Butterfield, *The Whig Interpretation of History* (New York: Penguin, 1931).

7. James Farr, “The History of Political Science,” *American Journal of Political Science* 32 (1988): 1175–95.

8. Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962). On Kuhn and related applications of the philosophy of science, see Richard J. Bernstein, *The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1978); Gary Gutting, ed., *Paradigms and Revolutions: Applications and Appraisals of Thomas Kuhn’s Philosophy of Science* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1980); and Terence Ball, ed., *Idioms of Inquiry: Critique and Renewal in Political Science* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1987).

9. Essays by and about Skinner are collected in James Tully, ed., *Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and His Critics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988). Also see, among other places, J. G. A. Pocock, *Politics, Language, and Time* (London: Methuen, 1972); and

Pocock is singled out by Ross as inspiring or best describing her historiographical approach in *The Origins of American Social Science*. Yet her explanation of the persistence of American exceptionalism turns upon larger social forces, such as modernization and secularization, as well as upon the causal role of professionalization and the rise of the research university.¹⁰ This is already reanimating a debate—heard earlier and elsewhere—about whether the history of political science, or of any science, should consist essentially in a narrative about “external” forces or in one about the “internal” development of scientific ideas and theories themselves.¹¹

One very general and humbling consequence follows from the variety of arguments and perspectives contained in the various works of history and historiography mentioned above. As John G. Gunnell has observed: “Although the study of the history of political science may not be as fully developed as that of some of the other social sciences, this area of research in the United States has now reached a point where it is difficult any longer to contemplate a single general treatment.”¹² Yet, while no “single general treatment” may be possible, any treatment at all of the history of American political science must proceed in terms of certain general themes that inform the narration of the past or an analysis of the present. These themes may be understood in part as templates that overlay and help organize the disparate facts of the discipline’s past. However, these themes have also fueled the

Richard Rorty, J. B. Schneewind, and Quentin Skinner, eds., *Philosophy in History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984). On “tradition,” see John G. Gunnell, *Political Theory: Tradition and Interpretation* (Cambridge, MA: Winthrop, 1986). A vast related literature has also developed in the history of anthropology and sociology. For beginnings, see, for example, George W. Stocking, “On the Limits of ‘Presentism’ and ‘Historicism’ in the Historiography of the Behavioral Sciences,” *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences* 1 (1965): 211–18; and Steven Seidman, Robert Alun Jones, R. Stephen Warner, and Stephen Turner, “The Historicist Controversy: Understanding the Sociological Past,” *Sociological Theory* 3 (1985): 13–28.

10. Ross, *The Origins*, xvii. On the professionalization of American social science more generally, see Robert H. Wiebe, *The Search for Order, 1877–1920* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967); Mary O. Furner, *Advocacy and Objectivity: A Crisis in the Professionalization of American Social Science, 1865–1905* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1975); and Thomas L. Haskell, *The Emergence of Professional Social Science: The American Social Science Association and the Nineteenth Century Crisis of Authority* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1977).

11. John G. Gunnell, *The Descent of Political Theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, forthcoming). The competing claims of “genealogy” and “archaeology” will also fuel this debate, particularly as the works of Michel Foucault continue to be felt among political scientists and disciplinary historians. For a clear overview that is especially attentive to Foucault’s substantive history of the human sciences in *The Order of Things*, see Gary Gutting, *Michel Foucault’s Archaeology of Scientific Reason* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

12. John G. Gunnell, “In Search of the State: Political Science as an Emerging Discipline in the U.S.,” in Peter Wagner, Bjorn Wittrock, and Richard Whitley, eds., *Discourses on Society: The Shaping of the Social Science Disciplines* (Boston and Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991), p. 123.

persistent debates that past political scientists themselves have been engaged in for over a century or so. Indeed, it is these long-standing debates, not some agreement on fundamental principles, that give the discipline the identity it now has.

By our reckoning, there are at least nine general themes (several of which could be collapsed into fewer heads or others added to them):

1. The *diversity of theories and methods* that have been developed and that have vied for the intellectual allegiance of the discipline
2. The central role that the concept of *the state* has played in focusing the debates that attend this diversity, even when the concept is ostensibly rejected
3. The equally central role that *behavioralism* has played in focusing these debates, even when it too is rejected
4. The claims about the character of a *science* of politics, and the *contested meanings* of science that have informed these claims
5. The intellectual *confluences with other disciplines*, especially history and the social sciences
6. The *professionalization* of the discipline and the *institutional associations* it has forged internally and with other professions, especially history and the social sciences
7. The *public roles* that political scientists have played or should play, and particularly their responsibilities as *civic educators* of one kind or another
8. The roles that *women and minorities* have played or been denied in the discipline, as well as the silence about or fitful incorporation of *gender and race* into the theories and methods of the discipline
9. The broader *ideological debates* of American politics that have engaged political scientists in their role as public intellectuals, especially debates about liberalism and American exceptionalism, socialism and social classes, even when political science promises an end of ideology

The present volume brings together several essays that individually and collectively highlight and historicize these general themes. Commentary on the significance and connections of the individual essays is left to the section introductions below, as is a sense of the relevant contexts, events, or forces that helped to shape and define the four formative periods of the discipline. Here we provide a few general observations about the essays and the volume as a whole.

The volume includes several documentary essays on “the state of the discipline,” written at different times by different political scientists, as well

as a few interpretative narratives written in the past few years by various disciplinary historians. The authors are divisible into three general groupings. First, there are prominent figures in the discipline's less recent past, including Francis Lieber, John W. Burgess, Woodrow Wilson, W. W. Willoughby, Charles A. Beard, Charles E. Merriam, Harold D. Lasswell, Benjamin E. Lippincott, and Leonard D. White. Second, there are current or recent leaders of the discipline, including David Easton, Robert A. Dahl, William H. Riker, Norman Jacobson, Charles E. Lindblom, and Theodore J. Lowi. Third, there are contemporary historians of the discipline, including Dorothy Ross, John G. Gunnell, David M. Ricci, Terence Ball, Helene Silverberg, the editors, and again David Easton. Overall, the volume brings together essays *from* or *about* the history of the discipline, organized into four general periods from the latter half of the nineteenth century to the present.

The essays cover considerable intellectual and historical ground. Several invoke or criticize many of the more important theories and theoretical traditions of political science (such as the study of administration, political economy, systems theory, institutionalism, and especially the state). Several recall or denounce some of the discipline's more striking methodological approaches (such as comparative history, rational choice, political psychology, gender analysis, and especially behavioralism). Several champion or castigate a number of the public roles that political scientists have served (as civic educators, liberal reformers, specialized experts, or exporters of the American way of life). Other essays critically recount key episodes in the professionalization of the discipline or discuss some of its signal debates during the late nineteenth century, the Progressive era, the New Deal, the aftermath of World War II, the 1960s, and the 1980s.

Most of the essays analyze the state of the discipline by providing general proclamations about the discipline that were (or are) influential or provocative in their time. All are also self-consciously historical in that they recall their past, in greater or lesser scholarly detail. We thereby witness not only different states of the discipline at different times but also systematically changing perspectives on the discipline's past over time. Indeed, it would only be a slight exaggeration to refer to them as the discipline's different pasts, given the range of remembrances and the variety of historical interpretations that attend analyses of the state of the discipline.

This sense of historical plurality is strongly reinforced and complemented by the other essays written by disciplinary historians. These writers exhibit a range of critical and sympathetic judgments about political science as well as about what disciplinary history should principally focus upon, whether it be theories or personalities or institutional developments. When surveyed as a whole, the essays in the volume also present a variety of different methodological principles and historiographical perspectives. Whigs

and skeptics, textualists and contextualists, internalists and externalists are all given voice here. One can hear different axes grinding and witness the partisan and less-partisan uses of history. This was intentional. No methodological uniformity, historiographical hegemony, or political rectitude was sought or imposed in bringing these essays together. We hope that the volume thereby underscores the necessity and inevitability of historical interpretation when reflecting on the discipline, even as it acknowledges and encourages the great range of styles, principles, and contents that pass muster as histories of political science.

The *American Political Science Review* is amply (though not, we hope, overly) represented in the pages below. Such prominence is perhaps understandable given that the *Review* is the journal of the national association and that it frequently features just the sorts of diagnoses and remembrances of the discipline that appear in this volume. The annual presidential addresses are standardly of this sort. However, this volume includes only two such addresses, even though several authors—Willoughby, Wilson, Beard, Merriam, Lasswell, White, Dahl, Easton, Lindblom, Riker, and Lowi—were at one time or another presidents of the American Political Science Association. A study of the presidential addresses in the *Review*, perhaps alongside the presidential addresses in the journals of the regional associations, would make an interesting study. It would certainly be one kind of contribution to disciplinary history; however, this volume is not such a study, as much as several of its essays may sound presidential in tone or judgment.

The essays' general themes apply to the historical sweep of American political science as a whole. Taken together, therefore, the essays at least touch upon all of the various subfields of political science in the United States, including comparative politics, international relations, and political methodology, as well as American politics and political theory. But, admittedly, the essays address the subfield of American politics in a much more direct and sustained fashion; and, to a lesser extent, they also address the subfield of political theory insofar as its history is tied to the history of the study of American politics. Thus, for example, the general themes about behavioralism and about the state are evidently relevant to all of the discipline's subfields, although these themes are addressed below in essays drawn mainly from American politics and political theory. Or, to take a different example, one could suggest (as some of our authors do below) that one or another of the themes of American exceptionalism—that American politics was an exception to Old World politics or that Americans faced historically special trials in the New World or that Americans were uniquely positioned to make novel contributions to human thinking, including a science of politics—may be found in the categories and theories of all of the various subfields of political science. But the themes of American exceptionalism are surely most persua-

sive when political scientists and political theorists are studying America itself or reflecting upon the place of political science in American public life. In any case, for better or worse, the discipline has had at its core the study of American politics, and the students and theoretical critics of American politics have been particularly prone to assess the state of the discipline and to reflect upon its past.

The dates governing the periodization used in the volume pick out important events and developments in the history of the discipline in the context of American political life—such as the creation of America’s first professorship of political science (1857), the founding of the American Political Science Association (1903), the end of World War II (1945), and the challenge to (and from) behaviorism (around 1970). We acknowledge that our periodization is a conventional construction designed to forward our pluralistic purposes. The dates and events variously reflect and make concrete some of the general themes about the history of political science mentioned above, especially the discipline’s increasing professionalization, its various public roles in American politics, and its internal methodological debates. Like all periodizations, ours is, of course, open to dispute or to reconstruction for different purposes. Indeed, at least two of the essays below—the one by Merriam, and the second of the two by Easton—provide rather different four-stage periodizations of the discipline’s history.

The periods of the discipline’s history are described in the section introductions that follow. But, at a glance, we begin with the creation of the first chair of political science, a signal instance of the institutionalization of the profession in the United States. The first period (Beginnings) that it helps to demarcate embraces the theoretical articulations of “the state” and their practical applications to administration, as well as the formation of a comparative-historical method. The creation of the American Political Science Association accelerates the institutionalization of the discipline, and this we use to inaugurate a second period (Developments). This period witnesses a terminological shift away from “the state” along with an increasingly realistic assessment of American politics coupled with the hopes for Progressive reform led in part by political scientists. The invocation of psychology and sociology also helps to inaugurate the first behavioral revolution and to distance empirical political scientists from émigré political theorists.

World War II had an enormous effect on American political scientists, as it did on people the world over. Not only did it quash certain kinds of reformism, but it mobilized political scientists in the war effort. We use its conclusion to begin our third period (Debates), a period in which the research university expands and political scientists seek out a much-expanded fiscal basis in league with the other social and now “behavioral” sciences. The second behavioral revolution helps to define this period, as do the challenges

to behavioralism that come in part as a consequence of facing urban riots and the Vietnam War. The postbehavioral era, as it is sometimes called, may be seen to begin around 1970; it constitutes our most recent period (Departures). A pervasive sense of crisis, a call for an expanded dialogue at the discipline's center, and a profusion of new modes of inquiry, most notably rational choice theory and theories of gender, have characterized our most recent round of debates. Perhaps this volume, too, and historical studies like it, should be understood as a product of our discipline's present departures, even though the appeal and argument are decidedly historical.

In conclusion, this volume has been designed to capture some sense of and appreciation for the diverse theoretical, methodological, and political aspects of the discipline of American political science over the course of a century and more. It goes without saying that much else in the history of the discipline had to be passed over in silence and what is not passed over is open to different interpretations. Certainly, many readers will wish that we had included other essays or covered other episodes in the history of the discipline. In a collection of this or any size, this is probably unavoidable. But if readers who have this reaction do so nonetheless by remembering the past as a gauge to understanding the present, the volume will even then have served its purpose. Our aim in editing this collection of essays will be realized only to the extent that readers seriously return to the historical record in order to reflect on the state of the discipline and on the politics that we profess to study.