

## CHAPTER 1

# Introduction

Since its origins, the study of international relations has centered on the analysis of war. This analysis has taken on various forms: Small and Singer (1982) and Bueno de Mesquita (1981) examined all wars since 1816, Jervis (1976) chose wars that related to his specific purposes, Van Evera (1984) examined the causes of World War I, and Lebow (1981) analyzed 13 crises, many of which ended in war. In spite of their ideological and methodological differences, war as the phenomenon to be explained unites these diverse scholars.

In contrast, we suggest in this volume that one can learn much about war by taking a step back and focusing attention on militarized relationships, what we refer to as rivalries. We argue that examining war only is like trying to understand a problem marriage by looking only at when a husband beats his wife. Understanding such a marriage requires understanding the kind of relationship in which violence is possible. Wars do not suddenly occur between two states, but rather almost always arise in situations in which the two countries have had serious conflicts and have been using the military instruments of foreign policy against one another. Only recently have students of war become conscious of what they already intuitively knew: a large portion of wars occur in long-term enduring rivalry relationships (see chapter 3).

Jervis, Singer and Small, Bueno de Mesquita, Lebow, Van Evera, and other scholars want to understand the causes of war. In contrast, we examine the causes and consequences of rivalry. For us, war is potentially both a cause and an effect of rivalry. War occurs within rivalry because both parties are managing their conflicts with military tools. Yet, at the same time, war can establish the relationship as militarized. For example, the Korean War initiated a militarized rivalry between the United States and China that lasted until a rapprochement between the states in the 1970s. This book explores some—certainly not all—of the implications that this fundamental shift in perspective from war to rivalry has for the study of international conflict.

Rivalries provide us with a way of thinking about many issues of war and peace—what we call the rivalry approach. The rivalry approach has theoretical, methodological, and empirical dimensions. The first part of the book delves into the many ramifications of the rivalry approach in terms of theory and methodology. There we examine how rivalries enter into standard theories of international conflict and how they provide new testing strategies for many classic hypotheses. The rivalry approach sheds new light on classic theories as well as classic phenomena such as power transitions. It also points out important phenomena for which there are no standard theories or explanations, because these phenomena appear only as a result of the rivalry framework. Here we see the multifaceted character of the rivalry approach. In chapter 6, for example, we use rivalries to test aspects of democracy that do not fit into standard methodologies, as we can look at regime changes *within* rivalries (interrupted time-series) as well as compare patterns of democracy and war *across* rivalries. The former escapes completely the cross-sectional methodologies that dominate the analysis of democratic peace, while the later uses a different unit of analysis, the rivalry.

The empirical dimension of the rivalry approach focuses on phenomena ignored by standard conflict theories. The second part of the book focuses on one such phenomenon—enduring rivalries. One characteristic of a useful theoretical framework is that it points out new phenomena that merit theoretical and empirical attention. The rivalry approach stresses the interconnectedness and the temporal duration of military rivalries. It brings into the limelight the existence of the phenomenon of enduring rivalries and at the same time calls out for a theoretical explanation. Scholars and policymakers are aware of long-term rivalries, but given the cross-sectional bias of most qualitative and quantitative conflict research, this knowledge rarely produces studies, models, and theories of enduring rivalries.

The existence of enduring rivalries cries out for theoretical and empirical treatment. Part 2 of this volume is our response. We argue that a central characteristic of enduring rivalries is their *stability*. Traditional balance-of-power or deterrence theories usually contrast stability (i.e., the absence of war) with instability, signified by crises and wars. Our model of enduring rivalry turns this standard view on its head. What we call the punctuated equilibrium model of enduring rivalries (see below) stresses the stability or continuity of these military conflicts. Instability in the form of political shocks (i.e., world wars, civil wars, regime shifts) is associated with the initiation and termination of rivalries. Hence, instead of instability being associated with war and crisis—essentially its negative connotation—we propose that it is also associated with peace and conflict termination. Wars and regime changes are shocks that upset the stability of enduring rivalries, setting the stage for a qualitative change in the relationship between would-be or actual rivals.

One side of the enduring rivalry coin is stability and duration, but the other is that they all have beginnings and ends. Hence a complete theory of the empirical phenomenon of enduring rivalries requires a consideration and analysis of conflict management and termination. Because rivalries exist over time, we can examine the impact of attempts at conflict mediation, shifts to democracy, and other factors potentially associated with conflict resolution and management. Because rivalries do end, the rivalry approach requires us to have not only a model of war, but also a model of peace. The literature on conflict resolution, mediation, and the like remains, as a rule, quite isolated from that on the causes of war. One would be hard pressed to find a book or theory that addresses the causes of war and the causes of peace within the same theoretical framework, but the rivalry approach outlined in the first part of the book all but demands this. Our punctuated equilibrium model of enduring rivalry deals with both military conflict and peace.

Part 1 of the book focuses on the theoretical and methodological implications of the rivalry approach for classic approaches, hypotheses, and theories of international conflict. We examine how rivalry factors appear in (mostly in the background of) classic theories, such as the power transition hypothesis and deterrence. We propose that the rivalry approach provides new ways (theoretically and methodologically) to test such classic hypotheses, and we provide an example ourselves using the democratic peace.

We view the second part of the book as a logical extension of the first part's emphasis on the rivalry approach to war and peace. Part 2 focuses on one crucial empirical phenomenon—enduring rivalries—that appears once one looks at international conflict through rivalry lenses. If scholars are directed to focus on rivalries, an unsurprising first step is to focus on the longest and most dangerous of them. Moreover, a focus on enduring rivalries permits a fuller explication of the rivalry approach, as many of its elements are used in our analyses. We propose a theoretical model of enduring rivalries, the punctuated equilibrium model, which we believe contributes to an understanding of the phenomena. This is not an inherent part of the rivalry approach, but the model is specified in terms of key rivalry components. We hope that even those who do not accept our rivalry approach or the punctuated equilibrium model (and there are several other scholars studying rivalries, some with different approaches) will find our empirical analyses and detection of key rivalry trends fruitful in their own theoretical pursuits.

## Part 1: Rivalries and International Conflict

In the first part of this volume, we devote our attention to the general theoretical and methodological implications of the rivalry approach to international war and peace. We develop the implications of thinking about war in terms of militarized relationships. This turns out to recast our perceptions on virtually all aspects of conflict research, including data creation, testing, and theory.

## Conceptualization and Data Creation

The first order of business is to define the fundamental concept of rivalry or militarized relationship. Just as the Correlates of War Project in its early stages concentrated much effort on conceptualizing and creating an operational definition of war, chapter 2 gives an analysis of the theoretical and operational dimensions of an international militarized rivalry. Conceptually, a rivalry is a relationship between two states in which both use, with some regularity, military threats and force as well as one in which both sides formulate foreign policy in military terms.<sup>1</sup> A classic example of this is deterrence policy. Deterrence involves military threats, hence by definition a military rivalry. Such, of course, was a large component of the U.S. policy toward the USSR after World War II, and vice versa. In contrast, U.S.-Canadian relations, while frequently conflictual, have not generally been conducted in military terms over the last century. Operationally, we shall use the existence of militarized disputes and wars to identify our universe of rivalries. Although it is theoretically possible for states to conduct militarized foreign policies without actual militarized exchanges, in practice this is just about impossible; crises, disputes, and war are the results of militarized foreign policies.

Given that most work has utilized the concept of enduring rivalry, we hasten to reemphasize that rivalries can be of any length: from very short to enduring. The enduring rivalry literature tends to confound two dimensions of a rivalry. The first is duration, indicated by the adjective enduring. The second, implicit, is the severity or seriousness of the rivalry. Just as Small and Singer (1982) described war on the dimensions of duration and fatalities, so too can we characterize rivalries. Until now attention has been explicitly focused on the extreme end of the duration dimension. Implicitly, scholars have assumed that long-term rivalries are also the most severe ones. Nevertheless, one can find short-term severe as well as long-term low-severity rivalries. Conceptually, we must allow this possibility. Empirically, we will find examples of this as well when we create a data set of over one thousand rivalries in the 1816–1992 period.

## Rivalries and Hypothesis Testing

The intellectual history of the rivalry concept originates in its testing function. From the early 1980s until well into the 1990s, this remained its almost exclusive use. Rivalries proved useful in some theoretical contexts because they

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<sup>1</sup>This definition reflects our focus on the violent aspects of rivalries. It is quite conceivable for rivalries to exist without violent interactions, for example between two economic competitors (see Hensel 1996 for a discussion of nonmilitarized rivalries). It is also possible to define rivalries without reliance on the militarized elements, as Thompson 1995 does. Yet it was our decision to focus on militarized rivalries because of their enormous impact on human life, representing a major cause of death in the twentieth century, and because of their impact on the conduct of international relations in general. Understanding and ultimately managing or solving these rivalries seemed to us to have the greatest priority.

provided a universe of cases with which to test a model or theory. The power transition hypothesis provides a good example of this phenomenon. According to Organski and Kugler (1980), for a power transition to cause a war, serious grievances must already exist between two countries. Power transitions between states at peace do not result in war, but such is not the case when there are underlying conflicts. The rivalry concept taps this distinction because the notion of a militarized rivalry implies some basic conflict. One can restate this hypothesis, then, to say that power transition results in war only if there is a rivalry relationship. Wayman (1982, 1996) did exactly that. He defined a rivalry as a minimum of two disputes in a 10-year period, and then proceeded to test the Organski and Kugler hypothesis on this universe of cases. Geller (1993) has conducted an analogous analysis on enduring rivalries.

In all of these testing applications, rivalries remain out of the limelight. They play a role in choosing cases but are then theoretically irrelevant. The focus of concern in such studies always stays with the conflict hypothesis, be it concerned with arms races, power transition, or deterrence. One result is that scholars develop different operational definitions of rivalry for their testing purposes. These range from Wayman's (1982) two-dispute, 10-year minimum to Jones's (1989) minimum of five disputes and 25 years (see chapter 2). Because few are thinking about rivalries *per se*, there is no debate about which universe of cases is most appropriate, because rivalries only serve to select specific cases for narrow purposes. By focusing on the rivalry part of the theory, we pose the question about what is the appropriate rivalry concept for testing theory. As we discuss below, by making clear the role of rivalry in hypotheses, we are forced to be more precise about the role of rivalry in testing. For many problems, rivalries provide a new—and perhaps better—way to test theory. Certainly, empirical tests of arms race hypotheses existed (Huntington 1958) before Diehl (1985a) used rivalries to analyze them. Yet there are other situations in which testing is difficult or almost impossible. There the rivalry approach can step in and make a valuable contribution.

For purposes of testing, deterrence constitutes perhaps the most controversial topic in world politics. Much of the debate revolves around the tendency to select cases in which deterrence fails and to ignore its successes. It is much easier to observe deterrence failure because it results in crisis or war, whereas deterrence success is easy to confound with cases in which deterrence is not attempted. As we mentioned above, deterrence policy implies a militarized relationship. Huth and Russett (1993) have turned this around to contend that if there is a rivalry relationship, then we can test deterrence. Thus, they can define deterrence success as those years in the rivalry without dispute or war. This application takes advantage of a fundamental characteristic of rivalries: they exist over time. Most statistical and case study approaches to deterrence select individual crises and wars. In such cases, it is not clear what the appropriate control or comparison group should be. With rivalries, one can compare

years with disputes to years without disputes, as the rivalry approach itself provides a suitable control group. We address these and related concerns in detail in chapters 4 and 5, using deterrence studies as our central example.

Because rivalries consist of relationships over time, virtually every conflict hypothesis can be reanalyzed within this framework. To illustrate the potential of rivalries for theory development and testing, we examine the democratic peace in chapter 6. Using rivalries, we avoid many of the problems that have plagued cross-sectional approaches. We do not fret about the definition of “relevant dyads,” nor do we need to worry about whether to focus on wars or war-years. We can compare periods when the dyad is nondemocratic to periods when it is a joint democracy: we know what the regime type is when the rivalry starts, and the relevant dyad is merely the rivalry. The standard causes-of-war approach has problems because it uses the dyad-year to organize its analysis. This chops relationships into tiny pieces and creates difficulties for multiyear wars. The rivalry approach divides the history of a relationship into militarized and peaceful periods, each of which can be very long or very short. Instead of the arbitrary “year” procedure, our approach uses more natural breakpoints, when the character of the relationship fundamentally changes.

Using the rivalry as a whole gives us a new way to look at the—already much looked at—question of democratic peace. It is largely accepted that relatively few disputes and virtually no wars have occurred between democracies (although there is some controversy over how much of this can be attributed to democratic factors; see Russett 1993 and Ray 1995 for an analysis of alleged democratic dyad wars). With the rivalry concept in hand we can go further and ask about the characteristic of militarized relationships between democracies. We can ask about the duration and severity of democratic (enduring) rivalries. For example, among the democracy versus democracy militarized disputes, it is possible to identify quite different patterns of rivalry. One extreme is enduring rivalries with many disputes. The other pole is isolated, brief, one-shot militarized rivalries. These two patterns have critically different implications for the democratic peace hypothesis: the former casts much more doubt on the peaceful character of relations between democracies, while the latter supports it. This kind of evidence concerning the democratic peace is not available until one considers the question in rivalry terms.

The issue of peace between democracies illustrates the hammerlock that traditional cross-sectional approaches to war hold on the discipline. Some studies do use rivalries in order to choose cases but still analyze the relationship in a cross-sectional fashion (or cross-sectional time-series). Huth and Russett’s (1993) analyses of deterrence exemplify this practice. In investigating how well their model performs, they use techniques that treat each dispute as an isolated case. One could—and should—ask if their model works better for some rivalries than others. If almost all of the model’s incorrect predictions are concentrated in a few rivalries, that outcome suggests what is wrong with the model,

as well as hints at corrections (see chapter 5). In effect, this is what we propose to do for the democratic peace.

In brief, the rivalry approach creates new ways to test old hypotheses, ways that were difficult or impossible to achieve with traditional methods. This is a direct result of thinking about conflict within militarized relationships that can last for decades, rather than in isolation and devoid of context.

### Hypothesis and Theory Generation

To think about war in terms of rivalry implies a certain theoretical orientation toward the phenomenon of international conflict. The tension between standard practice, which treats crisis and war as independent events,<sup>2</sup> and the common-sense expectation that wars between rivals are somehow related to each other motivated us to think about and develop the rivalry approach. We started from the simple observation that many wars have involved the same set of states, such as India and Pakistan, and Israel and its Arab neighbors. India and Pakistan have fought three wars in the last 50 years, with the outcome of each of the first two wars having a strong influence on the occurrence and timing of the war that followed. Similarly, Israel and various Arab states have clashed over the same pieces of territory four times since 1948. The Yom Kippur War in 1973 is the one that most obviously traces its roots to the circumstances and outcome of the previous war.

When we conceptualize rivalry, we make a nontrivial theoretical claim: disputes and wars occurring in the rivalry are not independent of each other because they belong to the same relationship. This can become a causal claim: some aspects of the war or crisis at time 1 are causes of war or crisis at time 2. Few theories of war explicitly link these events across time, war diffusion being the main exception, and even there the emphasis is more spatial than temporal. Underlying the rivalry approach lies an implicit theory connecting disputes over time.

As we have noted, rivalries have served as a case selection device to test well-known hypotheses and theories. If one thinks of rivalries as part of the theory instead of just the research design, then the appearance of these well-known models begins to change. To take up the power transition example again, as the label indicates, it is the power transition factor that receives all the attention. Yet if we examine its logical structure, the theory predicts that war is very likely if there is power transition *and* rivalry. Loosely, both are necessary for war to occur: "Only when a pair of states are relatively equal in capabilities can both sides in conflict realistically expect to win; only when the challenger is committed to change is there something over which to fight" (Lemke and Werner 1996,

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<sup>2</sup>Statistical tests and fixes for error dependence (e.g., Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998) may solve some methodological problems of dependence, but they do not reflect any *theoretical* analysis of interconflict linkages. See also Raknerud and Hegre 1997.

235). Lemke and Werner operationalize “commitment to change” through increasing military expenditures. In our terms, it is a commitment to a militarized foreign policy toward the rival. The two variables play a symmetrical role. War is very unlikely in the absence of either variable. Hence one needs to include rivalry variables explicitly in the theory, not bury them as case selection rules.

Almost all theories of learning refer to how events in the past influence current actions. “Learning” is an intervening variable that links the history of the rivalry to current decisions. Tetlock and Breslauer (1991) gathered together a large volume on learning involving relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, but did not recognize that it is one among many rivalries, or that one can use other rivalries to develop learning models. Particularly in enduring rivalries, leaders may rely on “lessons learned” from previous confrontations with the same enemy.

Once one is attentive to the rivalry relationship, it appears frequently in the conflict literature. For example, virtually all models of crisis include variables such as “background conflict.” Lebow (1981, 337) starts his crisis model with “underlying hostility” (i.e., a rivalry relationship) with causal arrows leading to crisis and a feedback arrow leading back to underlying hostility. Brecher (1979) frequently describes “past experience” as a core input into various phases of the crises he analyzes. Rivalries provide one way to specify what background factors matter and how they influence crisis behavior. Within the comparative case study framework, it is hard to develop, and even harder to test, these aspects of crisis theories. For example, Lebow had as one of his three main interests the “relationship between crisis and underlying patterns of conflict” (1981, 5). He wanted to know: “In what ways do crises affect the long-term relations between protagonists? In what circumstances do they act to intensify or ameliorate the conflicts which they reflect?” (5). Given his cross-sectional case study approach, he was not able to examine this question in much detail (that part of his book has one chapter, in contrast with the three and four chapters each for the other two parts). To answer these sorts of question one needs longitudinal comparative case studies, just as quantitative researchers need time-series data.

Although these references to underlying hostility or background conflict appear in figures and tables, they remain undeveloped theoretically. We suggest that all these embryonic intuitions refer to rivalry relationships. Crises usually occur within a rivalry. Learning often refers to past events in the relationship. Once we have the conceptual tools of rivalry, we can think about how, when, and why crises arise within this situation, and what is learned from them. We can pose questions about the role of crises in prolonging or ending the relationship. Similar to Lebow, we can ask if rivalry participants have learned something from the crisis that influences their behavior in the next exchange. Theories of learning or crisis that link disputes between rivals imply a dynamic explanation. Learning is a theory of belief change. Once we see a rivalry as enduring, we naturally ask questions about its evolution: how and why does it



change over its lifetime? (Hensel 1996; Maoz and Mor 1998; see also the other articles in Diehl 1998). A dynamic theory implies a longitudinal perspective, and conversely the longitudinal character of rivalries cries out for a dynamic explanation.

Not only does the rivalry approach change the way we perceive well-established research agendas, it generates hypotheses to be tested. These can be variations and refinements of existing agendas, as one reformulates power transition or crisis models, but there are also new hypotheses that relate to the phenomenon of rivalry itself—indeed the second half of this book is dedicated to exactly the latter. Once one replaces war as the core concept and phenomenon with rivalry, a new research program begins.

Chapter 4 develops these theoretical issues in a discussion of the rivalry approach to war and peace, detailing the ways it differs from the conventional “causes of war” approach as well as articulating the theoretical implications. Examples from different theoretical traditions and research programs, with deterrence studies being the primary example, illustrate the arguments. As a companion to its predecessor, chapter 5 focuses on the methodological implications of the rivalry approach for testing propositions about international conflict. The rivalry approach not only changes the way we think about old hypotheses, it has significant implications for the ways that research designs are constructed in testing old and new hypotheses alike.

Chapter 6 addresses perhaps the most interesting and important body of conflict research in the last decade, the notion of the “democratic peace”—the proposition that democracies rarely fight each other. In this chapter, we illustrate how the rivalry approach can lead to new insights on this phenomenon. The longitudinal character of the rivalry approach can help analyze changing conflict behavior and democratization over time. Thus, the question of why rivalries consisting of democratic dyads do not seem to evolve past a few disputes or escalate to war fits naturally into the rivalry framework of analysis. Furthermore, with a dynamic approach to conflict we can ask, for example, how changes in regime type influence the course of a rivalry. Does democratization of one or both rivals lead to the termination of the rivalry? Thus, we can hold most aspects of a given competition constant in order to see the impact of one factor (democracy) on conflict. Thus, chapter 6 serves as an illustration of the data, testing, and theory elements of the rivalry approach that are the centerpiece of the first half of this book.

## Part 2: Enduring Rivalries

The first part of this volume develops a new way to think about war and peace, what we have termed the rivalry approach. We apply rivalry notions to diverse areas of international war and peace scholarship. The focus is on the application of rivalry concepts to existing theory and phenomena such as deterrence, power transition, and the like. Part 2 develops another dimension of the rivalry

approach, which identifies important phenomena that require theoretical and empirical analysis: enduring rivalries.

In chapter 3, we indicate why enduring rivalries are an important empirical phenomenon, one worthy of extended study. A very large percentage of all disputes and wars is concentrated in this small number of dyads. As of 1992, there were approximately 17 thousand dyadic interstate relationships in the international system. As of that same year, there were only 37 ongoing enduring rivalries. Even if we limit our benchmark population to that of all rivalries, enduring rivalries still only constitute less than 6% of the total. Such a heavy concentration of military activity within a small number of enduring rivalries means that if we can understand them then we have made large steps in understanding war and other conflict in general.

As part of our focus in the second half of this book, we offer a general framework or model of enduring rivalries in order to understand their origins, dynamics, and termination. Accordingly, in chapter 7, we outline a punctuated equilibrium model of enduring rivalries.<sup>3</sup> The central elements of this model are stability and infrequent, abrupt change.

Punctuated equilibrium is a biological theory of great controversy, but it is now accepted by many natural scientists. Originally proposed by Eldredge and Gould (1972; for a general discussion see Eldredge 1985), it replaces the gradualistic evolution of standard Darwinism with one in which species are, for the most part, very stable. Yet periods of stability are occasionally disrupted by massive environmental shocks, which result in the death of many species and permit the rapid development of new species (Raup 1992). These environmental shocks consist of large-scale climate changes or the impact of large asteroids. Our punctuated equilibrium model of rivalry parallels quite faithfully in its general outlines the biological theory of punctuated equilibrium.

Many enduring rivalries last for decades, and this shows a remarkable stability in the relationship. Here we alter the common usage of the stability notion in international affairs. Traditional international relations theory (e.g., balance of power) often uses the physical metaphor of stability. This almost always means a condition of nonwar. One encounters the same language with regard to deterrence stability. In contrast, enduring rivalries are also a stable relationship in the sense that there is consistent recourse to force or the threat of force for decades on end. We also note a stability or consistency in the conflict levels of those violent interactions. We are faithful to the physical sense of stability, which refers to a situation of no change, and, more importantly, one resistant to change.

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<sup>3</sup>There is inconsistency in the use of *equilibria* versus *equilibrium* with the modifier *punctuated*. Even with the field of evolutionary biology, the originators of the model, Gould and Eldredge, use the singular and plural version seemingly interchangeably. As we consider each rivalry to have its own and usually single pattern of stability, we adopt the singular form and therefore use the term *punctuated equilibrium* throughout the book

In a hypothesis-testing frame of mind, what would be the basic hypothesis for a punctuated equilibrium model of enduring rivalries? We suggest that the place to start—and perhaps to end—is with the “no change” pattern. It is not that the rivalry relationship experiences no ups and downs, but those ups and downs exhibit no secular trend. Visually, this is a horizontal line representing the basic rivalry relationship, with disputes, crises, and wars randomly distributed around it.

Related to the expectation of no evolution is what we call the “lock-in” hypothesis. States initially move into rivalry relationships, and the punctuated equilibrium model proposes that this occurs quite rapidly. Once locked in, the rivalry relationship does not fundamentally change. Of course, the word evolution does not in itself say anything about speed, but implicitly the notion is of gradual change. In contrast, the lock-in hypothesis implies a rapid evolution of rivalry in its initial phases. In terms of “evolution,” there is rapid change initially as the militarized relationship gets established, but thereafter little or no fundamental change until that established relationship ends.

Thus, the first element of the punctuated equilibrium model is stability: rivalries and their patterns of conflict are stable over time. In chapter 9, we introduce the concept of the basic rivalry level, or BRL. At the heart of our approach lies the concept of militarized relationships: the BRL captures the level of hostility in this relationship. It is an unmeasured concept whose manifestations include war, disputes, crises, and the like. A high BRL corresponds roughly, in the conflict studies context, to a large number of battlefield casualties. The traditional international conflict literature is interested in why some disputes become wars. We are concerned with why some rivalries are more severe than others, in other words, why some have a higher basic rivalry level. We analyze different patterns in the evolution of rivalries and demonstrate that a constant BRL (a relatively flat distribution of conflict severity over time) represents the dominant pattern in our population of enduring rivalries.

One expectation in a punctuated equilibrium model of enduring rivalries is that the BRL will be largely unaffected in the short and medium term by most endogenous and exogenous events. Yet because enduring rivalries are the most dangerous forms of international conflict, there is special concern that such repeated confrontations be ameliorated, even if they can not be easily ended. Thus, we direct our attention to conflict management in enduring rivalries, looking not only to confirm the expectations of the punctuated equilibrium model, but also for insights on how such management might be understood and achieved.

Chapter 10 begins with a general discussion of how to conceptualize and operationalize conflict management within the context of enduring rivalries. The chapter then focuses specifically on how the evolution of enduring rivalries is affected by international attempts at conflict mediation and other forms of third-party intervention. Drawing on a new data set on international conflict

management, we explore how often conflict management occurs in the context of enduring rivalries and try to understand when such efforts are made (if indeed they are made at all). Are conflict management efforts made only in the most severe rivalries, or are they attempted in rivalries before they become enduring? At what stage in the rivalry are mediation and other approaches attempted, and how do they compare to the prescriptions derived from the extensive literature on timing and mediation success? Beyond a description of conflict management in rivalries, we also wish to assess its impact on the medium-term dynamics of enduring rivalries. Do conflict management efforts in such a context help to postpone the onset of violence, abate conflict, or even end rivalries? This question will provide us with some insights on exogenous influences on the stability of rivalries. Consistent with the expectations of the punctuated equilibrium model, we discover that rivalry stability is largely resistant to international mediation attempts.

While chapters 9 and 10 emphasize the stability of enduring rivalries, they are indeed subject to alterations. The most notable of these modifications reflects the second element of the punctuated equilibrium model: abrupt change. In our formulation, abrupt change in rivalries comes as a result of a political shock, a massive change in the political environment: domestic, international, or both. It can be a world war, a dramatic shift in power distribution, a change in the type of government regime, or the creation of a new state. Shocks almost always involve both a power shift and a change in the character of some of the actors. These shocks set the stage for possible new enduring rivalries and at the same time disrupt the stability of existing ones, possibly allowing them to end.

Shocks can occur in two forms, dramatic changes either in the international system or in the character of the actor/state. Though realists focus on the former and ignore the latter, changes in the character of the state—and by extension almost always in leadership—have a key impact on foreign policy. We consider the possibility that system-level shocks, such as a change in the power distribution of the international system or a world war, set the stage for the beginning of new rivalries and the end of existing rivalries. In addition, we consider how state-level political shocks, such as civil wars and changes in regime, affect the onset and continuation of rivalries.

In terms of both the origin and the termination of enduring rivalries, we take the stability notion very seriously. It is easy to see how well entrenched hostile policies can become with the example of the Cold War still fresh in mind. One needs serious reasons to pay the costs of a long-lasting military conflict. Chapter 11 describes the stability hypotheses in more detail and presents our empirical analysis of them. We stress that political shocks are not sufficient for either creation or termination of rivalries, but they are quasi-necessary conditions. It is rare to find rivalry origination or termination without a political shock, but many shocks occur without starting or ending a rivalry. Stability

means the ability to withstand shocks without losing equilibrium; hence we would expect enduring rivalries to weather some, but not all shocks.

Rivalries, similar to biological species, do not exist in isolation, and not all influences on their dynamics are of great magnitude. The rivalry approach privileges the dyad (it is not alone in this, e.g., Bremer 1992). Whether a rivalry makes it into the enduring category may very well depend on how the dyad interacts with other dyads. Big wars are almost always multilateral: a war's severity is largely a function of the number of participants. Alliances provide the classic means and reasons for additional parties to join a dispute or war. We introduce these considerations into the rivalry approach with the concept of *linked rivalries*. As with the war diffusion literature (for a survey see Most, Starr, and Siverson 1989), we see rivalries as connected by factors such as geography and alliances. We choose, however, the term *linked* to avoid the distracting and potentially misleading connotations of terms such as *diffusion* and *contagion*. The linkage concept represents a significant change in the view of war's expansion and diffusion. For example, because dyads (not states) are linked, the dependent variable in war diffusion studies becomes an independent variable for us: common participation in wars or disputes links rivalries (in addition to alliances and geography) and affects other conflict behavior. The causal arrow is also no longer completely determined by temporal order. For example, we argue that rivalries between two minor powers that are linked to a rivalry between major powers are influenced by that major-major rivalry, but the reverse causal influence does not necessarily hold. This is, of course, a hypothesis; many have argued that the tail sometimes wags the dog, (e.g., Israeli influence over the United States).

Beyond specific hypotheses, the key point in this introductory context is that one must consider the interactions between rivalries, as well as within them. The end of the Cold War rivalry between the United States and the USSR had major implications for many minor-minor power rivalries that were linked to it. Here we see shock and linkage variables working in tandem. The end of the Cold War was a political shock of the first magnitude, and at the same time it cut the links between a major-power rivalry and many smaller ones. Chapter 12 explores the different types of linkage between enduring rivalries and their impact on each other's conflict patterns.

Finally, as the conclusion to the book, chapter 13 presents a substantial research agenda for future work. There we return to the issues of data, testing, and theory construction in light of the rivalry approach. More substantially, we discuss promising avenues of research on the origins, dynamics, and termination of rivalries in light of the punctuated equilibrium model.

The rivalry approach attracts us because it generates new questions and provides new ways to examine traditional problems and theories. At every turn it has motivated us to rethink issues and practices, many of which we learned in graduate school and have not challenged since. As this volume shows, the

rivalry approach requires new data, new concepts, and new theory. The life cycle of an (enduring) rivalry also demands explanation. Understanding international conflict requires more than theories about the causes of war: it necessitates putting war in the rivalry context. In this book, we sketch out many of the issues involved and propose some solutions.