CHAPTER 7

Pennsylvania: Deindustrialization and Division

As a state that is closely identified with deindustrialization and the rust belt decline of the post–World War II period, Pennsylvania has not grown much in the last four decades of the twentieth century. Once the heartland of coal, apparel, and steel production, by 1990 only 20 percent of the labor force was employed in manufacturing. The shipbuilding industry in Philadelphia died soon after World War II. The steel industry in western Pennsylvania completely collapsed by the early 1980s, with only 14 percent of Pittsburgh's employment accounted for by manufacturing by 1988 (Giarratani and Houston 1989; Serrin 1993). In Bethlehem, the homegrown Bethlehem Steel Corporation employed only 3,600 workers by the mid-1990s, down from nearly 32,000 at its peak during World War II (Deitrick and Beauregard 1995). The coal industry in northeastern Pennsylvania also died, stranding long-time industrial workers in a postindustrial economy (Marsh 1987, 339; Kolbe 1975).

In spite of the deindustrialization process, the state has grown, though very slowly. The Pennsylvania population was just 14 percent larger in the mid-1990s than it was in 1950. Between 1980 and 1992, the average county grew by only 3.8 percent, and in thirty-five of the state's sixty-seven counties the population declined. None of Pennsylvania's jurisdictions have grown as fast as those of Florida or California. This is no surprise, of course. Migrants and immigrants base their choice of destinations partly on the availability of employment. Pennsylvania's stagnant economy has not been inviting in this respect.

For years there has been a cultural divide separating the people of eastern and western Pennsylvania. This divide has become demographic and economic, too, as map 7.1 illustrates. Eastern Pennsylvania has weathered the process of deindustrialization far better than the west and has completed the transition to the service economy without the long-term unemployment that still plagues the western counties (Gimpel 1996). The



Map 7.1. Population growth in Pennsylvania counties, 1950–92. (Mean = 32.7, Moran's I = .22)

shading in map 7.1 displays the contrast between growing and declining regions. Western Pennsylvania has experienced stunning population losses. Only one county in this area shows rapid growth from 1950 to 1992, Butler County, north of Pittsburgh. Allegheny County (Pittsburgh and its immediate suburbs) was 12 percent smaller in the 1990s than it was in the 1950s. Since white people of means are among the first to abandon a locality when jobs disappear and the poor are the least likely to move, the population loss has contributed to the spatial isolation of blacks and poorer ethnics in the worst labor markets in the state (Bodnar, Simon, and Weber 1982). Eastern Pennsylvania has experienced the most rapid growth, with the expansion of the suburbs around Philadelphia leading the way. Wealthy Montgomery County has doubled in size since the 1950s, and next door Bucks County has led suburban Philadelphia in population growth, moving from 145,000 in 1950 to over half a million by 1992. Some of this growth in the suburbs is due to out-migration from Philadelphia, but the economy of the region has also attracted migrants from out of state, in particular from the neighboring states of Maryland, New Jersey, and New York.

Little of Pennsylvania's growth can be accounted for by the arrival of new immigrants. It is one of the few states where a majority of foreign-born residents were still Caucasian in 1990. The ethnic composition of Pennsylvania's 370,000 immigrants is illustrated in fig. 7.1. Forty-two percent of the immigrant population entered the country before 1965, the year that the nationality preference system was changed by Congress, making Pennsylvania's immigrants much older on average than those in other states. As figure 7.1 shows, nearly half of the foreign-born population in the state is of European origin. An increasing number of Asians have been moving into the state, mostly to settle in Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and the Philadelphia suburbs (Goode 1990), but their numbers in 1990 remained small. Immigration from Latin America also constituted a small percentage of the foreign-born population, only 11 percent for South America, Mexico, the Caribbean, and Central America combined. Pennsylvania is therefore distinct from the other states discussed in this book with their much larger shares of Hispanic immigrants.

Adding to the state's ethnic diversity, though, is a large and concentrated black population, numbering more than a million in 1990. This bloc is highly concentrated in Philadelphia and to a lesser degree in Pittsburgh. Together, these cities contained 72 percent of the state's black population in 1992. When a racial dissimilarity index is calculated to determine the



Fig. 7.1. Composition of the foreign-born population in Pennsylvania, 1990

concentration of the black population across the state's counties, the index reveals considerably more concentration and segregation of blacks from whites than in Florida (chap. 6). In Pennsylvania, nearly two-thirds of blacks would have to move for them to be evenly distributed across the state's sixty-seven counties. The Asian and Hispanic populations, while much smaller, are not nearly so segregated. The same diversity index indicates that only about one-third of Asians and 46 percent of Hispanics would have to move for them to be evenly distributed. Politically, too, the state is spatially balkanized, as there are many one-party counties of either strong Republican or Democratic inclination. As in Florida, an index of dissimilarity suggests that about one-third of Republicans (or Democrats) would have to move in order for the parties to have equal strength across all counties.

Differences between immigrants, native Pennsylvanians, and internal migrants residing in the state in 1990 closely reflect the findings of many national studies. Migrants earn considerably more than either immigrants or natives (see appendix A, table A7.1). Internal migrants are also the best educated of the three groups. Natives and immigrants, though, are only several hundred dollars apart in average wage and salary incomes. Table A7.1 shows considerable difference between mean and median incomes for immigrants, indicating that immigrant earnings are especially concentrated at the lower end of the income distribution. An important difference between Pennsylvania and other states lies in the age of the foreign-born population. Immigrants were several years older, on average, than either natives or internal migrants in 1990. Pennsylvania has attracted so few recent immigrants from Latin America and Asia that fully 67 percent of

foreign-born residents there are non-Hispanic whites. The data strongly suggest that the foreign-born population in Pennsylvania arrived in the United States early. It is well established relative to populations in other states, although it is certainly not wealthy. Given the racial and economic profile of the immigrant population, we can reasonably expect it to be better integrated with the native and internal migrant populations than it is in many other places.

Settlement Patterns of Migrants and Immigrants in Pennsylvania

The darkly shaded areas of map 7.2 show where the growth in the proportion of internal migrants has been strongest in recent years. The south-central and northeastern counties stand out in the highest growth quartile, having benefited from migration from adjacent states, including New York, New Jersey, and Maryland. The counties of western Pennsylvania stand out because the proportion of out-of-state migrants in these places has declined. In western Pennsylvania, internal migrants have been slow to flow into the state, and many who were there in the 1960s and 1970s have left. In Philadelphia and its suburbs, the proportion of internal migrants shrunk during the 1990s because the native population increased faster than the foreign-born or migrant population. Growth in the proportion of immigrants across Pennsylvania during the 1980s can be characterized as sluggish at best (see map 7.3). Once again, western Pennsylvania stands out as an area increasingly dominated by natives whose familial attachments keep them in place. The lightly shaded counties near Wilkes-Barre and Scranton indicate that few recent immigrants have been attracted to the depressed anthracite coal region of northeastern Pennsylvania. In Philadelphia, the immigrant population has become slightly more visible but not in most of its suburbs.

Table 7.1 displays the results of regression models predicting where immigrants and U.S. internal migrants are becoming a larger or smaller proportion of the population in the areas where they have settled. The dependent variable, as in previous chapters, is the increase or decrease in the proportion of the population comprised of the particular group from 1980 to 1990. In other words, for a particular observation (county), if the proportion of Mexican migrants began the decade as 2 percent of the population and finished the decade at 4 percent, the dependent variable for that case would take on the value, +.2. By constructing the variable in this



Map 7.2. Change in the proportion of internal migrants in Pennsylvania counties, 1980–90. (Mean = .84, Moran's I = .43)



Map 7.3. Change in the proportion of immigrants in Pennsylvania counties, 1980–90. (Mean = –.28, Moran's I = .19)

TABLE 7.1. Influences on Population Concentration in Pennsylvania Counties, 1980–90

Variable	U.S. Migrants	African Immigrants	Asian Immigrants	European Immigrants	Canadian Immigrants	Mexican Immigrants	Central American Immigrants	South American Immigrants
% 1980 group population	.10** (.04)	–1.06** (.13)	.61** (.11)	–.42** (.03)	–.28** (.08)	1.36** (.33)	–.18 (.21)	.06 (.19)
% unemployment, 1980	.24** (.10)	–.004 (.003)	.03* (.01)	–.03** (.01)	–.001 (.002)	–.005 (.006)	–.009 (.006)	.0001 (.004)
Change in real median income, 1980–90	–.13** (.05)	.003* (.002)	.01* (.005)	.02** (.006)	–.0005 (.001)	–.002 (.003)	–.007* (.004)	–.003 (.002)
% net population change	.14** (.03)	.0006 (.001)	–.0007 (.002)	.004* (.002)	.0005 (.0004)	.002* (.001)	.003** (.001)	.002** (.001)
Population density	–.0005** (.00008)	–.00001** (.000002)	.00002** (.00001)	.00003** (.000007)	.0000001 (.00001)	.000001 (.000003)	.00003** (.000007)	.00001** (.000003)
% college students	–.09** (.05)	.006** (.002)	–.03* (.005)	.001 (.005)	.003** (.001)	–.003 (.003)	.005** (.003)	–.004** (.002)
Spatial lag	.46** (.09)	–.05 (.19)	.22** (.09)	–.18** (.09)	–.03 (.15)	–.31* (.18)	.42 (.33)	.38** (.18)
Constant	–2.47	.03	–.53	.21	.014	.07	.09	.02
N	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67
R^2_a	.89	.67	.94	.89	.21	.34	.45	.55

Note: Spatial autoregressive model, weighted for population; income coefficients expressed in thousands of 1992 dollars; dependent variable = change in population group as a percentage of total population. See appendix A for a full description of variables.

*$p < .10$. **$p < .05$.

manner, areas where the group population has increased do not necessarily register a positive value. It is important that the variable here shows positive gains for the population in question only when it has grown relative to the rest of the population.

The independent variables have been selected mostly on the basis of what economic and sociological theory has taught us about the reasons migrants and immigrants choose to settle where they do. The two principal hypotheses to be tested are (1) that groups concentrate where there are friends and family members—for example, coethnics—who can help them to gain a foothold in the new society; and (2) that groups concentrate where the job prospects are strongest or at least in areas where unemployment is most easily avoided.

The results are consistent with the notion that Asian and Mexican settlement patterns are most dependent upon existing coethnic communities. The areas where Asians and Mexicans are growing relative to the rest of the population are places where there were sizable populations of Asians and Mexicans at the beginning of the decade. Africans, Europeans, and Canadians, on the other hand, have been shrinking as a proportion of the population in areas where they have settled in the past. This is a reflection of both the declining proportion of immigrants from these world areas and their independence of coethnic enclaves.

European émigrés show some propensity to avoid increasing their presence in areas of high unemployment, but this is not the case with the other groups. Asians and U.S. internal migrants are a growing proportion of the population in areas that began the decade with high unemployment rates. This is unusual for internal migrants, who generally have the kind of information about local conditions that directs them to avoid areas with poor employment prospects. Some of the strongest growth in the out-of-state population occurred in northeastern Pennsylvania along the New York and New Jersey borders. Some of this growth is the result of development in the Pocono Mountains in Monroe and Pike Counties east of Scranton. The reason this growth is unrelated to employment in these areas is that northeastern Pennsylvania has not attracted as many job seekers as it has retirees and commuters from northern New Jersey and the New York City suburbs lured there by low-cost housing, open space, lakes, and mountains. Migration models that only consider economic conditions are likely to miss the important component of migration motivated by lifestyle considerations.

Several groups are growing as a function of net population increase.

These include internal migrants, Europeans, South Americans, Central Americans, and Mexicans. In other words, these groups are growing larger even in areas that are experiencing growth from other sources. These are sometimes, but not always, the more densely populated areas of the state, as the coefficients for population density show (table 7.1). Africans, Asians, Europeans, and South and Central Americans are all drawn to Pennsylvania's larger cities and suburbs. Asians increased their presence in both Philadelphia and suburban Montgomery County. Mexicans became a more significant presence in Berks (Reading) and Chester (suburban Philadelphia) Counties. Internal migrants are actually drawn to areas of low-density development, especially Monroe, Pike, and Wayne Counties. These results make it clear that the destinations of migrants and those where immigrants are concentrating are very different. The immigrant population is growing larger in Pennsylvania's urban centers and older suburbs. The population of out-of-state migrants is growing in rural areas of eastern Pennsylvania and in less densely populated suburbs.

Ethnic Balkanization and Naturalization in Pennsylvania

The fact that the internal migrant and immigrant populations are drawn to different areas of the state is of some consequence. Concentrated populations are much more noticeable than dispersed ones. While internal migration is not always of sufficient volume in Pennsylvania to influence the residential segregation of groups within counties, it is distinguishing counties from one another, strongly suggesting that the population of mostly white migrants from out of state, and that of immigrants, are not mixing well. The segregation accompanying increasing ethnic heterogeneity is occurring on top of the more familiar separation of the white and black populations that has helped to identify Philadelphia as a city with special interests and needs on the basis of its racial composition alone.

Concentrated immigrant populations are slower to assimilate politically than dispersed populations are, but naturalization rates also vary directly with duration of residence in the country. Given Pennsylvania's older stock of immigrants, the percentage of immigrants who are citizens is likely to be far higher there than in areas with more recent immigration—and at 59 percent in 1990, the state's naturalization rate is among the highest in the nation. Still, duration of residence is not the only important variable. Naturalization rates are a function of immigrant concentra-

tion and isolation, as table A7.2 shows. In 1980, however, it is noteworthy that foreign-born concentration was associated with high naturalization rates because the immigrant population in Pennsylvania remained predominantly of European origin. These European immigrants were concentrated in the state's urban areas but had immigrated prior to 1970. Where more recent Hispanic and Asian immigrant populations were clustered, naturalization rates were much lower. Hence, the segregation of Asian and Hispanic from white neighborhoods depressed naturalization rates according to the 1980 census data (table A7.2). By 1990, with Europeans shrinking as a proportion of the immigrant population, immigrant concentrations in Pennsylvania were associated with lower naturalization rates. Asian and Hispanic isolation are not statistically significant in 1990 because these variables are closely related to foreign-born concentration (table A7.2).

Migrants, Immigrants, and Voter Turnout in Pennsylvania

Has population migration and immigration helped to politically stratify the state? One might evaluate this by looking directly at levels of voter turnout across Pennsylvania jurisdictions. Trends and patterns of political participation have important implications for politics and policy because turnout ultimately determines who is elected to govern. One scholar of urban politics has noted that there are more avenues for citizen involvement and participation in central cities than in suburbs or "edge cities" (Scavo 1995). This dearth of participation in local politics by suburban residents may have broader implications for state and national politics. If a much smaller fraction of the suburban than the rural electorate participates in gubernatorial races, this undoubtedly gives rural areas a stronger voice in choosing statewide officeholders than they would have otherwise.

Participation rates averaged across two gubernatorial elections are shown by quartile on map 7.4. Interestingly, the area of the state that has experienced the most population growth, suburban Philadelphia (except for Delaware County), is in the lowest turnout cohort. Other areas of growth, including Butler County outside Pittsburgh, have lower than average turnout rates. The highest turnout areas, on the other hand, are those characterized by population stability or decline, including the rural northwest.

To explain these turnout patterns, table 7.2 presents a regression analysis of the influence of several demographic variables on the percent-



Map 7.4. Average turnout in Pennsylvania gubernatorial elections, 1990–94. (Mean = 55.7, Moran's I, = .33)

TABLE 7.2. Impact of Population Mobility on Voter Turnout in Pennsylvania Counties, 1980–94

Variable	1980	1982	1990	1992	1994	Pooled 1990s
% college educated	.31*	–.04	–.09	.15*	–.04	.01
	(.17)	(.24)	(.11)	(.08)	(.10)	(.09)
Isolation of minorities from whites (within counties)	–.0001	–.03	–.02	.03*	–.006	–.007
	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)
% post-1970 immigrants	–5.17**	–3.75	.22	–.23	–.25	–.30
	(1.52)	(2.20)	(1.15)	(.84)	(.93)	(.88)
% born out of state	–.09	–.21**	–.18**	–.07	–.07	–.09*
	(.06)	(.09)	(.07)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)
% black	–.35**	.32	.10	.20[a]	.09	.01
	(.14)	(.22)	(.21)	(.14)	(.15)	(.09)
Population density	–.001**	–.001*	–.001[a]	–.001[a]	–.0007[a]	–.0001
	(.0001)	(.0005)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)
Spatial lag	.28*	.04	.25*	.02	.55**	.61**
	(.17)	(.16)	(.15)	(.16)	(.14)	(.10)
Presidential race	—	—	—	—	—	4.35**
						(1.44)
Constant	56.42	73.65	48.54	60.87	46.53	23.47
N	67	67	67	67	67	201
R^2_a	.72	.76	.65	.26	.54	.69

Note: Spatial autoregressive model, weighted for population; dependent variable = percentage of turnout by county. See appendix A for a full description of variables.

[a]Variables with low tolerances and high standard errors due to multicollinearity.

*$p < .10$. **$p < .05$.

age of registered voters who have participated in recent elections. My central hypothesis is that population growth from outside Pennsylvania reduces the political participation of eligible voters given various barriers to reregistration. Control variables for education, population density, the segregation of white from minority neighborhoods, and the percentage of the population that is African American are designed to evaluate whether population mobility has an impact on county-level participation once these other variables are added. The results show that the percentage of the population born out of state is negatively associated with turnout in all of the elections. This corresponds to the findings in other states, including Kentucky (chap. 5), which suggest that migrants may be slower to take an interest in politics than long-term residents. Corresponding to this is the finding that the percentage of recent immigrants (those who immigrated since 1970) is associated with lower turnout in four out of the five races considered in table 7.2. In the 1980 presidential contest, for instance, a 1 point increase in the percentage of recent immigrants across counties was associated with a 5.2 point drop in voter turnout. The key insight here is that the exercise of social and political power by a population lags well behind that population's arrival in a new place. There are considerable costs involved in learning about the politics of a new location.

The population of college educated residents promotes turnout in presidential elections but depresses it in gubernatorial contests. Apparently areas with well-educated populations such as Chester, Montgomery, and Bucks Counties in the Philadelphia suburbs are far less interested in local politics than in major national elections. Not coincidentally these are also the counties with the most interstate migrants.

The black population has no consistent impact on an area's turnout, increasing it relative to predominantly white areas in most races but dropping it in 1980. Black turnout in cities such as Philadelphia and Pittsburgh may depend upon the competitiveness of the contest and the mobilization efforts of particular candidates and campaigns. Population density is negatively associated with turnout in all five elections. On average, urban and suburban areas do turn out a smaller percentage of eligible voters than the more rural counties. Finally, the spatially lagged dependent variable indicates that turnout patterns have a regional basis in Pennsylvania that reaches across county boundaries in the most recent elections.

These results clearly show that turnout across Pennsylvania counties is highly variable both across the state and across election years. Still, the state is stratified in some consistent and predictable ways. In most elec-

tions, urban areas do not have the representation at the polls that rural areas do. Suburban areas with well-educated populations vary more from election to election, often generating higher turnout than nonsuburban counties in presidential elections but then lagging behind the other counties in off-year contests. Not coincidentally, it is the suburbs that have the highest proportion of out-of-state migrants, who are slow to develop interest in local and statewide elections (Muller, Meyer, and Cybriwsky 1976). Turnout rates are occasionally cleaved along native-immigrant lines, with areas of large immigrant concentrations having lower levels of political participation than those with large native concentrations, especially in the early 1980s.

Much has been made of the rise of suburban power in American politics, and rightly so, for a plurality of voters in most states now live in suburban communities. For purposes of legislative apportionment, it is not at all trivial that the membership of Congress and the state legislatures is more suburban than it has ever been. But in statewide elections suburban power may not be fully realized due to the transient nature of the suburbs and the reluctance of well-educated migrants to involve themselves in state and local affairs. A further factor may also be relevant to the Pennsylvania case in particular. Several recent gubernatorial contests have been won by popular politicians who were well ahead in the polls in the weeks before election day. The perception that a race is not competitive gives voters the impression that their votes will make little difference to the outcome. Many suburban voters may respond by skipping the consensus contests such as the 1990 reelection of popular governor Bob Casey.

Migrants, Immigrants, and Party Regularity in Pennsylvania

Areas of heavy in-migration are more likely to be irregular in their political behavior than those with highly stable populations. By party irregularity in this context, I mean the extent to which party registration figures predict actual balloting. Those counties where there is little correspondence between the two are said to be irregular. Which counties might be irregular can be predicted based on studies done at the individual level of analysis (Brown 1988). Political attitudes and party affiliations often change with migration as people sort out how traditional cues apply in novel, unfamiliar settings. The percentage of migrants from out of state is highly associated with independent party registration in Pennsylvania

(table not reported). Counties with more nonnatives, whether immigrants or internal migrants, should be more irregular in their behavior, often departing from party registration figures when actual ballots are cast.

Alternatively, counties may be irregular because sizable proportions of the registered electorate simply fail to show up at the polls. If 35 percent of the county is registered Democratic and 35 percent Republican, but only half of the registered Democrats vote while all the Republicans do, the difference in turnout will cause the county to be far more Republican than its registration figures would predict. The counties with the lowest turnout are most likely to show wide gaps between party balance and voting behavior. Since higher proportions of foreign-born residents and internal migrants are associated with low turnout, we would also expect these variables to be associated with party irregularity.

In fact, the results for Pennsylvania are mixed and vary from election to election (see table 7.3). The proportion of recent foreign-born residents is associated with party irregularity in most elections, but the effect is not always statistically significant. The proportion of out-of-state migrants seems to promote party *regularity* in most elections but in the 1990s has no statistically significant impact when other variables are included. This is contrary to the findings at the individual level, and for other states, where interstate migrants were *positively* associated with departures from partisanship. In Pennsylvania, however, the tendency for cross-state migration to generate party regularity must be understood in the context of the irregular partisanship of many rural Democrats, who often vote for Republicans. In western Pennsylvania, in particular, Republican candidates often do far better than registration figures would predict. In 1982, incumbent governor Richard Thornburgh, a Republican, won 48 percent of the Westmoreland County vote, though Republican registration was only at 29.1 percent. Thornburgh's opponent that year was a liberal congressman from eastern Pennsylvania, and eastern politicians are often eyed suspiciously by westerners. While the voting patterns of rural counties like Westmoreland are not easily predicted by their balance of party registrants, some counties did follow their registration patterns in the early 1980s. One of these is Chester County, in suburban Philadelphia, where high in-migration, Republican registration, and Republican voting coincide. Adjacent to Chester are Delaware and Montgomery Counties, also strongly Republican and quite regular in their behavior in spite of having a large population of nonnatives. Two things may account for the close alignment of party registration and voting in suburban Philadelphia. First, there is the

TABLE 7.3. Similarity of Party Registration to Party Voting in Pennsylvania Counties, 1980–94

Variable	1980	1982	1990	1992	1994	Pooled 1990s
% college educated	–.02	–.43	–.18	.40**	–.06	–.31*
	(.37)	(.38)	(.30)	(.18)	(.16)	(.17)
% born out of state	–.24*	–.33**	.02	–.02	–.06	.06
	(.13)	(.16)	(.18)	(.11)	(.09)	(.10)
% post-1970 immigrants	–.64	–1.96[a]	2.94[a]	.39[a]	.97[a]	5.13**
	(3.73)	(3.61)	(2.90)	(1.87)	(1.68)	(1.73)
% black	.07[a]	1.19**	–.67[a]	–.58[a]	.14[a]	–.28
	(.29)	(.30)	(.47)	(.31)	(.24)	(.27)
Population density	.0004	–.003**	.0005[a]	.0008[a]	–.001[a]	–.001
	(.001)	(.001)	(.002)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)
% turnout	–.03	–.18	.23	.14	–.13	.19
	(.31)	(.23)	(.33)	(.29)	(.21)	(.15)
Spatial lag	.50**	.72**	.69**	.70**	1.20**	.14
	(.20)	(.18)	(.14)	(.19)	(.13)	(.10)
Presidential race	—	—	—	—	—	–6.81**
						(2.28)
Constant	11.03	20.91	–6.75	–12.13	6.89	3.62
N	67	67	67	67	67	201
R^2_a	.16	.42	.42	.41	.64	.21

Note: Spatial autoregressive model, weighted for population; dependent variable = Abs (% Republican vote – % Republican registration); high positive values indicate counties where voting differed from registration. See appendix A for a full description of variables.

[a]Variables with low tolerances and high standard errors due to multicollinearity.

*$p < .10$. **$p < .05$.

"anticity" vote. The Philadelphia suburbs are more cohesively Republican than they might otherwise be because Philadelphia is so loyally Democratic. Second, the Philadelphia suburbs are known for being tightly organized and having strong party machines. This ensures a stronger measure of party discipline than one might find in a more rural Republican county where high costs prohibit the effective organization of a more dispersed population.

The inconsistent signs on the coefficients in table 7.3 for variables such as population density and percentage black may be due to multicollinearity—densely populated counties also contain large black populations. But the inconsistency of direction may have a more substantive meaning that points to the competitiveness of elections. In 1990 and 1982, both incumbents were considered easy candidates for reelection. The 1994 election, though, was the most competitive statewide governor's race in recent memory. Local patterns of turnout and party regularity are not as predictably stratified in Pennsylvania as they are in states where underlying demographic characteristics explain these outcomes independent of the particulars of a given election year. In other chapters, I have shown that the differences in turnout and party regularity usually hinge upon the proportion of nonnatives in an area and often upon the education and racial composition of the local population. In Pennsylvania, however, the role these factors play in distinguishing one place from another may depend upon the competitiveness of the election. In close elections, when mobilization and party loyalty count most, the state is more cleaved by region than in elections where strong incumbents have secured consensus behind their candidacy. Proof of this lies in the size and significance of the spatially lagged dependent variable for 1994 in tables 7.2 and 7.3. The 1994 election was the closest gubernatorial race in recent memory. For both turnout and party regularity, positive spatial dependency is stronger in 1994 than any other year, indicating that regional balkanization is more pronounced in competitive elections than in noncompetitive ones.

Changes in Party Registration in Pennsylvania

In previous chapters, I have repeatedly argued that growth in the population of U.S. internal migrants stimulates growth in the share of Republican registrants. Prima facie evidence for the connection between the two appears on map 7.5, where the shading bears a striking resemblance to the patterns of population growth depicted on map 7.1. Economically



Map 7.5. Change in the proportion of Republican registrants in Pennsylvania counties, 1980–90. (Mean = .80, Moran's I = .37)

depressed areas have not been kind to the GOP, as we see in the lightly shaded regions in western Pennsylvania (map 7.5).

In the Pennsylvania case, Republican growth is associated with increases in the out-of-state population in both decades (table 7.4). For every percentage point of growth in the proportion of internal migrants, Republican registration growth moves up half a point during the 1970s and by .30 during the 1980s. Growth in the proportion of foreign-born residents is also associated with Republican growth in the 1970s and 1980s, reflecting the suburbanization of the immigrant population. It is noteworthy that increases in the proportion of foreign-born residents are associated with Republican growth in both decades. The places where Republicans seem to be gaining in the face of immigrant growth are in the southeastern Pennsylvania counties (York, Adams, and Lancaster) and several directly north of Philadelphia. This is no indication, of course, that

TABLE 7.4. Impact of Population Mobility on Changes in Republican Party Registration in Pennsylvania Counties, 1970–80, 1980–90

Variable	1970–80	1980–90
% born out of state, 1970 (1980)	–.13*	.03
	(.08)	(.07)
Change in % born out of state	.46**	.30**
	(.22)	(.14)
% foreign born, 1970 (1980)	–.19	–.10
	(.35)	(.28)
Change in % foreign born	2.85**	3.02**
	(.77)	(.71)
% Republican registrants, 1970 (1980)	–.19**	–.05**
	(.03)	(.02)
Population density	–.001**	.0003**
	(.00004)	(.0002)
Spatial lag	–.48**	.56**
	(.18)	(.15)
Constant	4.66	3.72
N	67	67
R^2_a	.78	.68

Note: Spatial autoregressive model, weighted for population; dependent variable = change in Republican Party registration. See appendix A for a full description of variables.

[a]Variables with low tolerances and high standard errors due to multicollinearity.

*$p < .10$. **$p < .05$.

the foreign born are necessarily registering and voting Republican. Many of the immigrants moving to such places are educated and skilled and have simply found their way to a better life in suburbia along with much of the native-born population. Suburbia's GOP orientation is coincidental to their arrival.

Much of the partisan change in Pennsylvania is directly related to deindustrialization. In chapter 1, I cited the evidence that Republicans are among the first to leave depressed areas. Republicans, therefore, lose registrants in economic hard times due to attrition. The results in table 7.4 are consistent with this explanation. In the 1970s, places of greater population density suffered heavy GOP losses. Areas that were strongly Republican in 1970 lost GOP strength from 1970 to 1980 and again from 1980 to 1990. Many of these losses occurred in areas where unemployment hit hardest, forcing the able bodied and well educated to move out. During the 1980s, Republicans lost five points to other parties in Armstrong County near Pittsburgh, and similar losses were incurred in western jurisdictions that were affected by the collapse of the steel industry.

Partisan change shows a pattern of negative spatial dependency during the 1970s, indicating that growth in GOP registration in a particular place was negatively related to growth in GOP registration in adjacent areas (see table 7.4; see also appendix B). Such a pattern of spatial clustering is consistent with the political development of suburban counties surrounding Pittsburgh and Philadelphia. At the same time that the state's largest cities are losing Republican registrants, the suburbs are gaining them. Hence, positive values for one observation are associated with negative values for geographically proximate observations. In the 1980s, though, the coefficient for the spatially lagged dependent variable in table 7.4 shows positive spatial dependency. This pattern indicates that Republican growth is occurring in "county clusters" or entire subsections of the state, independent of county boundaries or the redistribution of population between urban and suburban counties.

Pennsylvania's slow growth masks changes going on at the county level, which altered the balance of party registrants during the 1980s and early 1990s. Eastern Pennsylvania, in particular, has weathered difficult recessionary times to come out on top. Suburban Philadelphia has seen both population growth and Republican growth due to an influx of migrants from other states. Western Pennsylvania, on the other hand, has experienced population decline and Republican losses relative to those of

other parties. Eastern Pennsylvania's restructured postindustrial economy, with its burgeoning share of white collar jobs in service industries and high technology manufacturing, is an especially suitable foundation for building a Republican-dominant politics. Western Pennsylvania still finds many of its interests best represented by Democrats.

The instrument for the economic balkanization of the state has been the uneven development of postindustrial enterprise. This uneven development has perpetuated, and to a great extent exacerbated, the separation of the state's population into two regions, east and west. The growth of Philadelphia's suburbs has been the result of in-migration from both other states and other countries. It is highly doubtful, of course, that many of the immigrants are naturalizing and registering as Republicans. The finding in table 7.4 suggesting that growth in the foreign-born population is closely linked to Republican growth could also be due to the native reaction to the growing number of immigrants in some Pennsylvania communities. Alternatively, immigration to an area is often a sign of an expanding economy. Immigrants are no less smart than native migrants. If they are going to the trouble to relocate, they want to settle in a place where there are economic opportunities. Coincidentally, expanding economies that are drawing population from all sources are often the places where the Republican share of the electorate is growing most rapidly. Democrats, on the other hand, gain most from immobility—from those who are left behind—which is one reason why Democrats have not lost their hold on the most deindustrialized and depopulated regions of the state.

Ethnicity and Political Behavior at the Individual Level

The aggregate data examined up to this point have revealed some interesting patterns in the Keystone State's recent development. We know that Asians and Mexicans are becoming more noticeable and concentrated in the areas where they have settled (table 7.1). There is also the important fact that recent statewide gubernatorial races have not always been competitive contests. Long-established generalizations in political science link turnout levels to the competitiveness of an election. Having added that important caveat, we have seen that out-of-state and foreign-born populations are associated with lower turnout in many major elections and that party regularity is higher in suburban Philadelphia than in other areas of

the state. We have also seen that growth in the migrant and immigrant populations is linked to Republican growth. The inevitable ambiguities of ecological data do not allow us to conclude that the relationships examined in tables 7.2, 7.3, and 7.4 exist at the individual level. Drawing upon the statistical technique designed by Gary King (1997) to provide maximally descriptive individual level information from aggregate data, I estimated the proportion of blacks and whites who registered Republican for 1990, 1992, and 1994, based on county level observations of Republican registration and racial/ethnic composition. The proportion of white voters registering as Republicans hovered around 48 to 49 percent for all three years. Estimates of the proportion of the black population registered with the GOP were considerably lower, as we would expect them to be, but fluctuated more from presidential to gubernatorial election years: 24 percent for 1990, 6 percent for 1992, and 15 percent for 1994. Estimates for Hispanics and Asians showed greater Republican registration than among blacks, but less support for Republicans than among whites. The estimates for Asians and Hispanics, while clearly plausible, were not very precise due to severe aggregation bias in the data. State-level polling data may provide additional insight into the validity of inferences made at the aggregate level, especially on the question of whether ethnic groups in the state identify with the Republican or Democratic Party.

Whites are about evenly split between the parties, blacks are predictably Democratic, and Hispanics are, surprisingly, more Republican than in many other states, including California (see table 7.5; for the California comparison, see table 2.5). In 1994, a majority of Hispanic respondents reported that they were independents. Asians, on the other hand, were highly Republican in the 1994 contest. Only 10 percent of Pennsylvania's Asian population identified with the Democrats that year, compared to 58 percent in 1990. While the small numbers of Asians and Hispanics sampled are responsible for the volatility of these figures, it is also possible that Republicans do gain from the kind of established older immigrants one is likely to find in Pennsylvania. Philadelphia, for instance, shows stronger black versus white cleavages in voting behavior than any other area or city in the state. Philadelphia's nonblack minorities (Asians and Hispanics) are as likely to say they are independent as Democrat. Perhaps this is because the Democratic Party in Philadelphia is so dependent upon the majority black community for support that it has no incentive to reach out to the much smaller Hispanic and Asian communities. In Pittsburgh, where the black community is not nearly as influential, Hispanics are far

more likely to report that they are Democrats. Asians, however, are more likely to be Republicans than Democrats in western Pennsylvania.

The patterns of party regularity described in the county-level analysis do have some basis in the traits of individual voters. Survey data reveal that Philadelphia's suburban voters were more consistent in their partisanship in the 1994 election than voters in the city proper, and more consistent than in Pittsburgh. That the suburbs should show such regularity is surprising given that whites are far more likely than ethnics to vote in a manner inconsistent with partisanship. But in highly polarized elections fierce competition enforces party regularity. Once again, the extent to which the state is geographically stratified into high and low turnout areas seems to depend crucially on the competition for given offices.

Political Change and the Internal Composition of Pennsylvania Counties

Several of Pennsylvania's counties are worth close scrutiny because they present cases different from others in this book. None of the other states have experienced the kind of economic restructuring that has occurred in Pennsylvania. In a previous work, I argued that deindustrialization has

TABLE 7.5. Party Identification by Race/Ethnicity in Pennsylvania Elections, 1990–94

Race/Ethnic Group	Year	Democrat	Independent	Republican
White	1990	42.4	20.6	37.0
	1992	40.5	19.8	39.6
	1994	35.2	21.0	43.7
Black	1990	78.1	14.6	7.3
	1992	75.5	20.2	4.3
	1994	80.6	15.2	4.2
Hispanic	1990	37.5	12.5	50.0
	1992	21.1	34.0	44.9
	1994	20.7	54.9	24.4
Asian	1990	58.3	25.0	16.7
	1992	38.2	12.3	49.5
	1994	10.3	27.6	67.1

Source: Voter Research and Surveys, General Election Exit Polls, 1990–94 (weighted data).

changed the electoral foundations of the state, contributing to a less predictably divided electorate than existed in the past and thereby generating a more candidate-centered politics (Gimpel 1996). Here I have posed a slightly different question: how the population changes accompanying the industrial restructuring of Pennsylvania have altered the social and political composition of counties, cities, and regions.

As in Florida and the other states I have studied, political change in Pennsylvania is related to demographic changes within the state. Of the various characteristics of an area that are relevant to politics, I have focused on patterns of ethnic and racial segregation. Spatially isolated minority groups practice a different kind of politics than spatially integrated ones. Isolated minorities are less likely to participate than more integrated groups, and they are more likely to practice a distinctively group-centered politics when they do get involved. Politicians from these communities have difficulty not practicing a racial or ethnic style of politics, for this is what is most likely to get them elected. While a group-centered politics may succeed in securing a few ethnically held seats in a city, state, or national legislature, these candidates usually have trouble moving any further because the race-based rhetoric that resonates so well in isolated communities turns off the broader majority. An additional perverse political effect of minority isolation is the election of electorally safe incumbents who rarely have to fear retribution at the polls for bad behavior. Finally, another noticeable effect of the isolation of minorities has been their inactivity in broad-based Democratic party-building efforts and the consequent strengthening of Republican prospects. But what of Pennsylvania? Is it any different?

Pennsylvania's patterns of ethnic and residential segregation are similar to those of the other states we have examined. The dissimilarity index in table 7.6 shows that blacks are the most spatially isolated minority population relative to whites (for a definition of the index, see chap. 2, n. 1). In 1990, nearly 80 percent of blacks would have had to move for them to be evenly distributed across the state's 3,166 census tracts. The degree of segregation has hardly changed since 1980. As in other states, Hispanics are the second most segregated population, more highly segregated than in Kentucky (chap. 5). Asians are the least segregated, although, interestingly, they are more highly segregated in Pennsylvania than in Florida (chap. 6).

The counties evaluated in table 7.6 run a wide gamut but do not necessarily represent the experience and composition of all areas in the state.

TABLE 7.6. Index of Dissimilarity for the Black, Asian, and Hispanic Populations Relative to Whites in Four Pennsylvania Counties, 1980 and 1990, by Census Tract

	Pennsylvania		Allegheny		Adams		Chester		Erie	
Variable	1980	1990	1980	1990	1980	1990	1980	1990	1980	1990
Asians	.46	.51	.44	.48	.31	.26	.32	.32	.37	.37
Blacks	.81	.79	.76	.74	.38	.43	.52	.50	.65	.65
Hispanics	.58	.61	.29	.29	.33	.32	.51	.47	.38	.49
N	3,166	3,166	499	499	19	19	113	113	69	69

Source: U.S. Census 1990, and author's calculations.

Note: Figures represent the percentage of each group that would have to move in order for the group to be evenly distributed across census tracts in the county.

In none of these jurisdictions is the population of recent immigrants much of a force. Pennsylvania's immigrant population is small, and the number of Asian immigrants is shrinking relative to the native population in Adams and Erie Counties. Hispanic immigrants increased as a proportion of the population in all four counties from 1980 to 1990. But in spite of their small numbers relative to the white population people of color are segregated to an extraordinary degree across all four places.

Adams County (Gettysburg) sits in the rural south-central region along the Maryland border. Never an area of heavy industry, between 1980 and 1992 this county experienced strong growth by Pennsylvania standards, moving from 68,000 to 81,000, a 19 percent increase. Republicans have also gained considerable ground, picking up about four points on Democrats and third parties during the 1980s. Adams shows comparatively low levels of racial segregation until one recognizes just how small the minority population is. With a black population of only 1 percent, less than 1 percent Asians, and about 2 percent Hispanics, it is difficult to imagine that there could be active racial exclusion. Nevertheless, according to the figures in table 7.6, 43 percent of the black population would have to move for this group to be evenly distributed across the nineteen tracts in the county.

Allegheny County is comprised of Pittsburgh and most of its suburbs, including McKeesport and Monroeville. Home to many Polish and Italian immigrants, as well as black migrants from the South and their descendants, Allegheny is a particularly good place to examine patterns of segregation in an urban area afflicted with significant population losses. Eight percent fewer people lived there in 1992 than in 1980. The figures in table 7.6 show that Allegheny County's Asian and black populations are nearly as isolated as in the state itself. Hispanics, on the other hand, are considerably less segregated from whites in the Pittsburgh area than they are statewide. In spite of the segregation, Democrats have done well here, probably because the first to leave the area were the most skilled, educated, and mobile of those laid off.

Chester County in the Philadelphia suburbs (see map 7.1) has experienced rapid economic growth. It has one of the largest non-Pennsylvanian populations in the state, as it has drawn many white collar workers from Delaware. Republicans gained some ground in Chester, though only a modest 1.3 percent, from 1980 to 1990. The population is only 6 percent black, but these blacks are more likely to be middle class than poor so

there is less segregation between Caucasians and other races than is found in either Allegheny or poorer communities like Erie.

Finally, Erie County is in the northwest corner of the state, adjacent to New York and Ohio, bordering the shores of Lake Erie. Unlike Pittsburgh, Erie has experienced some growth since midcentury, but nearly all of that growth has occurred in the county rather than the city of Erie. From 1980 to 1990, the county lost less than 1 percent of its population, which stood at 280,000 by 1992. The county's black population is small (5 percent) but highly concentrated. Table 7.6 shows that two-thirds of the black population would be required to move for their numbers to be evenly distributed across the county's sixty-nine tracts. Hispanics are more segregated here than in Allegheny County, a surprising finding given that they only comprised 1 percent of the population in 1990. Republicans have done well in recent elections but have hardly improved their registration. From 1980 to 1990, there was a minuscule .1 percent increase in the share of GOP registrants. Erie County appears to violate the generalization that racially segregated populations benefit Republicans. Like other cities, though, the density of the population probably lessens the impact of spatial isolation on political activity.

Adams County

The Adams County economy is based on agriculture and tourism. Twenty thousand acres of apple and peach orchards cover the northern and western reaches of the county. Gettysburg is adjacent to the famous Civil War battlefield, now a national park. Growth has become an increasingly divisive issue, as commuters from the nearby cities of Baltimore, Washington, D.C., and Harrisburg have sought to escape urban life into more pastoral settings. "People like the rural life and will commute incredible distances to live here," said one local planner. Pennsylvania does not tax pension income, so elderly retirees from Maryland are also attracted to the area. Natives resent that Maryland commuters, with incomes much higher than those of the average Pennsylvania resident, have driven prices up and forced the natives into a kind of second-class status. The nonagricultural segment of the local economy is based on low-paying service sector jobs related to tourism, restaurant and hotel businesses mostly. In average annual wages, Adams County ranked among the lowest in the state in the early 1990s.

The new arrivals, often moving from more developed suburban areas, are accustomed to a wide range of public services. This puts pressure on

local governments to raise taxes to meet new demands. Natives, often living on fixed incomes or employed in low-paying service sector jobs, cannot afford the taxes to support economic development. Still, the newcomers have been slow to involve themselves in Pennsylvania politics, and natives control most political offices. Local politicians proudly distinguish themselves from newcomers by proclaiming that they were born in the county.

The natives also look to the east and see the crowding of Lancaster County. They are fearful that this pattern of change is in their future. "People are not interested in a city moving here," said one local, himself a California transplant (Eshleman 1991). Naturally these fears have translated into pressure for local growth control. The integrity of the Gettysburg battlefield itself has been at stake in some recent quarrels about whether to build a shopping mall that abuts the park. Development has won some of these battles. Route 30, the major east-west thoroughfare, has been described as overburdened, a "homogenized, stripped-out melange of 20th century motel and fast-food culture" (Goldstein 1991).

The areas of migrant settlement are shown on map 7.6. Even in this sparsely populated area, one can see that immigrant and migrant settlements are in separate parts of the county. The area is home to a significant population of Mexican migrant workers who pick apples on farms north of Gettysburg. Haitians are a smaller but still significant portion of the migrant work force. Given the location of the orchards, "upper Adams" is where most of the Hispanic population is concentrated. South-central Pennsylvania has long had the lowest unemployment rate in the state, so it is not surprising that the migrant laborers have been a presence here since the 1960s. Even family-owned farms hire them. Long-time Anglo natives describe the migrant workers as "good citizens. They work, raise their families, and do not go on welfare." They are also politically inactive and "stick to themselves. The Catholic church is their only gathering point." They are "not involved in criminal activity like minorities elsewhere," said one local reporter.

The model of partisan change in table 7.4 suggested that growth in the immigrant population is associated with growth in the Republican share of registrants. In the case of Adams County, however, there is no direct causal relationship at the individual level. Most Hispanics in Adams do not vote, and many are not even citizens. Hispanics are drawn to Adams County because of economic opportunities that are not available in the declining areas of the state. This economic growth also happens to be attracting an increasing number of Republican migrants from Maryland



Map 7.6. Internal migrant and immigrant magnets in Adams County, Pennsylvania, 1990

and other states. Ethnic balkanization is on its way because Hispanics are settling down to raise families in rural Pennsylvania, only occasionally returning to their hometowns in Mexico.

The mechanism of the spatial segregation of the Hispanic population in Adams County is the location of jobs. It makes little sense for Hispanic migrants to commute to the apple farms when there is housing close by and commuting costs are high. Hispanic families (of all races) made only 65 percent of what non-Hispanic white families made in 1990. Ethnic tension is not much of an issue. Blacks constituted only 1 percent of the county population in 1990. There are few Asians, although Indians in the hospitality and convenience store businesses are a noticeable presence. Adams County is an excellent example of a case in which the isolation of the Hispanic population has hindered its assimilation and rendered it politically powerless. Like communities of immigrant agricultural laborers in California, Colorado, Florida, and other states, rural isolation has a far more adverse impact on participation in civic life than urban isolation has. While there are no signs of exploitation of Hispanics by farmers that compares to what is found in the meatpacking industry in Kansas and Colorado, the Latino population is vulnerable and excessively dependent upon the benevolence of their employers.

Pittsburgh and Allegheny County

Allegheny County's population loss can be attributed to younger middle and upper income out-migrants and semiskilled workers who finally realized that the old blue collar manufacturing jobs would not return. "You figured out the old jobs weren't going to come back when they started tearing down the mills in the early 1980s," said one local reporter. This left a large population of older residents, and a demoralized underclass, alongside established older wealth. By the early 1990s, Pittsburgh had made a comeback, bringing in high technology and service industries for the well educated (Stokes 1994). For the unskilled, the new industries offered lower paying nonunion employment, but this was better than nothing. Pittsburgh's effort to become the next Silicon Valley has been aided by the presence of excellent universities, but public school enrollment has declined, indicating that few people with families have been attracted to the area.

The Mon Valley, southeast of Pittsburgh, has not fared as well as the city itself. Along the Monongahela River lie the blighted, bombed-out remains of once thriving steel towns: Homestead, McKeesport, Duquesne, and Clairton (Serrin 1993; see map 7.7). In the early 1980s, 150,000 jobs



Map 7.7. Internal migrant and immigrant magnets in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, 1990

were permanently lost in this area. A few marginal businesses survive, mostly because the buildings they are in would be empty otherwise and are owned by elderly proprietors who have nothing else to do (Marsh 1987). With the sudden loss of the industrial tax base, these communities have been hard pressed to pay for basic public services. The remaining population consists mainly of two groups: the elderly, living on fixed incomes; and the poor, who are usually dependent on public assistance (Gittell 1992). The neighborhoods in these depressed areas are in a long-term state of decline typified by abandoned and dilapidated housing, drug activity, and crime. William Julius Wilson has found the same neighborhood dynamics at work in Chicago associated with depopulation and neighborhood disinvestment (1996). The Mon Valley has experienced no population growth, a situation that has aided Democrats, as the elderly and black populations are highly loyal. When asked why more young people do not leave, one local observer explained that "many residents do not think it would be better anywhere else. There is a lack of hope." Nor are there the resources in this population to pack up and go. Then there is the familiar gap in depressed areas everywhere between what a place provides and what it means (Marsh 1987). Some endure the social and economic hardship of remaining in a poor community because they have strong psychic ties to their neighborhood, church, family, and friends (Wilson 1996).

The wave of immigrants arriving since 1968 has largely bypassed Pittsburgh. Hispanic immigrants in search of work would not find it in a depressed economy. The Latino population is large enough, however (8,000 in 1990), to support a Spanish language newspaper. Map 7.7 shows that the areas of immigrant concentration tend to be in the poorer sections south of Pittsburgh rather than in the wealthier northern tracts. Areas where migrants and immigrants have mixed include the tracts on the east side of Pittsburgh (darkly shaded areas in map 7.7). Asians, particularly Chinese, Filipino, and Indian immigrants, have settled in the city's eastern tracts near Carnegie-Mellon University and the University of Pittsburgh in the neighborhoods of Garfield and Lawrenceville as well as in the eastern suburbs of Wilkinsburg and Monroeville. In the suburbs, Asians are more likely to be professionals than small business owners, and their level of education has facilitated their assimilation. Some of the brightest students in the Monroeville schools are from Vietnamese and Indian families. Since Asians comprised only 1 percent of the population in the 1990 census, their high degree of segregation is somewhat surprising, but it can be explained by the location of the universities and the tendency for Asians to

chain migrate. Ethnic tensions between Asians and non-Asians are reportedly rare.

Many blacks came to the Pittsburgh area to take jobs in the steel mills as part of the "great migration" of the 1920s and 1930s (Gottlieb 1987). Their children and grandchildren have become the victims of deindustrialization. The black population is spatially segregated from the white population in both Pittsburgh and the Mon Valley towns. The black population in the valley is extremely poor, with 40 percent of the families living below the poverty line in 1990, compared to 14 to 15 percent for whites. In Pittsburgh, the only difference is that there are fewer white poor, so the income disparity is even greater in the city than in the suburbs. In the middle class eastern suburbs, such as Monroeville and Wilkinsburg, blacks have fared better. There have been isolated instances of racial intimidation but also concerted efforts to overcome this tension.

The mechanism of racial segregation is in part the county's unusual topography of hills, valleys, and rivers, which isolate neighborhoods in unique ways (Glasco 1989; Bodnar, Simon, and Weber 1982). But segregation has also been the product of industrial decline and differences between white and black birthrates. White, middle income neighborhoods were far better able to weather deindustrializing trends and have been the first to bounce back. In addition, more whites than blacks have decided to leave the county (and often the state) for better opportunities elsewhere. This has left the black population in some of the most impoverished and blighted areas in Pittsburgh and southwestern Pennsylvania. As the figures in table 7.6 show, the level of residential segregation of the black community has remained almost the same from 1980 to 1990. High birthrates among minorities and the out-migration of white families have created a highly segregated school system in which black children are a much larger proportion of the school population than blacks are in the general population. Population losses contribute to segregation because low-income minority groups are less mobile than wealthier whites.

Blacks are a minority in the city and the county, and nearly all of them vote Democratic. Pittsburgh is such an overwhelmingly Democratic town that the loyalty of the black wards to the Democratic Party has marginalized black influence. A recent move from at-large to district-level city council elections has helped elect several black council members who otherwise would not have been elected. But in countywide contests white Democratic politicians have been known to boast of not needing the black vote to win local elections. Local observers suggested that the black com-

munity has been afflicted with weak and inept leadership co-opted by Democratic machine politics. Ward leaders have a strong incentive to prevent aspiring and capable black leaders from gaining too much power.

By the 1990s, the Democratic Party machinery had ossified. Younger people were not drawn into the party leadership. As the suburbs have grown, and the city has declined, Republicans have sometimes taken advantage of Democratic factionalism. In the mid-1990s, the Allegheny County Commission was taken over by Republicans for the first time due to a feud within Democratic ranks. Party registration has remained heavily Democratic, and Republicans were still losing registrants as of the 1990s. Independent registration increased to 6 percent in 1994, up about one point since 1980, but there has been no massive abandonment of traditional party ties. Instead, party registration is stable because the population has not been replaced. The only changes are due to the attrition of voters, not to conversion or the addition of sizable new blocs.

The population trends in Allegheny County, its decline, the relative absence of immigrants, and the hopelessness of its unemployed population all speak to its isolation, from both the rest of the state and the nation. The reputable high-technology education centers in Pittsburgh have helped stabilize the area's economy, but the city is "just not on people's screens when they're looking for information about business markets. Not growing is a real clear signal from the market that you're not an attractive place to live," reported one *Post-Gazette* story in the mid-1990s (Heuck 1996). Rumors of Pittsburgh's recovery have been highly exaggerated. This area's long-term decline is favorable only to prolonged Democratic dominance.

Chester County

Chester County is a state away from Pittsburgh and worlds away in economic terms. Population growth started in the early 1970s, as Chester proved to be a second stop in the suburbanization of Philadelphia. Outmigrants from the city had first settled in Delaware County, but as Delaware became crowded the next move was to Chester. These are residential suburbs, then, where more people commute out to work to Delaware County, Philadelphia, and the state of Delaware than commute in. The population of newcomers consists mostly of affluent young families who, according to one long-time native, "want to convert Chester into the new Main Line. They want towns full of little shops that smell like lavender and serve cappuccino. They are obsessed with safety and crime. They lock their doors, don't allow their kids to go outside and expect someone to be

watching their children every minute." Wilmington, Delaware, started a busing program to integrate its schools in the late 1970s. Fearing the effects of integration, many white families fled across the border into Chester County. The new arrivals who have suburbanized Chester are distinct from the native population, which knew the county before the influx and grew up secure and comfortable in a rural way of life. Natives include affluent Italian and Quaker mushroom farmers at the southern end of the county and old wealth represented by the owners of Chester's sprawling horse farms, including descendants of William Penn himself.

The black and Asian populations are a minor presence. The Hispanic population, however, is growing (Garcia 1997). Mexican migrant laborers have settled at the south end of the county near the towns of Kennett Square and West Grove (see map 7.8). They are employed on the mushroom farms that have made Pennsylvania the nation's largest mushroom-producing state. Chester County became the nation's center of mushroom production in the 1920s as a secondary crop for florists (Hamm 1997). Mexicans are drawn to this area because unemployment is low and the black and Italian laborers who were once hired to work with the mushrooms are no longer willing to do so for the wages farmers are willing to pay. Low-wage labor is so scarce, in fact, that in the early 1990s businesses began paying workers' transportation costs from Philadelphia to suburban work sites. Working the mushroom farms is hot, smelly work, as mushrooms are grown in a manure and straw compost that must be mixed and "cooked out" before it is spread on the trays in dark, humid sheds where the fungus is grown. The original farm laborers were Italian immigrants. Now Italians own many of the farms. Mexican farm labor is prized for its low cost. In 1995, workers were paid one dollar above minimum wage (slightly over $5.30), and some growers also pay workers a bonus per pound harvested. A yearly salary for a Mexican migrant worker in the mid-1990s stood at $15,000 to $20,000.

The Mexican population has been greeted with hostility by the white newcomers and some natives who are unhappy with the prospect of low-income housing and integrated schools. In Kennett Square, internal migrants and immigrants have mixed uneasily. A local homeowners movement has tried to have the town declared a historic district with enforcement of strict architectural controls to force the Hispanic population to leave. Since a sizable percentage of the Mexican workers are either illegal or have forged papers, most are not politically active. The Mexicans all originate from one of several Mexican towns. Political activity by legal res-



Map 7.8. Internal migrant and immigrant magnets in Chester County, Pennsylvania, 1990

idents and U.S. citizens is avoided for fear that retaliation could mean arrest and deportation of friends and relatives. Black residents, some of whom have lived here since before the Civil War, when Chester County was a stop on the underground railroad (Oblinger 1973), have been forced to move out by the rising cost of living (Garcia 1997). The ones who remain are people of some means. Only 14 percent of the black population lived in poverty in 1990, and this undoubtedly explains their relatively higher degree of integration compared to Erie or Allegheny Counties (see table 7.6). The small number of well-educated black residents are politically active. A few serve on local government boards in the southern boroughs and townships with mostly white constituencies.

Reflecting its rural roots, Chester County is one-party Republican turf and has been since before the New Deal. The Main Line WASP population combined with German and Dutch immigrants has made for a very conservative brew. Republicanism is also a reaction to the prevailing anti-Philadelphia sentiment that has differentiated the suburbs from the city for decades. Recent efforts to transfer money from the suburbs into the city to deal with Philadelphia's chronic fiscal problems have been met with hostility by all the suburban communities. "When Chester Countians see Philadelphia, they see business, money, traffic and crime. There is a hostility to diversity. People out here won't say they hate diversity, but their definition of diversity is very homogeneous," said one community reporter. In spite of cultural differences among natives and newcomers, population in-migration has not dented the county's Republican tradition as it has in other suburbs. Newcomers and natives may vote Republican for slightly different reasons. Natives, for instance, tend to be socially liberal, or even libertarian, on issues such as abortion. But the area is unified in its fiscal conservatism. No wonder Republican registration has remained stable through the 1980s while Democratic registration has declined slightly. Why haven't Republican gains been more positive? Many new voters from out of state have not registered and have been slow to develop an interest in state and local issues. New residents also know that juries are chosen from voter registration lists, an additional disincentive to regular participation. Finally, the population growth in this region has translated into strong gains for independent registration, which reached its historical peak of 12 percent of the electorate in 1994.

Erie County

At a convenient junction at the corners of Pennsylvania, Ohio, and New York, Erie was once a meeting place for rival Indian tribes seeking to resolve disputes on neutral ground. In the late twentieth century, Erie has found itself at the intersection of two major interstate highways (I–79 and I–90) and has emerged as a retail and wholesale trade center for the entire region. Small town residents from western New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and even Canada arrive in Erie for weekend sightseeing and shopping trips. While its population has been stable since 1980, Erie County is one of the few places that has grown in western Pennsylvania in the post–World War II period, suggesting some resilience in the face of the deindustrialization that wrecked Allegheny County and areas further south. The scale of industrial employment has always been smaller here. Economic hard times meant layoffs and plant closings, but the smaller size of plants meant that a closing rarely had the kind of ripple effect on the community that one found in the towns in the Mon Valley. Industrial employers in Erie include smaller shops that could more easily make the shift toward batch production than the hulking and inflexible steel mills to the south. When union laborers found themselves out of work in Erie, they either moved or were able to make the transition to jobs in nonunion employment, sometimes even changing careers. The outlying suburbs and towns have experienced a boom in low-wage retail and government employment. The university in Edinboro is a major employer, as is the state prison at the western end of the county. In the town of Albion, full of small retail employers typical of towns of this size, the school district is the single largest employer.

Originally settled by immigrants from Poland, Ireland, and Italy early in the twentieth century, the city of Erie, like cities elsewhere, has lost population to its suburbs and bedroom communities. This has left the city with the usual problems: increasing poverty, poorly equipped schools, dilapidated housing stock, an aging population, and crime. With good transportation links to the south, west, and east, the commute is short and tolerable for those wishing to shop and work in the city. The nonwhite population of Erie was only 15 percent by the mid-1990s, but the Hispanic population was growing rapidly. As in Adams and Chester Counties, Hispanics are employed in agriculture as seasonal labor on area grape farms. Judging from the figures in table 7.6, the segregation of the Hispanic population appears to be increasing along with its numbers. The Hispanic population of Erie is extremely poor, earning only half of what non-His-

panic white families earned in 1990, and isolated in neighborhoods on the east end of town. The city has also attracted recent waves of immigration from Russia, Asia, and Eastern Europe. Apparently, however, the arrival of these groups has not caused any controversy because the volume of in-migration has been small enough that they have not put much of a strain on local resources and services. Erie's strong and self-conscious ethnic heritage has made it more accepting of immigrants than it might otherwise be.

Reflecting its roots in the settlement of eastern and southern European Catholics, the city of Erie has been a Democratic stronghold for most of this century. The outlying areas are mostly Protestant and Republican. Like the rest of western Pennsylvania, the social values are conservative. Republicans represented the area in the U.S. House through the 1980s and 1990s. Local observers report that partisanship is not the strong cue that it once was. How else could Republicans get elected in a county where 57 percent of the registered voters are Democrats? Although the growth of the suburbs has come mostly from the Democratic city of Erie, Republicans have gradually improved their prospects in outlying areas, increasing their membership to about 40 percent of total registrants in 1994. The improvement in GOP registration is not clearly linked to any trends in migration from out of state but instead appears to be the result of generational change, suburbanization, and growth from sources internal to the state such as heavily Republican Crawford County to the south.

Large Numbers, Economic Opportunity, and Segregation

The Pennsylvania case is a good example of a place where numbers are a good indicator of an ethnic group's assimilation and economic well-being. In areas where a group is concentrated in large numbers, its economic prospects are poorer than where ethnics are few and far between (Frisbie and Neidert 1976; Tienda and Lii 1987). Hence, the small number of Asian families in Chester, Erie, and Allegheny Counties earn, on average, more than the average non-Hispanic white family. But in Philadelphia, with a far larger Asian population, Asian family income is only 65 percent of non-Hispanic white income.

The precise mechanism of cause and effect is unclear here. Do ethnic enclaves hold back economic progress and assimilation or is the causal direction the other way, with ethnics clustering in enclaves because they are poor, uneducated, and need the strength of numbers for survival? Variations in the well-being of the Hispanic population in Pennsylvania are

also instructive and depend upon nativity and immigrant status. The small number of Hispanic families in Allegheny County earned nearly as much as non-Hispanic white families in 1990 because the vast majority were native born and English speaking. By contrast, in Adams, Chester, and Erie Counties, a far higher percentage were foreign born, in agricultural employment, and earning very low wages compared to the non-Hispanic white population.

Pennsylvania's varying patterns of population growth, stagnation, and decline add considerable texture to our understanding of the political consequences of demographic change. We have learned at least three things from this chapter. First, Pennsylvania's uneven development has lured more migrants and immigrants to the eastern than to the western region of the state. The instrument for the political and demographic balkanization of the state has been the uneven development of postindustrial enterprise. The geographic isolation of Pittsburgh and its reputation as a headquarters for costly union labor have been major barriers to new investment. By contrast, the proximity of Philadelphia and its suburbs to major East Coast markets has made for a much smoother transition to the service economy.

Second, and more important, population decline is far less likely to change the party balance of regions than population growth is. Those who remain behind when economic times turn sour are most likely to have entrenched patterns and ways of life and thought. Population loss leaves two kinds of people behind: the very old and the very poor—most of whom are unwilling or unable to move. With the most risk-averse citizens remaining behind, population loss has done little to alter the balance of party registration in Allegheny County. Population growth, on the other hand, has the capacity to upset the entire social and political balance of a community. This is why affluent white Pennsylvanians in Chester County have such a strong incentive to shut out the growing threat of the Hispanic population even as the local economy exploits their labor. In Adams County, the resentment is turned toward arrivals from other states, particularly Maryland, who with their superior incomes threaten to stratify an area that has been homogeneous with respect to income.

Finally, the spatial segregation of ethnic and racial minorities from the white majority, and from each other, can be exacerbated by either population growth or decline. In Chester County, and to a lesser extent in Adams, high-end development has taken the same track that it has in

Florida. It has made more neighborhoods off limits to low-income residents, many of whom are of color. While segregation in a rural county like Adams is a relatively benign function of Hispanic migrants who find living near the fruit orchards a practical measure, in the Philadelphia suburbs the mechanism of segregation is far from benign. White upper income residents are fiercely fighting to exclude low-income development from the southern end of Chester County in order to prevent the permanent settlement of Hispanic laborers. In the case of Allegheny County, we learn that spatial segregation is sustained through population losses because outmigrants are not a random mix of the area population. Those who leave are far more white, well educated, and motivated than those who stay behind. They are also those who can afford the costs of moving and are informed enough to know what opportunities lie elsewhere.

Segregation of minority from white population groups in Pennsylvania threatens to create homogeneous communities of interest, polarizing neighborhoods, cities, and counties in social and political terms. City-suburban polarization is nothing new. Philadelphia's inferiorities have always been accentuated by its suburbs (Muller, Meyer, and Cybriwsky 1976). Nor is the division between west and east in Pennsylvania especially new. The continuing polarization of such areas by race and class due to the mechanisms of either growth or decline are a matter of concern for those who value the practice of a pluralist politics of compromise where divisions in the community are temporary and subject to resolution. Overcoming the unpleasant political conflicts that occur along racial and ethnic lines has been a continuing battle in the history of the nation. Racial cleavages have been anything but temporary. The sustained segregation of racial and ethnic communities through contemporary migration and immigration processes places racial and ethnic harmony even further beyond our reach.