

## **An Assessment of Postcommunist Military Professionalism: The Russian and Czech Militaries' Democratic Deficits**

A primary theme of this work is that there are significant differences between military professionalism in democratic and nondemocratic states. The civil-military relations literature on civilian supremacy, however, does not distinguish among the types of political systems to which regimes owe their loyalty. The assumption is that professional militaries will remain loyal to whichever government comes to power through legitimate means.<sup>1</sup> The problem with such an assumption is that it ignores *how* the officer corps comes to accept the principle of civilian supremacy<sup>2</sup> and how this professionalism is manifested. I contend that the ideological underpinnings of the state must play some role in the inculcation of the value of civilian supremacy in the officer corps. Consequently, military professionalism must be reoriented through new methods of inculcating the concept of civilian supremacy in states that experience a shift in the ideological underpinnings of the state from authoritarian to democratic rule. Most troubling are cases that do not make a clear shift in the ideological basis of their state. Transitioning states, which still lack societal consensus on whether or not democratic norms of accountability should displace the norms of state and institutional behavior that characterized the authoritarian regime, remain perilously perched between ideologies. As a result, military professionalism also remains caught between two systems.

When states make the political transition from authoritarian to democratic rule, the infusion of democratic values in the transitioning society begins to permeate all of its institutions, including the military, affecting the expectations of those within the institution and those to whom it is accountable. The model of democratic military professionalism developed in chapter 1 balanced the dual goals of developing professional competence as a means of protecting the democratic state and the importance of reflecting in institutional practices the societal values of the democracy that the military defends. Democratic states have long recognized the quality and competency benefits of building military institutions reflective of their societies.

Transitioning states are still learning the interrelatedness of these issues and tend to address competency and value-related issues sequentially rather than simultaneously, with the latter often classified as a luxury to be concen-

trated on at some later date. Furthermore, transitioning militaries may remain caught between two models of military professionalism resulting in only a partial adoption of democratic norms in their institution. An analysis of the Czech Republic's and Russia's adaptations to the infusion of democratic values into their governing bodies and societies illustrates the tensions that persist when Soviet-style military professionalism meets a Western-style one with a marked emphasis on the inclusion of democratic norms.

This chapter highlights the ongoing struggle facing postcommunist militaries as they attempt to adapt to the presence of democratic values in their societies and to the subsequent expectations of developing democratic institutions and the society at large as represented by public opinion and the media. In the process, I analyze military professionalism in the postcommunist era by highlighting the overall adjustments that the Russian and Czech militaries have made and, most importantly, examine the democratic deficits in military professionalism that exist across the dimensions of the model of democratic military professionalism presented in chapter 1. As in the previous chapter, the purpose of this analysis is twofold: first, to specify the democratic deficits that persist in the realm of postcommunist military professionalism; second, to lay out specific problem areas that can serve to focus the assistance efforts of established democracies engaged in the task of facilitating the democratic transition of postcommunist militaries. An examination of the cases will show the challenges that democratic political transitions pose for military institutions in postcommunist states.

### **Redefining Military Professionalism in the Postcommunist Era**

Professionalism is a difficult subject to address with officers in transitioning states formed under the Soviet model. Indeed, for a Western officer to challenge the quality of that professionalism or its appropriateness to the postcommunist military in which the officers of a transitioning state serve is to call into question the very nature of the military to military relationship—the common bond that all officers share as military professionals.

In most respects Soviet-style military professionalism featured the characteristics of Huntington's definition: expertise, responsibility, and corporateness.<sup>3</sup> The Soviet model put great emphasis on developing specializations across all workers and infused in each citizen his/her responsibility to perform that specialty for the good of the state. The military was set apart as a separate caste with its own cultural features and practices. However, these similarities between the Western and Soviet systems do not explain the fundamental differences inherent in the military professionalism of each due to differences in the underpinning value systems of each political system.

In democratic models civilian control is executed across multiple axes of

democratic accountability, and it is rooted in democratic values. Consequently, a unique set of societal expectations results concerning habits and patterns of behavior within democratic military institutions.<sup>4</sup> These societal expectations include democratic accountability, transparency, respect for civil liberties and human rights, and dedication to democratic values. These criteria assume an importance at least equal to the military values of expertise, responsibility, and corporateness in defining the operational code of a professional military officer in a democracy.

In the Soviet model civilian control was executed through a single axis, the Communist Party.<sup>5</sup> The state was founded on the value of authority, which served as the basis of military professionalism and civilian supremacy. Democratic values and patterns of behavior within the Soviet bloc were either a generation removed from the citizens' experience or had never been experienced. While both models can and did develop brands of military professionalism that precluded military intervention, patterns of behavior below this common denominator will be distinct, depending on whether democratic or authoritarian values characterize the state.

The relevant question in the transitioning states, then, is not whether the officer corps is professional, but whether it possesses a brand of professionalism appropriate to the type of state that it serves. The evidence presented in this chapter supports the argument that a hybrid form of military professionalism characterizes transitioning states, a form that features characteristics of both authoritarian and democratic models.

Since the advent of perestroika in the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc, transitioning states have had to grapple with the infusion of democratic values into their societies. The process of democratization has created democratic expectations within both society at large and among the members of postcommunist military institutions. One result has been the development of a fundamental conflict between the maintenance of good order and discipline in the ranks and the belief common among many that since the arrival of democracy, military discipline was no longer required.<sup>6</sup>

Finding a balance between the competing forces of authoritarian and democratic principles is the common theme found in each of the dimensions of democratic military professionalism to be presented. The ACR is just now starting to take a hard look at what brand of postcommunist professionalism they need. They are asking key questions such as What is officer competence? How should we evaluate this? How can we instill these qualities? How can we attract good young people to the ranks?<sup>7</sup> But, in Russia, the resistance to change along the professional dimensions outlined in chapter 1 is much greater, and even the most basic questions regarding the military's adaptation to democratization have not yet been seriously considered by the military institution.

According to the reports of U.S. military attachés in Moscow, senior Russian officers credit Marxist-Leninist principles for the buildup of the Soviet armed forces to superpower status and therefore are hesitant to turn away from these principles. On a visit to the office of Admiral Ivanov, the head of the Kuznetsov Academy (the Russian equivalent of the U.S. Naval War College), U.S. Lt. Commander Charles Justice noted that a huge statue of Lenin remained on academy grounds and that a large painting of Lenin still hung over the admiral's desk. When the U.S. attaché asked why these things still remained, the admiral replied that his generation was responsible for building up the Soviet Navy, and their success was possible because of Marxist-Leninist principles. He added that, as long as he remained in his post, Lenin would remain. But once he left the academy he would approve Lenin's departure as well.<sup>8</sup>

The admiral's remarks indicated that he realized that times had changed, but that he did not want to change himself. This anecdote sums up the attitude of many older officers who have spent their whole professional lives under one system and one philosophy. Although the present political leadership purports to lead a democratic state, the military institution has been slow to acknowledge that it must adapt to whatever consequences the change in the political system has on its institutional practices.

Indeed, many Russian military personnel and military observers blame the advent of democratization as the cause of the Soviet and now Russian military's decline. "It's interesting. Democracy in the army is not possible. We have suffered through democracy with the army and saw the results in Chechnya. It has been difficult to call it an army since democratization came."<sup>9</sup>

An analysis of the Czech case will illustrate that even in the best transitioning cases, where society as a whole has embraced the idea of adopting democratic values and where the military has adopted wide-ranging reforms, the impact of democratic values on military professionalism has lagged other aspects of reform. The Czech case shows a certain inability to address structural and ideological reform simultaneously. But the issue of reforming the military, so that its practices reflect the values of the transitioning democratic society, has been addressed more as structural reform nears completion. Analysis of the Russian case, however, will reveal a military and a society that are more reluctant to embrace democratic values and to discard Soviet era practices.

The following section will lay the foundation for an analysis of the specific democratization deficits in military professionalism noted across the cases by highlighting which overall structural and ideological adjustments have been made by the Russian and Czech militaries. Clearly, structural reform is the easier transitional task, but in neither case is even this nonideological task complete.

## **Achievements of Postcommunist Military Reform in Russia and the Czech Republic**

### Russia

The greatest potential for substantial military reform in Russia was in the perestroika era when the restructuring of the Soviet Union was driven from the top and political forces were capable of demanding change. There was much discussion in the press, Parliament, and among officers about various courses of reform. This peaked in the period prior to the August 1991 coup and the subsequent dissolution of Parliament later in the year.<sup>10</sup> The military as an institution, though, was never excited about reform, continued to argue for more advanced technology for the armed forces, and interpreted all attempts at reform as thinly veiled attempts to downsize the military.<sup>11</sup>

In the late Soviet era there was conflict between pragmatic high-ranking officers, who understood the impossibility of Marxist economics sustaining military capability, and Party ideologues resistant to change.<sup>12</sup> There was hope that with the creation of the Russian Federation on 1 January 1992 there was also the possibility of creating a new military for the new state. Some of Yeltsin's more reform-minded advisers tried to sway the new Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) using intense lobbying for the institution of a reform agenda, but at the end of the day the Russian military inherited the old Soviet General Staff and MOD framework.<sup>13</sup> The CIS military chief, Marshal Evgenii Shaposhnikov, endorsed the creation of a civilian defense ministry and called for greater professionalization of the officer corps,<sup>14</sup> but Grachev's arrival as Russian defense minister slowed markedly the pace of reform.<sup>15</sup>

The consensus of Western and Russian analysts alike is that no substantive reform has yet to occur in the postcommunist Russian military. A plan announced in 1997 by Defense Minister Sergeyev to markedly reduce and consolidate the Russian armed forces has met significant resistance from both military and political leaders. Generals fear their services will lose in the restructuring, and politicians are hesitant to support any increases in the defense budget to fund the reform.<sup>16</sup> Analysts agree that the crux of any reform effort is reducing the scale of the armed forces so that they bear some relationship to both the threats they must meet and the resources they receive.<sup>17</sup> But the armed forces have not been restructured in response to redefined political goals of the state and an assessment of threats to its security.<sup>18</sup> "The problem now is making an Army that used to be 5.5 million strong into a force of 1.5 million."<sup>19</sup> We have to make a small force from a large one with quality."<sup>20</sup> However, Russian lawmakers say the simple fact is that the nation is too broke to maintain the military and too broke to shrink it. The upfront costs of retiring officers on a large scale is immediate and prohibitive.<sup>21</sup>

The negative consequences of delaying cuts in force structure have been evident throughout the postcommunist period. Sergey Rogov, an analyst at the USA-Canada Institute and a strong advocate of military reform, has argued that "Russia today is over-saturated with a huge number of undermanned and poorly supplied units and formations, as well as hastily organized armaments and equipment warehouses. These conditions have overstrained the support infrastructure of the Armed Forces and made it impossible to ensure normal combat training for the troops."<sup>22</sup> He argued, further, that the war in Chechnya demonstrated that an underpaid, undermanned, untrained Army can hardly achieve military goals even in a low intensity military conflict. "The failure to implement military reform creates a very dangerous threat to national security in Russia."<sup>23</sup> Four years later the progressive rotting of the Russian military machine has caused an increasing sense of insecurity in the West as well. National security experts in the United States warn that the inability of Russia to maintain a safe nuclear deterrent operation is the greatest threat to the physical security of the United States.<sup>24</sup>

An American naval attaché stationed in Moscow witnessed, firsthand, officers and families living in derelict hulls and barracks in Kaliningrad. He heard the pleas of the Baltic Fleet's commander for the construction of housing units for 19,000 officers and their families. Fulfillment of this need would have required a major commitment on the part of the government. However, the U.S. Lt. Commander added, "the government has never decided if it really needs those 19,000 troops stationed in Kaliningrad."<sup>25</sup> Although a poorly organized drawdown occurred, a bloated force remains that the military wants to preserve even it cannot afford to equip or train it. As a result, the forces that remain become more and more degraded.<sup>26</sup>

General Sergeyev's reform plan approved by President Yeltsin in July 1997 proposes to cut ground forces from 1.7 million to 1.2 million troops by 1 January 1999, combining the services into two main branches: strategic deterrence nuclear forces and general purpose ground, sea, and air forces. The plan also envisions a gradual transition toward professionalization as ground forces are further reduced to levels between 500,000 and 600,000 troops, half of them reservists, by 2005. Additionally, the plan calls for increased reliance on nuclear weapons as Russia's conventional capabilities are improved through investment in new technologies. Aspects of the plan had already begun to be implemented by late 1997. The integration of missile troops, the space force, and aerospace defense troops into a united Strategic Purpose Forces was already under way,<sup>27</sup> and for the first time the State Duma earmarked money to reduce the armed forces.<sup>28</sup> But not enough money has been budgeted by the Duma to finance the desired cutbacks,<sup>29</sup> and the government's continual inability to collect taxes may result in other cuts in budget authorization. In addition, comprehensive reform will depend on a coordinated leadership effort

between the MOD, the Finance Ministry, and the Duma, which has yet to show an ability to cooperate at such levels.

In the postcommunist period, the Russian MOD has demanded unsustainable levels of defense spending, devoted disproportionately to salary and social needs, and even this commitment has been woefully inadequate. As much as 85 percent of the military budget has gone to salary and social needs, with salary at times absorbing more than 60 percent of the total. As a result, there has been almost no money for training and operations.<sup>30</sup>

Experts estimate that the major streamlining required to reform the Russian military would cost \$70 billion a year. The 1998 defense budget is \$13 billion. Military reform has remained such an intractable problem because it has proven impossible to finance up front and it is also dependent on progress made on economic reforms.<sup>31</sup> Professionalization of some segment of the conscript force is an example of a costly but essential aspect of military reform.

A halfhearted attempt at professionalizing a small segment of the enlisted force was undertaken by offering some conscripts "contract service" in which soldiers would be given higher pay, better housing, and increased responsibility in exchange for a longer term of service in a nonconscript, "professional" status. The problem is that contract and draft service did not turn out to be appreciably different since the government could not deliver the benefits agreed upon in the contract.<sup>32</sup> Additionally, contract troops were primarily used in auxiliary duties instead of in main combat units, so no significant gains in the control of troops through this system was possible.<sup>33</sup> Military leaders complain that prohibitive costs make the transition to a professional army impossible, but many see this as an excuse to perpetuate the familiar Soviet system despite overwhelming evidence from the war in Chechnya that this system is inappropriate for the current needs of the Russian state.<sup>34</sup> The truth is somewhere in between. To balance these claims, some former Warsaw Pact allies, who have moved as far along the professional army scale as their budgets will allow and who maintain complete professionalization as a long-term goal, could serve as models.

Observers agree, however, that senior military leaders have not been eager to seriously deal with the critical needs of the armed forces through reform. Only the recent efforts of Defense Minister Igor Sergeev have given the Russian military grounds for hope that structural reforms may be carried out. With regard to the adaptation of the military to the distinct demands of a democratic political system, "practically no state policy [has been] directed toward a sensible transition from an army of a totalitarian government to the army of a legal one."<sup>35</sup> The power relationships and trade-offs of loyalty for quality that have characterized the postcommunist era have also ensured that it is unlikely that reform will be spurred by the government, either. The national political leadership has interfered little in military affairs, preferring to stay out of such

internal matters while it simultaneously called on the military to play the role of arbiter between the executive and legislative branches of government. Pandering to military leaders by all sides in the December 1996 parliamentary elections indicated that placating them in return for votes has become a top priority of political parties.<sup>36</sup> Such dependence on the military institution in domestic political battles reduced the likelihood that the government will insist on a path of reform unsupported by the military elite.

### The Czech Republic

In the wake of the Velvet Revolution, the Czechoslovak military was caught up in the changes sweeping the country and wanted to be a part of them. The first postcommunist politicians, most of whom had antiregime backgrounds and little expertise in military issues, were ambivalent about the military in general, but interested in ensuring that certain reforms were implemented there. This led to a series of steps being taken immediately after the revolution.

The first substantive measure was to purge the officer corps of Communist sympathizers. This was accomplished mainly by transferring the political officers and officers of the military defense intelligence service.<sup>37</sup> Officers' records were examined, and anyone who had ever served in these positions, even if currently serving in another position, was reassigned or fired. The defect of this approach was that it allowed many good officers to be swept away in the pursuit of "Communists" while some political hacks who served in non-political specialties were allowed to stay. Additionally, 150 of the 156 general officers serving at the time of the revolution were immediately dismissed.<sup>38</sup> However, critics complain that many of the officers who were removed from their positions through the attestation and lustration process remain hidden on the payroll in less-exposed jobs or received newly created civilian positions within the defense establishment.<sup>39</sup>

The next major steps in the reform process were to downsize, reorganize, and redeploy the Czechoslovak military substantially in response to the new strategic environment. However, even before 1989, the CSPA was in the process of drawing down from a force of 200,000 to meet the limits imposed in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, which put a cap on Czechoslovak forces of 93,300.<sup>40</sup>

The split of the country in January 1993 into the Czech Republic and Slovakia compounded a reorganization process that was already under way and called for yet another revision of the strategic concept. By all accounts the division of military personnel and assets went smoothly according to a ratio of 2:1 with the Czech Republic getting the larger share of resources.<sup>41</sup> The separation of Czech and Slovak politicians, in turn, facilitated a clear consensus on how to proceed with further reform of the ACR.<sup>42</sup>



The new ACR came into existence with a force structure of 106,447.<sup>43</sup> In June 1993 the government approved a draft of the new Czech Army structure that called for the ACR to be drawn down to a force of 65,000 by the end of 1995.<sup>44</sup> Most of the physical realignment of the ACR was completed in 1994, and by the end of 1997 the ACR fell below 65,000 troops.

When Social Democrat Vladimir Vetchy was appointed defense minister as a result of the June 1998 elections, he inherited a proposal to cut the total number of personnel working for the Army from 78,000 to 60,000 by 2003. The proposal would have required a drop from 65,000 to 56,000 uniformed soldiers and the transformation of the Army into a 100 percent professional service. Vetchy believes the proposed reductions are too severe and he has reversed the plan to eliminate conscription.<sup>45</sup>

In general, organizational reform in terms of the restructuring and redeployment of units to meet a post-Cold War Czech national security strategy has been completed with the exception of making personnel cuts necessary to correct the inverted pyramid of the officer corps. Reform has been slower in terms of *how* the military functions as an institution. Many remnants of the Soviet model remain although the Czechs are enthusiastically reviewing Western models of military professionalism.

The dual dissolutions of the Warsaw Pact and Czechoslovakia forced the military leadership to focus on structural issues of adaptation to new strategic realities to the exclusion of other aspects of military reform, particularly those related to the democratic transformation of the Czech military institution. Although some progress was made in this area while the structural reforms were being carried out, democratic reforms did not become the focus of attention until mid-1995. As one member of the Czech General Staff put it, "It's easy to disband a unit in one to two months, but not so easy to rebuild one."<sup>46</sup> The leadership of the ACR is beginning to make the connection between building a quality force and reassessing many of the modes of operating inherited from the Soviet era that are incompatible with the norms of military professionalism found in democratic military institutions.

### **Democratic Military Professionalism**

The remainder of this chapter will address the progress that has been made along the dimensions of democratic military professionalism developed in the framework presented in chapter 1: recruitment and retention, promotion and advancement, education and training, officership and leadership, norms of political influence, prestige and public relations, and the compatibility of military and social values. The contrasting progress made in the Czech and Russian cases will illustrate how enthusiasm for the success of democratization across all institutions of the transitioning society and the transferring of these societal

expectations for democratic values to military members results in varying rates of progress in the achievement of democratic military professionalism.

### Recruitment and Retention

Chapter 1 emphasized that the type of candidate attracted to the military institution is an important factor in maintaining democratic civilian control, competency, and the prestige of the military. As postcommunist militaries transition to democracy, the type of person that they have set out to recruit and retain is also changing. In the Soviet era, both countries attracted officer candidates in search of stability and of a quality of life superior to what these individuals could have otherwise achieved in society at large. The prestige of military service was an added incentive in the Soviet Union, but in Czechoslovakia, lack of prestige was a disincentive to serve. The common perception in the CSPA was that only "second class people with no other opportunities" chose the military as their profession.<sup>47</sup>

In the postcommunist era, the primary recruitment and retention factors of pay, prestige, opportunity for advancement, and overall quality of life are all currently working against both Russia's and the Czech Republic's struggles to build a quality officer corps.

In Russia, the general economic decline and failure to downsize the force have resulted in a precipitous decline in living standards. Paychecks have been arriving months late for years. The wives of officers of an aviation squadron threatened to block the airfield's landing strip unless back pay was forthcoming.<sup>48</sup> Thirty airmen conducted a hunger strike in protest of their 3-month delay in pay.<sup>49</sup> When it does arrive, real pay when indexed for inflation has declined and is meager. For instance, the salary of a captain in January 1994 was \$186 per month, but by February 1995 had declined to \$89 per month.<sup>50</sup> In 1997, the pay of platoon commander, an essential position crucial to the future of the army, was \$111 per month.<sup>51</sup> Servicemen's pay has not been indexed for inflation since 1995.<sup>52</sup> At the end of 1998, reports from the field indicated that soldiers are still not regularly paid on time.<sup>53</sup>

Additionally, 120,000 officers and their families are without government housing to which they are entitled.<sup>54</sup> Despite a presidential decree mandating that servicemen receive vouchers for reimbursement of housing costs, actual budget authorization will permit the funding of only 21,300 apartments in 1997. With 200,000 more servicemen slated to move because of the closing of military bases and 700,000 more cuts planned if the military reform plan is implemented, at the current rate the resolution of the housing problem will take at least ten years.<sup>55</sup> Meanwhile, government auditors say that senior military officers stole the equivalent of \$14 million earmarked for new apartments. In a 1994 survey fewer than one-quarter of defense ministry officers described their

overall living conditions as good or very good. One in three described their living conditions as poor or very poor.<sup>56</sup> Three years later living conditions were reported to be even worse with shortages of food, clothing, and medical attention.<sup>57</sup> So desperate were 60 homeless army officers that they stormed a new apartment building in a town outside Moscow and installed their families in it.<sup>58</sup>

The quality of life has also declined appreciably for Czech officers continuing to serve in the democratic era. At the time of the Velvet Revolution 90 percent of the CSPA was deployed on the Western border. When forces started to relocate from this area, many fully equipped garrisons were abandoned that had provided family housing, quality schools for children, and job opportunities for officers' wives. Now there are new garrisons, but they are not fully equipped, and wives have trouble finding jobs in less developed areas of the country, which consequently exacerbates the overall decline in family income. Because there are fewer garrisons overall, the ones that remain are overcrowded, often making it impossible for officers to live with their families at their new posts. Throughout the country, the housing crisis is acute, and since Czech officers have traditionally depended on the availability of housing in local communities, in the current environment there is no excess housing to allot to personnel from the local base. As a result, most officers and nonconscript professional soldiers live in base dormitories during the work week and commute to visit their families on the weekend.<sup>59</sup>

It is clear that the overall declining situation for the military family is a negative factor in the retention of officers, particularly the younger ones with the potential for more opportunity outside the military. In the Czech Republic, economic prosperity made it difficult to retain officers because the military could not keep up with the improved standard of living within the private sector. The Czech Republic's relatively booming economy led to a general labor shortage in the country, which translated into substantial job opportunities for young Czechs. In recent years, officers have been leaving the ACR at a rate of 10 percent per year. The bulk of the ongoing exodus is made up of young officers with state-funded military educations and difficult-to-replace expertise,<sup>60</sup> such as pilots. These officers cited low prestige of the military profession, poor housing, and a shortage of prospective opportunities in the armed forces as their reasons for leaving.<sup>61</sup> The near departure of one young lieutenant drew international attention: Lieutenant Petr Vohralik, a 1997 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, asked to be released from the Czech Army after only a few months as a platoon commander, due to the inability of the state to support its soldiers. He remarked that some things could be endured, even inadequate financial support, "but people should have the hope that these things will finally end, and I have lost this hope."<sup>62</sup> After a meeting with Defense Minister Vyborny and a subsequent promotion to the post of lieutenant commander of the elite 4th rapid deployment brigade, Vohralik decided to remain in the ACR.<sup>63</sup>

As the market economy develops, a rich/poor division is becoming more prevalent in Czech society, which will negatively affect the military's ability to recruit from among the university-bound and college-educated youth.<sup>64</sup> Wages in the ACR are on par with the pay of professionals not employed by foreign companies and joint ventures.<sup>65</sup> However, the government has also kept wages artificially low with wage controls.<sup>66</sup>

In Russia, the hardships are more acute. It is important to point out, though, that it is difficult to generalize about conditions of service across all components of the Russian military forces. The hardships experienced are not spread across the five services evenly. To illustrate this point, the U.S. Defense Attaché in Moscow, General Gary Rubus, contrasted the differences between a typical Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) unit and a tank unit that has redeployed from East Germany. Officers in the SRF unit probably still have their old apartments, are suffering from real salary decreases due to the effect of inflation, probably have access to some off-budget goods in the locale of the base, and are not deployed to a "hot spot." The officer in the tank unit, on the other hand, is probably living in a tent city separated from his family due to the lack of new housing and may have been sent to fight in Chechnya.<sup>67</sup> Conditions are certainly not great in any unit, but disparities such as these have led to severe divisions in the military.<sup>68</sup>

One major factor in the solution to the officer recruitment and retention problem is obvious: creating favorable social conditions that will better satisfy those already in service and lead to increased competition among officer candidates. Reducing force levels to a point where these conditions can be provided is thus a critical step. There is a general feeling within the Czech officers corps that the government is not concerned with solving the military's problems. Officers complained that the Parliament seems to have no interest in passing either the legislation needed to reduce the rank-heavy officer corps or to allocate sufficient funds to the military's infrastructure and training needs.<sup>69</sup>

Similarly, servicemen in the Russian military feel that the state has abandoned its soldiers. From the Russian servicemen's point of view, they are doing the same important job that they had done before, but the material reward is not congruent with their responsibility to the state.<sup>70</sup> Service in Chechnya was worth \$150 per month to a general officer, \$50 to a lieutenant, and \$30 to a conscript. Meanwhile the proposal for the 1998 military budget does not call for any increase in salaries.<sup>71</sup> Junior officers are particularly hard to recruit and retain in both countries. In Russia, the problem is worsened by the dramatic decline in material status and prestige that has beset the Russian officer corps. Since 1992, officers leaving the service before reaching retirement age have annually become twice as numerous as in the previous year. Of the 300,000 officers and NCOs slated to leave the military between 1998 and 2000, 60 percent will be below retirement age.<sup>72</sup> In 1997, of the 20,000 officers discharged into

the reserve, one in three was under the age of 30.<sup>73</sup> Additionally, 40 percent of the lower-level command positions in the army and navy are vacant.<sup>74</sup> Contract servicemen have been put through crash courses to earn the rank of warrant officer in order to fill low-level troop command positions. Junior lieutenants have also been selected for intensive training courses to accelerate their assumption of mid-level command positions.<sup>75</sup>

The declining interest in the countries' military academies reflects the common lack of interest in the military profession. In the Czech Republic, military academies are only able to fill their MOD authorized quotas at rates of 25 to 50 percent. Consequently, there is no competition for admission.<sup>76</sup> Indeed, interviews with the social science faculty indicated that the quality of military cadets was quite low compared to university students. One faculty member remarked that the military academies are "the rubbish bin of the educational system."<sup>77</sup> Academy officials may think that discipline would deter even more students from attending military schools. Such anemic enrollment rates may eventually threaten their own positions. Ironically, however, it is just such attitudes that perpetuate the negative image of Czech society toward its military. Unless the ACR is transformed into a respected organization that projects an image of competence and excellence, Czech citizens will be reluctant to serve and to send their children to serve within such an organization. Recruitment of candidates may improve, though, as the general higher educational climate of the Czech Republic changes.

Similarly, in Russia competition for entrance to military schools has virtually disappeared.<sup>78</sup> Faculty at the Russian Kachinsky air force academy report that in the 1980s the academy had ten applicants for each position. In the early 1990s this number declined to two applicants per position and has recently increased to about three applicants per position.<sup>79</sup> But still, one-half of all qualified applicants get in—a much less competitive figure. Nationwide, the competition for each slot has declined to 1.5 persons per position.<sup>80</sup> Schools are forced to accept candidates who have failed their entrance examinations, while the number of gold medal candidates has declined by 300 percent from the 1980s.<sup>81</sup>

In Russia many of the new military academy graduates are not going to serve in the armed forces.<sup>82</sup> Because the education received at these institutions is still respected, these graduates are favored for civilian jobs and shun their military option because of the lack of social guarantees there.<sup>83</sup> Additionally, the Commandant of the Kachinsky Academy said that he determines which cadets are selected himself based on personal interviews. This means that there is no official mechanism for ensuring that the cadets at his institution are representative of the society at large. The absence of demographic controls falls short of optimal recruiting practices in advanced democratic states.

The slow progress of personnel management reform that will be addressed

fully in the following section also contributes to the retention problem. Reform of this type is beginning to be discussed in Russia and proceeding with great difficulty in the Czech Republic. In both cases many young officers with ambition and marketable skills have already left to seek their fortune in the private sector. Those who remain tend to want the security that goes with the job such as medical care and apartments (for those lucky enough to have housing) and do not think that there are better opportunities for them elsewhere. In addition, the immobile character of both societies due to the difficulty of obtaining housing makes the practicality of relocating low.<sup>84</sup> Many young officers look to the swollen senior officer ranks and decide that advancement opportunities are limited and apparently not improving. Officers from both of the countries are using some of the “good deals” available to junior officers such as English-language training, courses in the West, and service with UNPROFOR (UN Protection Force) and other peacekeeping missions to either enhance their résumés or save enough money to ease the transition of leaving the service.<sup>85</sup>

Great recruitment and retention problems also exist on the conscript side in both cases. In the Czech case, the problem is attracting young people to serve as experts alongside conscripts. In Russia, the problem is much more severe and centers around getting enough conscripts to show up for duty. One in six of the young Russians drafted will dodge the draft, and five times the number that serves will be granted deferments.<sup>86</sup> This has led to a situation where officers outnumber conscripts.<sup>87</sup> In order to field eight divisions in Chechnya, the resources of twenty-four divisions were combined.<sup>88</sup> Conscript service is almost universally avoided by resourceful young Russians. Reportedly, \$1,000 can buy a document to present to the local military commissariat proving that a person has already served in the military while \$500 can purchase a health certificate certifying that a young recruit is medically unfit to serve.<sup>89</sup> In 1989, 3,000 people avoided the draft. By 1997, the number rose more than tenfold to 32,000. But aloof law enforcement agencies have instituted proceedings against only 32 of these “evaders.”<sup>90</sup>

The greatest potential recruitment problem, meanwhile, has scarcely been addressed: increased professionalization of the Russian enlisted force. The war in Chechnya painfully demonstrated the low level of military competence that has been achieved four years after independence with a force of demoralized officers and low-quality conscripts. Analysts agree that the solution is to professionalize at least some percentage of the conscript force. Limited attempts to do this have thus far failed.

As noted earlier, a campaign to sign up 30 percent of the conscript force as contract servicemen sputtered due to lack of financial and psychological commitment to the program on the part of the MOD. Furthermore, around 90 to 95 percent of conscripts, when surveyed, indicated that they had no desire to continue to serve under contract.<sup>91</sup> Recruitment of individuals to meet broader

professionalization goals would require the extension of major incentives, which would be beyond the means of the military budget unless personnel were significantly cut. Meanwhile, the Russian military continues to deal with its “manpower problem” through such solutions as the extension of conscription service from eighteen months to two years. Economic constraints and the unpopularity of military service mean that reliance on a conscript system that produces low-quality soldiers will continue, despite stated government goals to the contrary.

Recruitment and retention issues plague both militaries. While some strides have been made in the Czech Republic, all indications from Russia are that these problems are only becoming worse. In the Czech Republic, the government and the military have backed off from their commitment to a fully professionalized Army, but are focusing on ways to attract volunteers to serve as the experts in the ACR.<sup>92</sup> Continued economic growth makes this a reasonable aim. But the military must continue to work hard on its agenda of reform items aimed at making the actual ACR more competent and attractive to serve in than the prevailing current image suggests. Failure to address these issues bodes poorly for the likelihood that officers and conscripts alike will remain loyal indefinitely to a democratic state that is not coming close to meeting their most basic needs. Political and military leaders must determine an appropriate military force structure for their state and search for the means to adequately support it. Some evidence of such leadership can be found in the Czech Republic and may be beginning to develop in Russia.<sup>93</sup> Only such a step will lead to the fostering of a military institution willing to support and defend a democratic political system and way of life to which it will one day, hopefully, feel a debt.

### Promotion and Advancement

Many of the elements of the Soviet model of personnel management described in chapter 1 remain in the Russian and Czech cases. The prime defects of the inherited system of the Communist era are that it promoted officers automatically based on time in service, often made promotions without giving the officer of the higher rank increased responsibility, and ultimately created an officer corps that allowed for a disproportionate number of officers to serve in the higher ranks with no expected standards of competency driving their daily performance or their next promotion.<sup>94</sup> Cronyism characterized the advancement of officers throughout the system.<sup>95</sup>

Many from provincial regions became officers as a means of acquiring a college education and leaving their towns. Others preferred service as an officer to serving any time as a conscript. Additionally, in Russia, the practice of counting time served in outpost regions as double that served elsewhere for officers' pensions made it possible for an officer to serve ten years in an area such as the Far North and earn a pension for twenty years of service. Such of-

Officers are not concerned about earning promotions when their first significant promotion to Major could occur after they are eligible for retirement.<sup>96</sup>

The promotion of officers on time instead of on merit led to the development of a disconnection between rank and position. Officer competency would be recognized by the assignment of greater authority to an officer often resulting in more senior officers working for officers junior to them in terms of rank.<sup>97</sup> The development of this practice over time contributed to the blurring of traditional lines of authority within the military hierarchy. But even position advancement often depended more on political reliability than professional competence since the evaluation of officers weighted ideological factors disproportionately over individual ability. This dilution of a merit-based system, where an officer's evaluation is based on an objective and standardized assessment of his or her contribution to the unit's mission, led to a distorted view of "merit" that is difficult to reform today.

In the Czech Republic these problems have been recognized, and much attention has been focused on how to correct them, but no adequate solution has been implemented. In Russia there is little evidence that any reform of the promotion and advancement system is in the offing.<sup>98</sup> Indeed, evidence concerning how cuts were made following the withdrawal from the West points to a continuation of past practices. Many of the officers who redeployed to Russia were simply retired early without competition among all officers. Those in the middle ranks not yet eligible for retirement have been kept on the rolls as "extra" officers. Many of these officers are staying on because the state does not have the means to discharge them with the proper social guarantees.

In the Czech case the main problem in the area of promotion and advancement is that the career expectations of older officers who remain in the ACR are clashing with those of the young people that the ACR needs to retain and attract. For those officers formed under the Communist era system, "growing old with the Army and reaching higher rank based on years of service was completely normal and there could be no shortage of higher-ranking officers. Central organs were inflated and within these units the men with gold shoulder boards frequently performed work worthy of incompetent auxiliary personnel."<sup>99</sup> On the other hand, junior officers have no vision for promotion to Colonel, perceive that reform of the system will never take place, and expect that politics will always matter more than merit.<sup>100</sup> The lack of a "career concept" has plagued the ACR since its inception.<sup>101</sup>

NATO and U.S. officials alike have singled out the inability of the ACR to reform its personnel system as one of its greatest obstacles to NATO accession.<sup>102</sup> The ACR is in great need of a pyramidal force structure with a defined up-or-out philosophy. Other necessary reforms include an evaluation system built on merit and a professional development program for officers and NCOs focused on improving both technical and leadership skills.

The inverted pyramid that now characterizes the ACR is dysfunctional at



TABLE 4. Inverted Pyramid of ACR Officer Personnel

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Generals: 22
Colonels: 753
Lt. Colonels: 3,985
Majors: 4,003
Captains: 4,024
First Lieutenants: 2,969
Lieutenants: 791
Second Lts: 324
Total Officers: 16,849
Total Personnel: 57,012
Warrant Officers and NCOs: 8,972
Other conscripts: 31,191

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*Source:* Czech News Service, "Deputy Minister Provides Figures on Size of Czech 'Army,'" 10 October 1997.

several levels. There is an excessive total number of officers in the ranks and the ACR has been unable to recruit sufficient numbers of conscripts to stay on as professional soldiers.<sup>103</sup> The Czech Army is composed of 67 percent officers while the average in NATO countries is 27 percent.<sup>104</sup> The principal problem of the rank and age imbalance of the ACR's personnel structure remains an intractable problem unresolved by appropriate legislation.<sup>105</sup> Table 4 indicates the inverted pyramid of the ACR present at the end of 1997.<sup>106</sup>

Table 5 shows the redistribution of the officer ranks that was proposed in 1995, but had not yet been enacted at the end of 1998. This proposal reflects an ideal distribution of ranks: .3 percent Generals, 4.7 percent Colonels, 11 percent Lt. Colonels, 17.5 percent Majors, 24.5 percent Captains, 22 percent Senior Lts., and 20 percent Lts. and Junior Lts. combined. The actual distribution according to the 1997 data is: .1 percent Generals, 4.4 percent Colonels, 23.7 percent Lt. Colonels, 23.8 percent Majors, 23.8 percent Captains, 17.6 percent Senior Lts., and 6.6 percent Lts. and Junior Lts. combined.

Wilem Holan, Defense Minister at the time of the 1995 proposal, remarked, "The ideal pyramid of ranks is clear to us. The current appearance of the rank hierarchy pyramid is also known. Inverting to its proper shape depends, first, and foremost, on the interest shown by young people in serving in the

TABLE 5. Proposed Pyramid of ACR Force Structure

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Generals: 30
Colonels: 470
Lt. Colonels: 1100
Majors: 1750
Captains: 2450
Sr. Lieutenants: 2200
Jr. Lieutenants: 2000

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*Source:* ACR General Staff document made available to U.S. Military Liaison Team, March 1995.

Czech Army.”<sup>107</sup> His successor, Miloslav Vyborny, argued that the ability of the state to offer new conditions of service is another key component of the solution.<sup>108</sup> However, neither minister nor their successors, Michal Lobkowicz and Vladimir Vetchy, have demonstrated the will or ability to direct the reform within the MOD. Critics maintain that precise rules for completing the downsizing of the ACR have been successfully resisted by high-ranking army officials throughout the transition era.<sup>109</sup>

The Director of Personnel for the ACR General Staff, Colonel Josef Jelik, attributed resistance to change at the MOD and within the General Staff as the primary obstacle blocking the implementation of personnel management reform. The main problem, he explained, is that “competing interests are operating. Activity that is in the best interests of the organization is threatening to other people of a certain age.”<sup>110</sup> The junior and senior officers have a fundamentally different personal stake in the reform agenda. Officers older than forty want to stay in the system as long as possible because each extra year served increases the military pension benefits that they must live on until they can receive a government pension at age sixty.<sup>111</sup> Of these officers, 60 to 70 percent are against making any changes that will force involuntary separations.<sup>112</sup>

Colonel Jelik added that while some reform-minded officers use their influence to move the effort along, they work side by side with “resisters.” The presence of “rehabilitated” officers, the “1968ers” called back to advise within the MOD, compounded the situation further. Though politically reliable, these officers, who in their youth served in a completely different era, could not understand the contemporary problems confronting the ACR.<sup>113</sup> Even the effectiveness of reform-minded officers depends on an array of factors: support through the chain of command, the amount of independence granted to those working at the top for reform, and the freedom to direct subordinates to implement the plan.<sup>114</sup>

General Jiri Nekvasil, whose 5 year tenure as ACR chief of staff dated back to the Czech Republic’s inception, remarked upon his dismissal from his post in March 1998 that the failure to achieve personnel reform during his term was “shameful.” “I was naive to think that everybody in the Defense Ministry and the General Staff had good intentions for the army. Some high-up functionaries insisted on their well-paid jobs, and were indifferent to the fate of the troops. If clear rules on personnel had been approved, many of them would have had to leave the army.”<sup>115</sup>

Besides the downsizing of the higher ranks—righting the inverted pyramid—the main elements of reform in the promotion and advancement of officers being considered include the development of an officer career pattern, the creation of a professional military education system to support the new career pattern, and the implementation of a new promotion system based on merit-based evaluations and centralized promotion boards. The development of a career pattern would establish for the first time concrete requirements for progression through the ranks and eliminate officers who do not progress, thus ensuring a pyramidal officer corps. But it is crucial that a career pattern and the implementation of a merit-based promotion system take place simultaneously so that officers who meet the new criteria are evaluated favorably and advance.

Observers agree that time is running out in the implementation of a new career pattern and promotion system. A message must be sent to the younger officers that change is on the way and that their potential for advancement within the ACR is limited only by their ambition and merit. But as MOD bureaucrats and resisters to change continue to stall the process, the clock ticks and the inverted pyramid becomes more distorted by the day as junior officers continue to leave the service.

In the Czech case, there is no certainty that the proposed reforms will be implemented, but the importance of ensuring continued progress is recognized by many within the government and MOD. External pressure by NATO overseers will give an additional impetus to the prospects of reform. Meanwhile, in Russia, recognition of the necessity for adapting the promotion and advancement system to the norms of democratic states has not yet occurred. Equality of opportunity is a basic value of democratic societies, and those who serve

democratic states expect that the institutions in which they serve will reflect the democratic values of the state. More importantly, standards of democratic accountability demand that expenditures spent on military personnel result in the most competent force possible to defend the values of the state. Finally, corrupted cronyism, lack of a widely recognized career path, and a priority on job security instead of job performance combine to create a package of disincentives for motivated service to the state.

### Officership and Leadership

The aspect of military professionalism most in need of reform due to the infusion of democratic values into postcommunist societies is the legacy of authoritarian styles of officership and leadership. In the tsarist system, and later across the Soviet bloc, the role of subjects and citizens of the state was to serve the state. In a democracy, the state exists for the sake of the interests of the people whose primary concern is preserving their civil liberties and human rights. Indeed, democratic control of the military is partially dependent on the shared socialization of all citizens, including those in military service, about the principles of democratic values and accountability.<sup>116</sup> Soldiers in democratic states are conditioned to believe that standards of treatment central to life within their democracy are expected within all societal institutions. These opposite priorities within authoritarian and democratic states result in fundamental differences in relationships between the state and its citizens and among citizens of the different types of states.<sup>117</sup>

For these reasons, the core issues of professional officership—*who*, *why*, and *how* an officer serves—differ markedly in authoritarian and democratic states. These issues are difficult to address because modification involves changing long-practiced behavioral patterns that have come to be associated with “professionalism” as officers in the Soviet bloc knew it. The answers to the *who*, *why*, and *how* questions vary according to the historical position of the military in each case. In the CSPA, the case could be made that an officer’s answer to the question *who* do I serve was, ultimately, himself. Since he could not protect the people of his state from the Soviet Union, which essentially controlled the CSPA, the standard motivation of defense of the state was denied the Czechoslovak officer. Serving in the coercive pillar of an illegitimate and less than beloved local Communist regime also denied him the satisfaction of protecting a system of government valued by the population. The answer to the *who* question in the Russian case is more positive because Soviet officers had the satisfaction of serving a state that was the cradle of the world communist movement. The Soviet military was instrumental in the spread of communist ideology, which had greater legitimacy among the Soviet people than among the citizens of the allied states in the Warsaw Pact.

The answer to the *why* question was similar to the *who* and *what* questions

but also featured an incentive-based dimension. Soviet society rewarded its officer corps beyond material levels that most Soviet workers could expect and undoubtedly lured some citizens to serve for this reason as well. Similarly, the CSPA attracted officers who liked the fact that the military was essentially a socialist state within a socialist state. *Why* serve? The response for many was, “because I don’t have to work and I’ll still get paid.” “Schwejkism” prevailed in the CSPA with the corresponding opportunity to exist by doing nothing.<sup>118</sup> In Czechoslovakia, the prime motivation for service in a social institution loathed by the civilians of the state was to have a means of existence within it.

These different motivations for service in an authoritarian state led ultimately to distinct differences in *how* Soviet era officers served, differences that persist today. The abuse of one’s position power was prevalent throughout the Soviet system and also characterized the behavior of officers toward their subordinates. “The order of the commander is law” was the phrase stated in armed forces manuals.<sup>119</sup> Unlimited one-man command continues in the Russian army and has actually become more severe with the removal of the political officers who used to restrict some actions of the commander. Consequently, practices that respect the dignity of each soldier and that are not directed toward suppressing the individual are still absent.<sup>120</sup> In democratic states, laws come from those elected to create them, and all citizens are subject to them. No individual’s order, even that of a military commander, could override the law of the land.

These contextual factors led to a different concept of leadership among Soviet era officers that persists today and that is negatively affecting the competency of the postcommunist armed forces. “The conscript-officer relationship has always been unhealthy and even Soviet era people have acknowledged this as a crucible of corruption.”<sup>121</sup> This was noted especially in the Afghan War when the poor quality of the NCO corps and the poor socialization of troops were identified as key reasons why Soviet troops were performing poorly in a modern battlefield situation.<sup>122</sup> The atrocities committed in Chechnya by Russian troops indicated that problems of leadership negligence and poor discipline persist in the postcommunist era.<sup>123</sup> According to one analyst, “the Russian military is simply a devourer and wrecker of Russian youth.”<sup>124</sup>

The concept of *leadership* as it is understood in the West did not exist within the CSPA or the Soviet Army. Leadership as understood by and taught to U.S. officers has never been and is not currently part of officer development. The concept that “leaders are made and not born” is fundamental to the U.S. system of officer and leader development.<sup>125</sup> The assumption of the American military education and training system is that leadership qualities can and should be taught and that the permeation of these traits across the military institution is essential to its professional competency. Furthermore, the system assumes that democratic values, when appropriate, should be present within mil-

itary institutions that serve democratic states. With regard to officership and leadership, the proper appropriation of democratic values includes respect for the rule of law and law-bound behavior, respect for the individual and nontolerance of the violation of civil liberties and individual human rights, equal opportunity for advancement based on merit, and the positive use of democratic ideology as a motivator for service.

The course of instruction at Russian and Czech military academies in this respect remains unchanged. U.S. Air Force Academy officers who visited the Kachinsky Higher Military Aviation School for Pilots, a Russian undergraduate military college, noted the lack of systematic training in leadership as a glaring difference in the approaches between U.S. and Russian military colleges.<sup>126</sup> The U.S. Army attaché in Prague went so far as to argue that “there are no traditions of leadership in the Czech military.” Throughout the course of his three-year tour he has never come across a single block of training on leadership anywhere.<sup>127</sup> He added that the whole concept of motivation is foreign to them. “Everything is always someone else’s problem. The 2 percent of ACR officers who have the attitude that their mission is to serve the state have some international experience and are probably natural born leaders.”<sup>128</sup>

The primary difference between the Russian and Czech cases on the issue of officership and leadership is that the Czechs recognize that their inherited system is defective and are considering steps to correct it. Senior Czech officers admit that in the past the military’s disregard for individuals serving within it was extreme. One member of the ACR General Staff related that before 1989, when there was a requirement to store all military equipment under roof, at times the equipment lived better than the soldiers, whose barracks might go unheated because the fuel was needed to keep the equipment depots warm.<sup>129</sup>

Another Czech officer related that besides the top priority of improved living conditions, what officers want most is better leadership. “If they get these two things they might stay in.”<sup>130</sup> A Czech officer who attended the USAF professional military education (PME) course for captains told the U.S. Army attaché upon his return that “I’ve seen your military and don’t want to go back [to his own].”<sup>131</sup>

An incident that occurred within the Czech UNPROFOR forces is indicative of the state of leadership at the unit level in the ACR. An NCO “fragged” or murdered an unpopular officer who held a leadership position within the unit. This incident within the highly touted volunteer United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) unit highlighted the persisting enmity between officers and soldiers. The U.S.-trained Czech major who related the story seemed disgraced by the incident involving his countrymen and fellow officer and explained how such a thing could occur: “Most officers don’t know what leadership means.”<sup>132</sup>

An American attaché thought that the fragging incident was also indica-

tive of weaknesses in the officer evaluation system. Officers are judged suitable for advancement and continued service based on the record of psychological examinations, which has led to a mentality that effectively equates psychological stability with good officership. Apparently, the “fragged” officer had satisfactory psychological exams and was deemed fit to lead.<sup>133</sup> This example demonstrates how a method of evaluating officers devoid of expectations of traits indicative of good leadership may produce stable officers, but not necessarily ones who are good leaders.

ACR leadership style could be influenced through a new evaluation system that records development across specific leadership traits and awards ratings accordingly. Such changes have been considered. One proposal for a new ACR officer evaluation form featured eighteen attributes such as “ability to lead subordinates,” “setting the example,” “will to be the best,” and “independence in fulfilling tasks,” which can be considered pure officership qualities that are apolitical and intrinsic to merit.<sup>134</sup> The new proposal differed from the old evaluation form, which was a purely narrative form not focused on measuring any specific attributes and which emphasized psychocultural aspects of an officer’s personality.

However, not much progress will be made in changing Communist era officer behavior patterns unless those who evaluate and those being evaluated understand the leadership traits being measured. Such a change also requires broad compliance to effect an institution-wide impact. Observers worry that compliance at all levels will be difficult to achieve because many officers in the field are resistant to implementing the reform.<sup>135</sup>

A meeting with a group of four senior Czech officers from the ACR General Staff, who were graduates of the first Marshall Center class, indicated that Western-style leadership traits are becoming more widely known. Before the meeting, I had been warned that one of these officers was a great fan of General Norman Schwarzkopf and that he had read his book numerous times. This tip alerted me to the possibility of turning the discussion to U.S.-style generalship and leadership and the willingness of the Czechs to adapt their ways.

When the opportunity presented itself I asked the alleged Schwarzkopf fan, General Jiri Martinek, what about General Schwarzkopf’s leadership style impressed him the most. The Czech general responded that the main lesson he learned from reading the book was that General Schwarzkopf was an officer who perfectly understood the problems of a commander and who never forgot that every subordinate had a family and that one day that soldier might have to leave the family behind. General Martinek added that General Schwarzkopf “understood how to train soldiers and how to live with them, how to live with his own family, and how to actively rest.” When asked if such a style of leadership was possible in the ACR, he responded that he did not think that it was so far-fetched for them to achieve, that he understands it and that other re-

formers also understand it, and that ultimately when their transformation is complete, they will achieve it.<sup>136</sup>

Though most of the ACR senior leadership, through the benefit of extensive and repeated exposure to Western officers, are beginning to understand the U.S. “leadership concept,” beyond this exposure and the individual experiences of the limited number of officers who have participated in IMET courses, most officers “don’t know it, haven’t been taught it, and don’t see it.”<sup>137</sup> Most officers are used to being told what to do and they understand that either they do it or get chewed out. The old leadership style is still prevalent. Positive motivation is absent, and authoritarian styles prevail.<sup>138</sup> Although commanders educated in the West are serving in important command and leadership positions, such as the commanders of the ground and air forces,<sup>139</sup> the leadership style has fundamentally remained unchanged from the dictatorial top-down leadership style of the past.<sup>140</sup>

A U.S. officer studying at the Czech Command and General Staff College observed that no fundamental curriculum changes beyond the elimination of Marxist-Leninist themes have occurred there. For instance, there is still no dimension of the curriculum that deals with leadership or leadership in combat. The focus is on managerial and business techniques. Such concepts as “leading by example” and the “Be, Know, Do” mantra instilled in U.S. Army officers are still foreign to the Czechs.<sup>141</sup> However, some recognition by Czech military leaders of the gap between Soviet era leadership practices and the norms of leadership expected in advanced democratic states indicates that a greater potential for reform exists in the Czech case.

In Russia, however, many Russians, even some who advocate the need for military reform in other respects, do not recognize the leadership deficit of the Russian officer corps. Their argument contends that officer-subordinate relationships are constant across all military institutions and do not change as a result of time or because of a change in the political system.<sup>142</sup> But those with experience serving within the military institutions of democracies disagree. Brigadier General Gregory Govan, former U.S. Defense Attaché in Moscow and a Russian military expert with experience serving as a draftee in the U.S. Army and in observing the treatment of conscripts in Russia, made the reverse argument that democracy does make a difference in the treatment of troops.<sup>143</sup>

In free societies, military institutions created to protect a certain quality of life tend to reflect these values in the life of the institution. This is a result of their lifelong socialization within a society built on democratic values. U.S. officers involved in planning joint exercises with Russian forces have recognized this blind spot among their Russian counterparts and consciously try to model the positive motivation that characterizes U.S. officership and the attention that is given to quality of life issues for troops participating in such exercises. “We try to show that our commanders actually think about these things—that it is



part of their computations in military planning.”<sup>144</sup> The American officer’s observation highlights the disparity in expectations between democratically socialized soldiers and those socialized to expect little from their leaders. However, as democratic values take root and become more pervasive, expectations of soldiers in transitional states will also change accordingly. The Czech case is beginning to bear out this hypothesis.

But in the Russian case, Soviet era leadership practices continue virtually unaffected by the change in political system. One indication of poor leadership among Russian officers is the high death rate among conscripts in military service.<sup>145</sup> A particularly atrocious incident occurred among conscripts serving on Russkiy Island, fifteen to twenty of whom starved to death.<sup>146</sup> The commander in this case was eventually relieved of his command, but was never brought up on criminal charges. It is unclear, though, whether the commander in question was reprimanded over the incident of emaciation or because he opposed a commission set up to investigate his corrupt behavior involving the sale of MOD property.<sup>147</sup> The suicide rate has also been rising in the Russian military. According to the Russian Military Procuracy’s own figures, 423 soldiers committed suicide in 1995. In 1996 the number grew to 543. In 1996, 1,071 soldiers were murdered, mostly by other soldiers.<sup>148</sup>

Perhaps the greatest evidence of leadership practices devoid of any appreciation of human rights is the persistence of *dedovshchina*, or hazing, in the Russian military.<sup>149</sup> The number of reported incidents continues to increase, but official statistics do not accurately portray the problem since commanders are still more likely to conceal than to report incidents in their units.<sup>150</sup> *Dedovshchina* includes various forms of physical and mental abuse, including the use of recruits as personal servants of more senior soldiers. But the practice goes way beyond commonly accepted notions of hazing in that it pits the strong against the weak in an effort to psychologically humiliate and physically break down soldiers—often to the point of death.<sup>151</sup> *Dedovshchina* is also the leading cause of suicides.<sup>152</sup> Military leaders claim that every effort is made to punish those who participate in the practice, but credible reports indicate that the practice continues unabated and that many officers continue to permit and even encourage *dedovshchina*.<sup>153</sup> The brutal treatment by older soldiers along with malnutrition and widely known poor conditions of service is a major deterrent to military service and also a major cause of desertion.<sup>154</sup>

The system of disciplining through corporal punishment and allowing unsupervised harassment in the conscript ranks is related both to the detached leadership styles of commanders who permit the practice to continue and to the warped sense of interpersonal relations brought to military service by the conscripts themselves who perpetuate the behavior against each other. This pattern of mistreating conscripts, sometimes to the point of death, is evidently another blind spot of many in Russian society. “Kids and mothers are against it, but not

really the people at large. We in the West play it up a lot more than it matters in Russia.”<sup>155</sup> Another Western expert noted, “They’ve tried to stop it, but it’s too cultural.”<sup>156</sup>

The main group advocating reform in this area is the Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers although other human rights groups have also been active in trying to eliminate the practice.<sup>157</sup> Before the war in Chechnya, the top goal of the Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers was to eliminate hazing. The group’s goals are to force commanders to take responsibility for incidents in their units, to prevent the malnourishment of soldiers, to pressure the MOD not to accept soldiers unfit for service, and for the MOD to be generally more responsive to the inquiries of the Committee.<sup>158</sup>

The mothers try to work directly with commanders and with the MOD. But the mothers have found that many commanders are indifferent to the problem and that the MOD refuses to address the problem systematically. “If a commander happens to be a good one, then the mothers can have a good relationship with him, but many allow the hazing to continue. Commanders think that hazing is convenient for them—it maintains discipline. It’s much easier to let it go than to try to fix the problem.”<sup>159</sup> Meanwhile the MOD has failed to lay out any negative consequences for commanders who allow the practice to persist.

The mothers have tried to pressure the MOD by lobbying their allies in the Duma to hold hearings on the topic, which only highlighted the MOD’s unwillingness to respond to the problem. The lead general sent to the hearing was very antagonistic and did not even try to address the problem. Others presented false statistics and made inane comments like “See, a lot of officers are getting killed too” or “We’re not the only ministry with problems.” But even the involvement of parliamentary committees has done little to alleviate the problem. The hearings are not televised, and nothing ever seems to come of them. The committee can make a report, but has no executive authority to take any greater steps.<sup>160</sup>

Possible solutions to the *dedovshchina* problem include stationing conscripts closer to home where it is more likely that parents can monitor their sons’ status, stationing soldiers in units of similar ethnic, geographic, and social origins to reduce the likelihood of tensions between troops, and increasing accountability among troops returning to the same cities after their service. Those who support this solution contend that the problem was able to persist so long because Marxism-Leninism taught that interpersonal conflicts within the military were impossible. When they happened, military leaders denied that a problem existed.<sup>161</sup>

However, the best solution is to demand higher standards of leadership and to reform the system of leader development so that conscripts understand what behavior is acceptable and so that commanders learn how to enforce and model

higher standards of interpersonal relations.<sup>162</sup> The institution of an NCO corps charged with leadership responsibilities would also be a major step toward solving the *dedovshchina* problem and raising the competency level of the Russian military in general.<sup>163</sup> “The problem is that all officers are professionals and all conscripts are not professional. Officers, by definition, cannot perform an NCO’s function because they have no enlisted experience.”<sup>164</sup> Russian conscripts have no NCO role models, empathizers, or teachers and no means of leadership between themselves and their officers. Western observers agree that the lack of NCOs is a tremendous disadvantage with regard to the leadership quotient of the Russian armed forces and stems from a culture that neither appreciates the needs of individuals nor is able to self-identify this particular democratic deficit. “Exploiters of troops would not have a future in an NCO system.”<sup>165</sup>

The bullying of conscripts in the ACR is still rife.<sup>166</sup> Half the young men who go to serve in the ACR are afraid of hazing.<sup>167</sup> Former Defense Minister Holan referenced the negative feeling that common knowledge of the practice conjures up in the public’s mind when he promised to “ease the fears of mothers whose sons currently serve” as one of his goals upon taking office.<sup>168</sup>

As in Russia, Czech observers attribute the persistence of the practice to the absence of an NCO corps and to the combined effect of the officer draw-down and the misinterpretation of democracy in the ranks. Officers about to be cut had little concern about the disciplinary state of their command, while those serving under them initially assumed that the new democratic CSA and, later, the ACR would not require the strict discipline of the past.<sup>169</sup>

The ACR leadership has realized the importance of building an NCO corps to fill the leadership vacuum between the officers and the conscripts, but faces an uphill battle in convincing enough conscripts to stay on for another three to five years to serve as platoon commanders. An American officer serving on the Military Liaison Team related an anecdote about how one ACR general came to value the idea of having NCOs in the unit. He said that the general realized that such a person with individual responsibility over the troops might be able to reduce the destruction of equipment and facilities that routinely takes place when the troops go unsupervised.<sup>170</sup> While this newfound motivation may not spring from hearts of commanders who have suddenly been converted to the cause of taking an interest in and caring for their troops, any movement toward inserting a professional NCO to serve as a junior leader between the officers and the conscripts would be a step toward achieving the goal of improved leadership.

While Russia’s reform plans have called for progress in professionalization, these motivations have been directed at increasing technical competency, not toward improving the broken leadership system. Russian military leaders in their contacts with Western militaries have been impressed by the great amount of responsibility given to Western NCOs and would like to have pro-

professionals in their force with such levels of expertise, but such plans that have been tried in the past, the *proposhik* and warrant officer systems and the contract servicemen systems, have not involved giving these more highly trained enlisted men responsibility for controlling troops that even comes close to the power still reserved for officers. Indeed, the contract servicemen fighting in Chechnya were implicated in the worst brutalities there and were considered to be little more than mercenary ex-convicts incapable of instilling leadership in troops.<sup>171</sup>

Soviet standards of ethical behavior also contribute to the democratic deficit of military professionalism among Russian officers. In the Soviet system, where direct salary compensation was low, a premium was placed on protecting such assets as information and friends. Contacts, were, and continue to be (in the postcommunist era of near hyperinflation), Russians' lifeline for all valuable commodities in life. The habit of circumventing established procedures, many of which are now codified in the rule of law, to procure one's wants also characterizes the behavior of many Russian officers who put a higher priority on taking advantage of every lucrative opportunity than following the standards of democratic accountability.<sup>172</sup>

U.S. military observers report that training in professional ethics is neither formalized at military colleges nor emphasized as an expected character trait of officers. U.S. Air Force Academy officials noted that cadets at the Kachinsky Higher Military Aviation College were shocked that U.S. academies had honor codes.<sup>173</sup> A separate group of American cadets reported, in their discussions with Czech cadets, that a premium is not placed on the instruction of honor or ethics nor is there an honor code.<sup>174</sup> "They're not taught anything about this at all. Whatever it takes to accomplish the mission is OK at the top. It's better for an officer out in the field not to whine about inadequate resources [that is, to get the resources needed through any possible means]."<sup>175</sup> Corruption is widespread and widely known to exist within the Russian military. "It is known that Dudayev got weapons from Russian military sources and that high military circles use their influence to gain riches. Much of the money put in the budget to improve officers' salaries was never seen by them."<sup>176</sup>

This section has highlighted the need for leadership and officership in both the Czech Republic and Russia that is characterized by accountability to democratic values, respect for human rights, stewardship of the public trust, and ethical behavior. Such reforms will not only make the transitioning militaries better reflectors of their transitioning democratic societies, but lead to increased competence as a military institution due to the adoption of more effective leadership styles. These reforms, however, must be accompanied by a simultaneous change in the education and training system to teach these desired qualities. Like so many other aspects of reform, success depends on supportive measures being carried out concurrently in other areas.

## Education and Training

A key component in the democratic professionalization of postcommunist militaries is the reform of their education and training systems. It is in this period of an officer's career that professional socialization occurs and an awareness of professional expectations develops. Military professionals in training acquire the technical expertise they will need to perform their craft as well as the cultural norms of their caste in society. It is through a series of these formative educational experiences that officers are taught the answers to the key questions of military service: *who*, *why*, and *how* they serve. As the discussion of the democratization of officership and leadership styles illustrated, even the answer to the question *how* an officer serves can change as the ideological character of the state changes.

A key question in the post-Soviet era regarding the education and training system of the postcommunist militaries is how this system is adapting to the vast ideological changes that have taken place within the state. A brief examination of changes taking place in the curriculum of military colleges and of the ongoing struggle to reach a consensus on what should comprise the content of ideological training will help illuminate the evolution of this particular aspect of the cases' democratic deficit.

Fundamental change in the approach to developing future officers through the military education system has not yet occurred in either case. The plan for reform of the military education system in Russia assumes that the historical experience and traditions of training officers' cadres are rich and unchangeable.<sup>177</sup> Those directing the reform profess that any changes will rely on this model, which needs only to be qualitatively improved.<sup>178</sup> In neither case has there been a shift away from the technical specialization approach to officer education that contrasts with the United States' method of training generalists who specialize later on in their careers. However, in Russia, a major component of the MOD education reform plan adopted in 1993 is to extend the period of training at military schools from four to five years in order to allow time to acquire a civilian specialty. This change will improve the social protection of officers by providing them with qualifications recognized in the military and that meet the state standards for civilian professionals.<sup>179</sup> But curriculums remain very rigid, with an emphasis on memorization and no electives.<sup>180</sup>

In the Czech Republic, legislation directing the reform of the military education system has been expected for years,<sup>181</sup> but has yet to materialize.<sup>182</sup> In the absence of such legislation, the faculties of the military academies have done little to transform their institutions to produce disciplined and well-educated graduates who are competent in their profession and socialized to serve a democratic society and system of government. Although official publications of the Brno Military Academy trumpet curriculum revisions resulting

from “consultations with Western democratic militaries,” when questioned faculty members could not come up with any specific examples of these changes.<sup>183</sup> Indeed, some junior civilian faculty members remarked that such claims in the English language version of the catalog are most likely for Western consumption and do not reflect any real changes in approach.<sup>184</sup>

While the overall approach to undergraduate military education has not changed, there is some evidence that there have been some positive changes in the teaching of courses in the social sciences that shape cadets’ attitudes toward the role of the military in society and in which cadets learn about their transitioning political system. An exchange of letters with the head of the social sciences department at the Kachinsky Higher Military Aviation School revealed some telling insights into the problem of giving cadets the ideological grounding needed to serve as military officers.

Lt. Colonel Yuri Runaev commented, upon reviewing the curriculum I sent him outlining how the U.S. Air Force Academy trains cadets in political science, that the American academy defends too strongly the American political system and “propagandizes” American cadets on the correctness of democracy. “All of us have our own definite opinions and political positions, but we don’t impose on the cadets a particular system of ideas.”<sup>185</sup> At Kachinsky, Marxism-Leninism is taught side by side with democratic capitalism, and cadets are not taught that they have a particular obligation to defend one political system over the other. Still absent is instruction that can help the future officer understand *who, why, or how* he/she serves as a military professional in service to a democratic state.

Of course the danger in this is that military officers in democratic states do not have the choice of defending the political system of their choice. They are the protectors of one type of political system—as imperfect as it may be—democracy. While American cadets certainly are free to learn about anything they want, an institutional responsibility of all commissioning sources is to ensure that graduating cadets understand, respect, and are motivated to defend the American political system.<sup>186</sup> Additionally, cadets must understand the principle of democratic civilian control of the armed forces and the proper role of the military in politics and in society at large.

Observers argue that instruction in the social sciences will be limited by the dogmatic training of the professors in this area, most of whom have been carried over from the Soviet era. The great majority of those in charge of incorporating new ideas into the social science curriculum of Russian military colleges are former professors of Marxism-Leninism.<sup>187</sup> In the Czech Republic the former “politruks,” whose careers were based on boundless loyalty to the KSC (Communist Party of Czechoslovakia), still rule the military schools and control the teaching of political science.<sup>188</sup> A Russian journalist related that after he used the term *paternal state* in one of his articles referring to the for-

mer Soviet Union and Russia, he received twenty to thirty letters from political scientists at military academies complaining that *paternal state* is a feature of the relationship between capitalism and society. "Even if they are not so devoted to Communist ideas any longer, they are too dogmatic in their thinking to really change much."<sup>189</sup>

In neither case do commissioning sources actively embrace the promotion of democratic values or allegiance to a democratic constitution. In the Czech Republic, Marxism-Leninism has disappeared, but its replacement has been some study of comparative political systems and Czech history with a nationalist emphasis.<sup>190</sup> This may be attributed to a delayed understanding of how to practically implement curriculum changes to reflect the democratic values that have been adopted by society as a whole. The Czechs must learn that the abandonment of Marxist-Leninist ideology does not necessarily mean that democratic ideology will fill the vacuum.

In the Russian case, the continued prevalence of Marxism-Leninism as a legitimate choice suggests that there is no accord on the permanence of democratic institutions. While the Russian military professor advocated his institution's support of multiple political systems as the more libertine approach to military education, such behavior indicates his uncertainty about what institutions will ultimately prevail in Russia and perhaps his personal hedge against an uncertain future. This new reserve in giving cadets answers to the *for whom* and *for what* questions may be explained by a lack of consensus on what the best response to these questions might be. It is also indicative of the fluidity of power in Russia and an unwillingness by those beholden to multiple sources of power to advocate the supremacy of any single political ideology. In advanced democratic states, such as the United States, military cadets may hold varying political views, but they are taught that challenging the Constitution, except through accepted procedures, is not acceptable. This tripwire against legitimate military involvement in politics is completely absent in the Russian case and perilously left unstated in the Czech case.

Beyond the system of military colleges, much of the ideological shaping and socializing was done by the political officers. The position of political officer has been completely eliminated in the Czech case. However, in Russia the continuing need for officers specializing in the ideological training and socialization of Russian troops has been recognized. "When we made the inclination toward the de-ideologization of the armed forces we committed a mistake. We spoke about the liquidation of Party influence and therefore were convinced that this idea was correct absolutely. The smashing of the communist ideology, though, left a big vacuum which is very dangerous and which was started to be filled by Zhirinovskiy and others."<sup>191</sup> As a result, the former Lenin Military Political Academy that used to specialize in the training of political officers for the Soviet military has been renamed the Military University and redesigned to

train the political officer's counterpart in the postcommunist era—the “educational” officer. The Military University is also the only higher military educational institution that trains interpreters, lawyers, journalists, teachers, psychologists, sociologists, and cultural workers.<sup>192</sup>

The observation by many that the Russian military lost its orientation when political officers stopped working has led to the development of a general consensus that some political training in the military should continue. “A man with no tsar in the head doesn't know what to do,” remarked one Russian military observer.<sup>193</sup> Additionally, when political officers were eliminated many of their nonideological duties such as looking after the morale and welfare of the troops have gone unfulfilled by others. The new educational officers are intended to fill these gaps with their primary task being the “orientation” of the troops or the so-called upbringing of the soldiers.<sup>194</sup> Other tasks will include information-psychological support, military-social and cultural-leisure activities, and serving as liaisons to religious groups.<sup>195</sup>

The problem is, however, that there is still not a consensus on what this new orientation should be. Faculty at the reshaped educational officer academy in Moscow agree that military personnel who take up arms should be convinced of *for whom* and *for what* he or she is serving, but those responsible for answering these questions are falling back on “the Motherland” as the motivation for postcommunist servicemen and servicewomen in Russia: “A specific characteristic of Russian history is to be devoted to the Motherland. In the very difficult Russian history a constant was the Motherland.”<sup>196</sup> Lt. General Sergey Zdorikov, Chief of the MOD Main Educational Work Directorate, stated that the position of his department and the Army is clear. “We serve not leaders, but the state. We are responsible to the people.”<sup>197</sup> His successor, Lt. General Vladimir Kulakov, admitted two years later when education officers were already engaged in their work with the troops that the ideological niche once filled by the Party and its organizations is still empty.<sup>198</sup> What is needed, according to Kulakov, are officers who first acquire military specialties and then undergo subsequent training, much like political officers did so that they will learn to talk with people in the language of the professional educator and skillfully influence the hearts and minds of their subordinates.<sup>199</sup>

Those who settle on the Motherland for the object of one's loyalties must answer the question “which Motherland?” Should Russian soldiers dedicate themselves to defending the boundaries of the present-day Russian Federation or the territory of the former Soviet Union where many Russians live in the near-abroad?<sup>200</sup> This approach to service is flawed if defense of the state does not include the defense of democratic institutions. Indeed, such an approach can lead to defending the dismantling of democratic institutions if the perception of the military leadership is that such institutions run counter to the people's interest.



There is not as much enthusiasm for focusing on serving a democratic state because the “democratic Motherland hasn’t given its children anything that would inspire them to give something back to it. Americans may say that they serve to defend the Constitution, democracy and rights that they have, but Russians don’t feel any such obligation to the democratic state yet.”<sup>201</sup> So, in the short term at least, the ideological training of Russian troops as guided by newly minted educational officers features a heavy dose of Russian history and traditions with a smattering of training on democratic principles. The foundation of the “new ideology,” General Zdorikov professed, must be “Statehood, Patriotism, and Professionalism.”<sup>202</sup> However, Zdorikov, the general responsible for coordinating the new educational work, had no objections to officers running for and serving in the state Duma.<sup>203</sup>

Thus far, the education officers assigned to work with the troops have not yet found their place. Commanders have been negative about their incorporation into the units, and former political officers, who perceive themselves to have much more experience in educational work, are resentful of the new education officers. The greatest reasons for the education officers’ ineffectiveness most likely lie in the absence of an intellectual framework for their work. The only subunit of the armed forces dedicated to research in military-sociological studies was abolished in 1994 due to lack of financing.<sup>204</sup> Additionally, adaptations of the military education system, in general, must be preceded by the development of a national security concept and military doctrine compatible with the Russian Federation’s current political and economic capabilities.<sup>205</sup>

In the Czech military education system little is being done to actively embrace the promotion of democratic values or allegiance to a democratic constitution. Although 30 percent of the cadets’ four-year curriculum used to be devoted to such courses as Scientific Communism and the History of the Communist Party, only thirty classroom hours are set aside in the postcommunist curriculum for the study of philosophy, history, economics, and political science. The political science course consists of ten one-hour lectures and five seminars. Only one lesson is devoted to the basic principles of democracy. Another lesson discusses the main political parties and movements, while a third explains the main political ideologies of governments. There are no lessons devoted to explaining the role of the military in a democratic society or the norms of behavior of military officers in service to a democratic state. The instructors of political science at the Brno Military Academy, two recent university graduates, agree that the time dedicated to teaching cadets about democratic political systems and to their role within it is woefully inadequate in the course of a four-year curriculum.<sup>206</sup> They contend, too, that much of the cadets’ instruction in philosophy, economics, and history is tainted because many Communist era ideologues still rule the military schools and negatively influence the teaching of these subjects.

The Czechs fail to understand that the mere abandonment of Marxist-Leninist ideology does not necessarily mean that democrats will result from programs that do not specifically educate students about democratic principles and the democratic political system. Many Czechs are averse to the idea of filling the Marxist-Leninist vacuum with democratic themes because they perceive any deliberate education or training on political subjects to be “indoctrination.”

The question of ideological reorientation is virtually ignored and is related to confusion over what role, if any, democratic values should play in the transition of Czech military forces. Czechs have placed a high priority on the “professionalization” of their military and credit the time recouped from the performance of ideological tasks to making this “new professionalism” possible. As a result, ideology has been thrown out completely and no ideological reorientation is occurring.<sup>207</sup> Marxist-Leninism has not been replaced by democracy; political ideology has simply disappeared. “There’s no time to worry about *who* or *why* they serve.”<sup>208</sup> Professionalism and ideological orientation are considered two unrelated concepts that can be addressed sequentially—time permitting. As a result of these deficiencies in the training of military professionals and conscripts, the tripwire against legitimate military involvement in politics is perilously left unstated in the Czech case.

The misinterpretation and subsequent misappropriation of democratic values to military life is also evident through behavior observed at the remaining Czech military academies. U.S. Air Force Academy cadets who visited the ACR military academy at Brno on a weeklong cadet exchange visit in March 1995 reported that discipline was lax and practically nonexistent there. The explanation they received was that the behavior was a reaction to the strictness of the days under Communism and stemmed from the equating of discipline with authoritarianism.<sup>209</sup> My own site visit to the Brno Military Academy in March 1997 with another contingent of U.S. Air Force Academy cadets confirmed these earlier reports. Academy officials lamented the erasure of discipline that had characterized the academy in the Communist era and blamed government officials for not “passing laws to help us.”<sup>210</sup> Cadets are free to do as they please in the afternoons and evenings, because “they do not like to be told what to do.” Uniforms are only worn while cadets attend classes. Even officers wear uniforms only when performing official duties, not while traveling to or from work or when walking about the town.

The Czech Defense attaché to the United States agreed that the compatibility of democracy and discipline is a lesson that has been lost on many associated with the ACR. Through the course of his assignment in the United States he has visited both the U.S. Military Academy at West Point and the U.S. Air Force Academy at Colorado Springs. “We need many more people to go and see what discipline looks like there.” He added that he thought his colleagues

would be surprised at what they see and that “if we want to be in NATO, we will need this discipline.”<sup>211</sup> However, others fear that stricter disciplinary standards will further reduce interest in the military academies, which are currently only filled to 50 percent capacity.<sup>212</sup>

Finally, I will address the democratic deficits in the Professional Military Education (PME) system. PME is defined as education that recurs throughout a professional soldier’s career and is normally focused on preparation for a specific rank or technical specialty. The IMET program has afforded the Russians and Czechs, as well as their postcommunist neighbors, the opportunity to attend various PME courses in the United States and in some NATO countries. But of the cases presented in this study, only the Czech Republic has taken full advantage of exposing its officers to the West’s broad-based approach to officership through this program.

However, the PME system predominant in the ACR is the technical-based system inherited from the Communist era. No significant adjustments to this system have been made.<sup>213</sup> While attendance at Western, and especially U.S., PME programs has become an important discriminator in a Czech officer’s record, a comparable program has not yet developed internally for the vast majority of officers who will never be selected to study in the West.<sup>214</sup> More importantly, the lessons learned abroad effectively do little to change the face of the ACR unless similar PME lessons are systematized in the Czechs’ own system.

The development of some semblance of an NCO corps also depends on the creation of an education and training system that prepares servicemen for these ranks and their corresponding responsibilities. The ACR is developing a program to train some contract professionals on the roles and responsibilities of NCOs, but no parallel program is being set up to ensure that officers understand NCOs’ roles and responsibilities.<sup>215</sup> Obviously, training NCOs without preparing officers for their integration into units will be less than effective.

Some Czech reformers argue in favor of revamping the whole system to achieve their goal of developing a semiprofessional ACR. Defense Minister Lobkowicz proposed abandoning the conscript-based system entirely, but his successor, Vladimir Vetchy, reversed the plan.<sup>216</sup> Hope remains, however, that some young Czechs can be attracted to serving as “professionals” within the semiprofessional ACR. This proposal would have all potential officers and NCOs beginning their military service as conscripts, subsequently serve as NCOs, and then those willing and able could progress on to university-level officer commissioning programs. The theory is that attrition at the commissioning schools could be reduced if the cadets had prior military experience.<sup>217</sup> However, it also assumes that service in the lower ranks will make a positive impression on the future officer candidates and that the training provided there will be considered an attractive alternative to other vocational-type training available in the civilian sector. However, the Czech MOD has determined that

50 percent of the negative information acquired by the public about the Army comes from their contact with conscripts.<sup>218</sup>

Reformed education and training programs are a crucial element in the democratization and professionalization of both the ACR and the Russian military. Without such a system in place, it is unlikely that any reform agenda will be successful. The hallmarks of professionalism are learned in the formative experience of a military academy or in the hands-on military training of an NCO. A broad education in which democratic values are taught and internalized so that officers and NCOs, and conscripts for that matter, know *who*, *why*, and *how* to serve is an essential prerequisite for both democratic military professionalism and competence. Reform is also necessary for the boosting of the institution's prestige as a whole and of the educational institutions that serve it.

### Norms of Political Influence

There are some similarities between the Czech and Russian cases with respect to understanding what the norms of acceptable political behavior and influence are for a military in a democratic state. The lack of experience of being a player in democratic processes affects both cases; however, the Russian military lags markedly behind the Czechs because it has not yet fully accepted its role in the new political order.

Russia has made only limited progress toward creating an apolitical military and setting up institutional safeguards to prevent the use of coercive force by political leaders intent on gaining or maintaining power. The Russian Armed Forces remain, in essence, the old Soviet Armed Forces—an institution traumatized by the breakup of the USSR and coexisting uneasily with the new political order.<sup>219</sup>

The Russian military's trauma is increasingly being played out by its inappropriate participation in the election process. While many officers still adhere to the idea that apolitical behavior is a hallmark of military professionalism,<sup>220</sup> others are endorsing a more direct political role.<sup>221</sup> Officers' participation in elections dates to the first Russian elections, when civilian candidates allied with officer candidates in an effort to woo the military vote.<sup>222</sup> In 1993, deputies who had good contacts with local generals were well supported because "soldiers will vote how officers tell them."<sup>223</sup> In addition, commanders can control which political blocs have access to garrisons to promote their platforms and candidates.<sup>224</sup> The isolation of many military bases also makes it possible for the military to control closed areas and deliver the vote.<sup>225</sup>

The All-Russian Officers' Assembly created in the first half of 1995 is led by some of the top plotters of the 1991 coup. The movement's aim is to seek

the support of active duty officers, reservists, and sympathetic civilians to support candidates of Communist, agrarian, and nationalist blocs.<sup>226</sup> Additionally, every major political party or bloc has recruited a senior officer to serve in its leadership<sup>227</sup> to help sway the military vote, which is estimated to account for one-third of the nation's registered voters.<sup>228</sup>

Even more disturbing is the presence of active duty officers serving in parliament. As one analyst noted, "It is as if the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff were elected to serve in the Congress." In the 1996 election, the MOD endorsed a slate of 123 officers, many of whom were still on active duty.<sup>229</sup> In some cases, officers from the official MOD slate were ordered to run against retired officers, such as General Boris Gromov, who had fallen out of favor with Grachev and the Ministry.<sup>230</sup> Even Grachev himself indicated a desire to run and authorized the collection of signatures on his behalf to qualify.<sup>231</sup> Colonel General Lev Rokhlin, former Chairman of the Duma's Defense Committee, was a particularly outspoken military parliamentarian.

The alliance building between the military and its civilian leadership that used to be based on accommodating the army's demands in exchange for subjugation to Party rule seems increasingly to have shifted to the political arena in the democratization era. However, the military candidates and blocs do not profess a unified agenda. Some, like the All-Russian Officers' Assembly, are opposed to the democratic and economic reforms that have taken place and seek to roll them back. Others are centrists who support the postcommunist government.<sup>232</sup> Still others are tied to the singular interests of the MOD, which has the aim of increasing the defense budget and improving the living conditions of soldiers without significantly reforming the MOD itself. Finally, the group the government is most eager to silence is Lev Rokhlin's Movement in Support of the Army, the Defense Industry, and Military Science,<sup>233</sup> which has its origins in Rokhlin's vocal opposition to the military reform plan launched in July 1997. Rokhlin called upon the military to unite in opposition against the military reform plan.<sup>234</sup> A Chechen war hero and former supporter of the government, Rokhlin moved into the opposition due to his perception that the proposed cuts to the ground forces will leave a hollow Army outnumbered by Interior Ministry troops<sup>235</sup> that he alleged Yeltsin is favoring as a sort of praetorian guard.<sup>236</sup> Rokhlin's murder in August 1998 puts into question the continued political impact of his movement.

Some justify the increased direct political involvement as fulfilling their duty to ensure that the problems of the armed forces are adequately addressed in order to protect the state.<sup>237</sup> Such rationalizing is the result of the evolution of postcommunist military professionalism within a context of ambiguous ideological allegiance. Loyalty to the Motherland has been preserved as the ideological point of consensus from the Communist era. Clearly, allegiance to democratic norms of political participation for soldiers has not yet taken root,

especially when adherence to such norms may be perceived as contrary to the interests of the Motherland as understood by the military. Though some officers still profess that an apolitical, professional military should be the norm, their views are being overshadowed by activists who have decided that this goal should be subordinate to restoring the honor of the armed forces and the state.

The Czech Republic, in contrast, has not been plagued by any rumblings from the ACR for direct participation in politics. The Czech deficit in democratic norms of political influence is characterized more by an unwillingness to participate in politics even by legitimate means and stems from a lack of experience in the political process. For example, present legislation permits cadets to attend military academies for one year, which counts as their mandatory year of conscript service, and then transfer to a civilian university by paying back the academy \$30 for each month of training. Current law also permits civilian firms to “buy out” the active duty service commitments of academy graduates at the same rate, enabling those graduates to acquire an academy education and fulfill their military commitment with no active duty service. Faculty members also cited legislation that governs all higher education in the Czech Republic calling for students to elect officials of the universities. With no exception for military schools, the Rektor of the Brno Military was consequently elected by the Senate of the academy, which includes cadet representatives. Because funding levels are also determined by the number of students in attendance at both military and civilian schools, military faculties are eager to retain students, while civilian faculties are happy to take military students into their programs. Such procedures put academy authorities in a difficult position with respect to enforcing standards.<sup>238</sup> Academy officials seemed incapable of solving their serious problems of discipline, funding, and recruitment of potential cadets without some sort of outside intervention by political authorities. There seemed to be little willingness to unilaterally impose regulations to enforce discipline or to lobby for legislation that was needed to ensure that the academy, specifically, and the military, in general, functioned in an efficient and disciplined manner.

There are several levels on which progress needs to be made. First, the ACR must become more astute at putting its own political house in order by developing processes through which ideas can compete openly and freely between the ranks, the General Staff, and the MOD. Second, members of the military institution in authoritative and expert positions need to more assertively develop positive working relationships with the direct oversight bodies in Parliament and with the population at large that has indirect oversight authority through its elected representatives.

Additionally, the attitude that sees professional officers as completely apolitical beings does not recognize the proper amount of political savvy and awareness that is not only appropriate, but essential, to a military institution in a democracy. Although Huntington extols apolitical military officers as the

purest professionals, such a view does not take into account the degree of lobbying and the political transmission of expert advice that is needed from time to time to ensure that civilian national security policymakers make well-informed judgments.

The evidence presented in the section on education and training showed that military academicians at military colleges in both the Czech Republic and Russia are struggling with this issue. Indeed, the first question put to me in my correspondence with a faculty member from a Russian military college on the subject of teaching political science at military schools was, "It seems that the American Armed Forces have a political role in your country, but why do we hear that the Army of the USA is outside of politics? How is it possible to explain this?"<sup>239</sup>

The Russian military's confusion stems, at least partially, from its reluctant involvement by political actors in political feuds. The Russian military was averse to taking sides in Yeltsin's fight with Parliament in October 1993, but ultimately participated in order to preserve order in the capital. The use of the military for such roles is dangerous for states in transition, because a certain amount of indebtedness to the military is created that may distort the military's perception of what norms of political influence it must adhere to in a democracy. The military may expect rewards for its behavior that go beyond what military institutions whose coercive powers had not been called upon would expect.

There is evidently still a lot of confusion about the proper role of the military institution in the democratic political process. One observer explained, "The problem up to now has been that in general neither the military nor society at large understands the political process. On the institutional level, few people understand political decision making or legislative procedures."<sup>240</sup> If the military leadership wants to ensure that its institution does not become involved in political conflicts, then it must provide the means for those serving in the armed forces to attain an understanding of the political process and what the proper role of soldiers is vis-à-vis the democratic state. It is not good enough for the military to get comfortable with being an apolitical institution if behaviors associated with this status are not understood. Transitioning militaries must understand the political processes happening around them and develop institutional practices that are compatible with the norms of political participation and influence in a democracy.

While the Russian case shows an inconsistent pattern of political behavior ranging from direct participation in politics to ignoring training on an officer's proper role in the political arena, the Czech case shows an extreme aversion to ideology and politics in any form. Both cases need to become comfortable with the norms of political influence of militaries in democratic states. An officer in service to a democratic state should learn the precepts of demo-

cratic ideology and his/her proper role as a defender of its democratic institutions. Officers should also be aware of the established norms for influencing the political process of a democratic state while remaining focused on respecting the constraints of democratic accountability.

### Prestige and Public Relations

Chapter 3 discussed extensively the relationship between society and the military as an essential element of democratic political control. The importance of transparency as a means of democratic oversight and the expectation that democratic values will be evident within all transitioning institutions were highlighted. This section and the final section of the chapter will briefly revisit this issue in the specific context of military professionalism. The aim is to present the issue from the internal perspective of the military institutions in transition and to show the progress made in the Czech Republic and Russia on actively managing the military relationship with the public.

In both the Czech Republic and Russia there is an insufficient understanding within the military that it must earn the respect of society and that it is largely responsible for the perpetuation of its own negative image. In the Czech Republic, Western observers note that although the ACR tends to dwell on its negative image, it misses some simple ways to work on it. The U.S. Army attaché noted that the Czech bases are by and large very “dumpy” and that little things like painting the front gate and flying the Czech flag go undone. There is a tendency, he argued further, for the Czechs to attribute their image problems to outside forces and not to take responsibility to improve some things on their own.<sup>241</sup> Political leaders must also take part in strengthening the prestige of the ACR through their material support and the provision of concrete political guidance.<sup>242</sup> The poor level of financial support from the government has led officers to question their worth to society. “Society must ask the question whether it wants the army in the first place or else it can be disbanded.”<sup>243</sup>

In Russia the picture is one of a demoralized military that is often at odds with the public. A survey of military elites in Russia reported that regrets about Russia’s loss of status as a military and political world power were a central theme. Seventy percent of the officers questioned described the decline of the Soviet Union as a “disaster for our country,” and more than 40 percent of those questioned whether military means should have been used to prevent it.<sup>244</sup> Negative self-images of perceived prestige within society also characterized the survey results. Only 11 percent of mid-level and senior officers thought that officers enjoyed popular respect while only 4 percent said that General Officers are respected by the populace.<sup>245</sup>

A U.S. attaché who spoke at a forum of Afghan and Vietnam vets in Volgograd during the Chechen War questioned those in attendance about their feel-



ings for the plight of the conscripts in Chechnya. He discovered that the citizens there had little sympathy for their countrymen. "They thought that these guys were stupid not to find some way to get out of conscription. They were either too lazy or stupid to find a way out of their service."<sup>246</sup> Commenting on the tactics that the Russian military is using to try to limit the shortfall of conscripts, other Russian observers report that "draft campaigns resemble military operations with future soldiers being escorted to the military draft offices at gun point."<sup>247</sup>

Impoverishment of the Russian officer corps is a prime reason for its demoralization, but freedom of the press has also contributed to the widespread propagation of a negative image for the military. The press has been an important player in pressuring the military into being more responsive to the public. In this sense, the free press has made the military more accountable than it would have been on its own and has led to the military leadership's greater acceptance of the idea that it cannot just do whatever it wants and ignore the public reaction to its behavior.<sup>248</sup> At the same time, the era of glasnost began a period of increased negative scrutiny of the military beginning with the tarnishing of the military's image through objective reporting of the Afghan War, followed by the revelation of widespread corruption scandals and practices, and continuing to the largely negative reporting on the war in Chechnya.

Some attempt has been made to address the issue of working actively to repair the damaged image of the Russian military through the creation of a public affairs department at the MOD. "In this way Grachev was actually some improvement over Yazov at first with regard to public relations. He had some appreciation of politics in a democracy."<sup>249</sup> This office, though, has no doubt been kept very busy fielding the corruption charges continually waged against various general officers. There are also some ACR officers serving in the public affairs specialty at the MOD and Corps levels.

While some public relations infrastructure exists that was previously missing, most observers concur that tremendous needs remain with regard to the Russian MOD's willingness to be a transparent institution. Lack of truthful information is such that "society does not even know the colossal efforts required to resolve the problems inherited from the military sphere."<sup>250</sup> Western observers think that the ACR has been more forthcoming in providing information to the public than other postcommunist militaries in the region, but that its responsiveness depends on whether or not the media has independently discovered a particular issue.<sup>251</sup> A U.S. trained public affairs specialist confirmed that there are still some lingering problems of obsessiveness with secrecy within the MOD. Often information that he thinks should have been routinely passed to him is not. No routine for passing on information commensurate with his responsibilities of communicating ACR activity to the public had yet developed.<sup>252</sup>

Both cases have shown that there is an important link between the tasks of improving the military's prestige and its responsiveness to the people. Reforms that are clearly communicated to the population will lead to improved coverage in the press and greater public support for the professionalization and transformation of the military. Both military institutions must convince all who serve in their ranks at all levels that democratic populations expect and deserve full accountability from all institutions of government including the military. This is especially true in the Czech case where the prospects for professionalization and reform are greater. The ACR is dependent on cultivating goodwill among the Czech population to support the higher spending levels that will be required to support a professional force. Both countries must also assure recruits that they can serve without fear and willingly commit to careers as NCOs and officers. Continued lack of reform, reliance on secrecy, and acceptance of corrupt behavior, on the other hand, will result in a continued downward spiral of prestige and low support among the public.

#### Compatibility of Military and Social Values

A central theme of this entire work is that societal institutions should reflect overall societal values. When societal values change, then the values of its subordinate institutions should adapt to these changes. A characteristic of the U.S. military is that it reflects the democratic values of U.S. society. "Our people are jealous of their military and will hold the government accountable for its misuse. This goes well beyond people not wanting their treasure wasted. Militaries are inevitably a reflection of the society that they serve."<sup>253</sup> The necessity of adapting to democratic civilian oversight is teaching transitioning militaries that no institutions in democracies exist in a political vacuum. While military institutions are not and should never be democracies, the values inherent in militaries should reflect the democratic values of such states.

In the Czech case, there is cross-institutional consensus on what constitutes the legitimate authority of the state. There is no question that the leadership of the ACR respects the principle of democratic civilian control although it has shown its inexperience in being subject to it. All societal institutions, though equally inexperienced, are working toward the common goal of consolidating democracy. President Havel has expressed his confidence in the ACR leadership: "I realize that, after all those complicated personnel changes, the Army is led by a relatively good team of younger generals who are willing to build the democratic army of a democratic state."<sup>254</sup>

In the Russian case, however, the advent of democratization has led to an increasing level of disparity between democratic values and the values of the post-Soviet military institution. For the first time, the military was put under scrutiny and subject to negative criticism; and for the first time Russian society

began to reject some of the military's values. The military particularly laments the across-the-board demilitarization of society that is taking place.<sup>255</sup> The situation is compounded by an overall lack of consensus within society as a whole concerning the acceptance of democratic values.

One fundamental value that Russian society is rejecting is the conscript system. A survey of draft age youth revealed that 70 percent of draftees are convinced of the needlessness of military service, 35 percent said that under certain circumstances they could forsake the Motherland, and 50 percent thought that such virtues as military duty, patriotism, and honor are from the past.<sup>256</sup> "The highly urbanized and educated mass culture is no longer going along with a conscript system based on beating youth into compliance. These elements make the continuation of such a conscript system untenable. Only the dregs too slow to get away are serving. So military leaders have an insoluble dilemma if they dream of maintaining the old model."<sup>257</sup>

At present, the military is providing a negative socialization function giving conscripts the worst possible introduction to what the state is capable of doing through service within a tough and brutal system. Mothers disillusioned by the senseless loss of their sons in Chechnya and the absence of government accountability regarding the fate of conscripts, either those presently serving or those who died in service, now protest that they never would have let their sons go to the military if they had known the true conditions. "We are ashamed and pained by our country."<sup>258</sup> Mothers who once regarded military service as the duty of all young Russian men now attend meetings where they learn how to avoid the draft and advocate for their sons subject to conscription.<sup>259</sup>

But abandoning the historical socialization function of the Russian military by forfeiting the military's claim on the great majority of Russian male youths would be a tremendous concession to changing priorities of Russian society. Even those who advocate abolishing the draft caution against some possible negative side effects that may lead to the widening of the gap between civilian society and the professional military. "If the consolidation of the military caste and its further politicization are not prevented, the democratic process in Russia can be greatly jeopardized."<sup>260</sup>

The Czech military, on the other hand, never felt the oneness with the state and its people that the Soviet military did and is consequently not clinging to its previous socialization function. Indeed, the ACR welcomes the day when the treasury will be able to finance the goal of converting the ACR to a professional all-volunteer force. However, as the ideology driving the Czech political system has dramatically shifted away from Communism to democracy, different institutions within society have adapted to these changes at different rates. It is important to carefully monitor the potential divergence of military and societal values as the postcommunist era continues. The democratic leaders of the Czech Republic must continue to use their influence to craft for the ACR a re-

spected and valued niche in the transitioning state. The continued perception of military service as a profession for social misfits cannot be allowed to persist.

Eventually the oversight capabilities of nascent democratic institutions will gain in strength and experience, and forcing reforms that will bring the values of the transitioning state and the military institution that serves it into line. In the Czech case, these values will be democratic and the ACR will be compelled to root out remaining institutional habits from the Soviet era that conflict with the expectations of its democratic citizens—both in and out of uniform. In the Russian case, the permanence of democratic values is less certain, but the rejection of some Soviet era practices such as conscript service seems clear. Authority is a value that is still important in varying degrees in transitioning societies. But unrestricted use of authority, as evidenced in authoritarian leadership practices, has come into conflict with the expectations of postcommunist citizens. Those responsible for military oversight have already rejected and will continue to reject such practices.

## **Conclusion**

This chapter has attempted to highlight the differences in military professionalism between democratic and transitioning states. Military professionalism in all states is measured by the degree to which civilian supremacy of the armed forces has been achieved. However, military professionalism in democratic states is differentiated further by loyalty to democratic political systems and their inherent democratic values. States undergoing transitions from authoritarian to democratic political systems face the unique challenge of adapting inherited forms of military professionalism so that norms of democratic accountability are evident in the transitioning military institution. The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that often transitioning militaries find themselves caught between two incompatible systems of military professionalism. Additionally, progress in the military sphere of democratization seems to lag progress achieved in other transitioning democratic institutions.

Specific democratization deficits have been outlined across the seven dimensions of democratic military professionalism first presented in chapter 1. First, in the area of recruitment and retention, there is a need to address the basic needs of the armed forces in order to attract and retain quality personnel. Developing appropriate and sustainable force structures that can support soldiers at a higher level will facilitate achievement of this goal. Second, deficits were noted in both cases regarding the need for merit-based promotion systems unscarred by corrupt procedures. Further development of competency-based advancement practices will result in a more skilled officer corps on which the people's treasure is spent more efficiently. Third, improvements in standards of officership and leadership depend on the effective democratic socialization of

all citizens, including those who serve in the armed forces and those who oversee them. The infusion of democratic values into a transitioning political system results in the development of higher expectations of treatment compatible with democratic principles. There is also the need to institutionalize democratic values through a society-wide emphasis on the rule of law that does not tolerate violations of ethical standards or corruption. Fourth, education and training programs must include clear instruction on *who*, *why*, and *how* military personnel serve in democratic states. The motivation for service must not be ambiguous and must be characterized by allegiance to a democratic political system as embodied in the state's constitution. Fifth, there is a need for further education on the norms of political influence in democratic states. Both countries suffer from a lack of experience in being players in democratic political systems. The Russian military has shown an inconsistent pattern of preferring apolitical behavior in some cases, but the recent trend is for direct political participation. The Czech military, on the other hand, revealed an extreme aversion to politics that falls short of an appropriate role in the political system. Sixth, in the area of prestige and public relations, both cases must work harder to earn the respect of their populations. Greater transparency and abandonment of old habits of secrecy and the control of information will enhance this process. Additionally, military institutions must respond to societal demands to instill democratic values that clearly communicate the accomplishment of democratic reforms in order to boost the prestige of the armed forces. Finally, transitioning military institutions need to work on improving the compatibility of military and societal values. The implementation of democratic reforms can reduce the gap that has developed since the advent of democratization. Democratic expectations in society at large have outstripped the ability of military institutions to respond to them.

In the Czech Republic democratic values have begun to take root and the combined focus of the population and its newly created democratic institutions is to complete the transition to democracy. While the transition for the military has been difficult, there is no question regarding their loyalty to the democratic state. Indeed, a general motivation to eventually achieve the dimensions of Western-style democratic military professionalism was noted although many democratization deficits still exist. In Russia, however, democracy has not been a positive experience for the military or for many other elements of post-Soviet society. It has meant only a loss in material status, increased disorder, and discontinuity with the familiar past. "It may be understandable for us what the American dream is, but we cannot say, 'What is the Russian Dream?'"<sup>261</sup> The Russian officer corps, like much of the Russian citizenry, is adrift in a sea of confusion—searching for values to guide their everyday lives. One result is a military institution that has made virtually no progress in responding to the shift from an authoritarian to a democratic political system. Severe democratization

deficits persist across all dimensions of democratic military professionalism presented in the chapter.

The following chapter will look at the U.S. response to the democratization deficits described in the Czech and Russian militaries. Specific measures taken to aid each case will be analyzed to determine the extent to which U.S. military assistance programs effectively meet the democratization needs of each military in terms of both democratic political control and democratic military professionalism.