

CHAPTER 11

Apologies

An apology is meant to counteract an insult, to help undo the offense and restore harmony. This chapter will discuss how apologies work, how they are connected to honor and face, and how they use symbolism. International apologies often show flaws that would never be tolerated in apologies between friends. The chapter will argue that this difference is due to the decreased importance of communication of attitudes and feelings in the international context and the greater importance of honor and face.

The Relationship of Apologies to Face and Honor

Apologies are linked to honor and face in several ways. When we feel someone owes us an apology, our honor prompts us to demand it. The apology satisfies the needs of honor by helping to right the offense, and failure to deliver it can even be taken as a challenge. When we are in the wrong ourselves, our own honor calls on us to make an apology. In 1995 while the Japanese Diet was debating an apology for the country's actions in World War II, the Chinese newspaper *People's Daily* urged an apology, stating, "there is no greater sin than not to admit a fault, and there is no greater disgrace than not to realize the need for shame" (quoted in *Japan Economic Newswire*, March 23, 1995).

Conversely, if making an apology would serve our practical ends, but we feel we do not owe one, then honor calls on us to refuse to apologize. During the 1980 hostage crisis, Iran demanded that President Carter apologize for the United States' involvement with the shah, but Carter would not, on the grounds of America's "honor and integrity" (*New York Times*, September 19, 1980). Other administration officials talked about avoiding "self-abasement" and "abject apology."

Though apologizing can be the honorable thing to do, it means admitting

that we were wrong and on that account losing face. It can generate common expectations that others will take us less seriously. The quests for honor and face are in conflict here, and the fact that we are willing to sacrifice face helps prove that we are sincere, in the fashion of costly signaling. After the Irangate affair, Ronald Reagan made an apology for the actions of his administration but leavened it with expressions of self-tolerance: "By the time you reach my age, you've made plenty of mistakes if you've lived your life properly. So you learn. You put things in perspective" (*New York Times*, March 5, 1987, quoted in Abadi 1990). The face involved in apologizing depends on the culture, but even for a Western leader his stance seemed at odds with the expectation that one takes full responsibility. That means accepting all the consequences, including the appropriate loss of face.

A Budget of International Apologies

To examine how international apologies work, 121 apology incidents between 1980 and 1995 were assembled from the Nexis database of newspaper articles. An apology incident means either a full apology or something weaker, like an expression of regret for a deed, or a demand for an apology, or a refusal to apologize.¹ The database was not restricted to apologies between governments, but the incident had to involve interstate relations. The actors themselves had to make an explicit reference to apologizing or had to use some related term—words or symbolic actions that newswriters interpreted as apologies were not included because their real meaning was uncertain.

Table 3 has some major categories of offenses and some examples. It shows that the offenses generating apologies can be of very different degrees of seriousness. We say that we "owe" an apology, but it is not like a banknote of fixed value. Our cost is in proportion to what we are admitting to. When the sin is small, like misplaying the other's national anthem at a ceremony, leaders apologize readily, as in the perfunctory "I'm sorry" or "Excuse me" when people bump into each other on the street (Abadi 1990). This is simply a reassurance that the event was a mistake and not a manifestation of one's attitude. The apology is announced to the world as well as to the offended party, so that the slight will not cause the offended party to lose face generally.

In other cases, the demand for the apology was strongly felt, as in the de-

1. The Nexis database was searched for the words *apology* or *apologize* used at least twice in an entry, in conjunction with some word suggesting an international context, such as *embassy*, *premier*, *president*, *prime minister*, *secretary of state*, *minister of foreign affairs*, or *foreign minister*. The great bulk of the returned articles were false alarms.

TABLE 3. Categories of International Apology Incidents from News Reports, 1980–95 (with counts and examples)

- A. Major, protracted acts of violence or abuses of rights (21 apology incidents)
Individual European nations apologize for complicity in the Holocaust.
Japanese officials apologize for offenses during World War II and colonial rule.
Russia apologizes for the detention of Japanese POWs after World War II (February 1991).

 - B. Protracted policies not included in A but harmful to another state (9)
U.S. expresses deep regret to France for shielding war criminal Klaus Barbie from French prosecutors (August 1983).
Belgium apologizes for refusing to send arms to its 1991 Gulf War allies (June 1993).
Kuwait continues demands that countries supporting Iraq in the Gulf War apologize.

 - C. Specific acts of violence or threats by a state against another state's institutions or functionaries (24)
Cuba apologizes for its planes sinking a Bahamian patrol boat (May 1980).
Nigeria demands that Cameroon apologize for killing Nigerian soldiers in a border incident (May 1981).
Saddam Hussein apologizes to U.S. for missile attack on the USS *Stark* (May 1987).

 - D. Specific nonverbal abuse or violence by another state toward another's citizens who are not functionaries (10)
Argentina apologizes for detention and abuse of U.S. and British reporters (May 1981).
U.S. secretly apologizes to Canada for CIA-run LSD experiments in Canada (January 1984).

 - E. Specific violations of sovereignty (18)
Various countries apologize for unintended overflights, border crossings by troops, or ships entering another's waters.
France apologizes to Switzerland for anti-Greenpeace agents forging Swiss passports (November 1985).
U.S. apologizes for forcibly entering the Nicaraguan embassy during the invasion of Panama (December 1989).
Netherlands demands a South African apology for police entering its embassy to seize a fugitive (July 1985).

 - F. Offensive words and statements (23)
Greece apologizes for its foreign minister calling Germany a "giant with bestial force and a childlike brain" (December 1993).
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(continued)

TABLE 3—*Continued*

	U.S. apologizes for accusing Philippian president Aquino of gun smuggling (September 1989).
	Malaysian representative “explains” its error to Indonesia in running a TV documentary on East Timor (September 1992).
	Japanese police officials apologize to Pakistan’s embassy for a police training manual derogatory to Pakistanis (December 1989).
	U.S. State Department apologizes to Arab countries for use of the term Abscam (“Arab scam”) in a probe of official corruption (February 1980).
G.	Specific acts of violence by one’s citizens or those in one’s domain, not one’s functionaries, against another state (4)
	Various countries apologize for demonstrators attacking foreign embassies or consulates on their territories.
	In an open letter, King Hussein apologizes to Syria for the presence in Jordan of the Moslem Brotherhood, “outlaws committing crimes and sowing seeds of division among people” (November 1985).
H.	Lapses of etiquette or protocol (8)
	Premier Yeltsin apologizes for canceled visits to Japan (July 1993).
	President Bush apologizes for Marine honor guard carrying the Canadian flag upside down at a World Series game (October 1992).
	The U.S. ambassador to Britian apologizes for President Reagan announcing his address to Parliament before Prime Minister Thatcher had informed Parliament of the plan (March 1982).
I.	Unintentional damage or loss of property (4)
	The U.N. apologizes to Japan for losing a pocket watch recording the time of A-bomb explosion from a display (October 1989).
	Soviet Union apologizes for fighter crashing in a Belgian town (July 1989).

bate about Japanese actions in World War II. This involved admitting a serious fault, renouncing one’s past behavior and declaring that one has accepted the other’s moral position.

The database suggests that demands for apologies are often expressed in the vocabulary of rights, honor, or face, rather than interests. Instead of saying that an action did it harm, a nation calls it an interference in domestic affairs. There were many apologies for symbolic violations of sovereignty, like overflights or abuse of another country’s citizens which are offenses connected with the metaphorical world of honor and face. Apologies were seldom given for cutting foreign aid or raising tariffs. These acts may have caused greater injury but did not fit the script of an attack on a point of honor.

A natural question is whether some nations are more ready to apologize than others. Anthropologists have classified societies as guilt based or shame based, and it would be interesting to see if this distinction has consequences in international affairs. The database shows apologies from every region, with many from Asian countries, but one cannot draw a conclusion. Many variables are uncontrolled, such as how extensively the press reported a country's activities in general or how much that country was involved in conflictual interactions or how many deeds the country had to apologize for.

How International Apologies Differ from Interpersonal Ones

The apology events in the database differ from interpersonal apologies. This section will state how, then analyze the differing purposes of interpersonal and international apologies to generate an explanation.

The first difference is that many international apologies seem insincere because they are delivered under pressure. An interpersonal apology is a commitment, but it will be seen that like most speech acts, it also contains an assertion of a fact. It asserts that one feels regret. If someone were forced to make it, the sincerity of the assertion would be in doubt. For some reason, this does not matter much on the international level, where apologies are negotiated, even coerced, but are still taken as important, as if uttering the words had significance in itself.

A second oddity about international apologizing is the lack of explicit forgiving. In everyday affairs the two acts are linked—an apology that does not achieve forgiveness is a partial failure.² An international recipient, however, will “note the apology” and state that it is “satisfied with the explanation given” or “considers the matter closed,” but no statement of forgiveness appears in the database.

The third feature is that international apologies are often from or to third parties. Britain was asked to apologize for expelling the Acadians, which happened centuries ago, and Japan for mistreating Koreans during its colonial rule. Some philosophers and ethicists have debated whether an apology can be delivered to a third party and whether forgiveness can come from one. Simon Wiesenthal (1972) narrates an experience in a Nazi concentration camp. He was working in a military hospital, and a nurse called him to the bed of a young SS

2. Forgiving is in part asserting that there was a wrong, so to avoid putting a potential forger in this position, we sometimes apologize in terms of asking for an acceptance—“Would you please accept my apology for” such and such.

officer. The officer confessed that he had taken part in a massacre of Jews, that he knew he was dying, and that he wished to receive the forgiveness of a Jew. Wiesenthal listened to the story but left the room without a word. He was not sure that he had acted correctly, but when he related the event to fellow inmates, they were adamant that he would have had no right to forgive the crime since he was not in a position to speak for its victims.

Most accounts of apologies, including the one to be offered here, agree that one must deliver the apology to the offended party. To a secondary degree, an offense against one member of a group is an offense against all the others, and on this account Wiesenthal did have something to forgive. However, he was not in a position to forgive the primary offense. In the Catholic tradition also, when God forgives our sins against others, this can be interpreted as God forgiving the aspect of the sin in which it was an offense against God, as a violation of our duty of obedience, or it could be God pardoning us, as an authority who can waive punishment. We still owe an apology to the person offended. Whatever holds for person-to-person and even person-to-God relations, international apologizers seem to be free of this constraint.

A Prototypical Scenario of Apologizing

To explain these differences, the first step will be to develop a theory of interpersonal apologies. Then it can be seen which of its elements change in the international setting. Apologies have a prototypical scenario (chap. 3), an expected

TABLE 4. The Prototypical Scenario for Apologizing

Initial situation

- X and Y are friends;
- X performs an action that is wrong because it offends or injures Y.

Resentment phase

- Y expresses resentment against the offense or injury and demands an apology.

Apology phase

- X feels remorse for the action;
- X apologizes;
- X promises to mitigate the damage.

Forgiveness phase

- Y accepts the apology or forgives X;
 - X tries to mitigate the damage;
 - X and Y's friendship is restored.
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script, as shown in table 4. The three elements in the list are the expression of resentment, the apology, and the expression of forgiveness.³

Resenting

Resentment is more than anger. I resent someone's action only if my anger is based on moral grounds. If someone beats me in a competition I might be angry, but if I believed they had cheated I would resent it. A second difference with anger is that I can resent an injustice only if it was done to me. Moral anger over an offense against someone else is *indignation* (Golding 1985). Resentment is thus partly cognitive; it is an emotion including supporting reasons.

Y's *expression of resentment* against X is a communicative act, a directive, whose illocutionary point is to get X to do something. Y wants X to declare on the record that X did A and that A was morally wrong because it harmed or offended Y. An expression of resentment thus presumes certain facts about the situation, its so-called preparatory conditions (Searle and Vanderveken 1985). It presumes that X really did A and that A really was morally wrong because of the harm to Y.

Apologizing

In an apology the offender puts his or her fault and feelings of remorse on the record. Remorse means the feeling that one should not have done it—it is more than regret, which is simply the wish that one had not done it. As defined in chapter 9, putting something on the record means communicating with the goal that the sending of the message becomes common belief. A touch or a wink may be enough in some circumstances, but to apologize with just a phrase like "I'm only human" would undermine the point. People often insist on special marker words like "I apologize." Putting an apology on the record is required because it is more than a transfer of information. It involves matters of face and honor. If one backs away from the apology in the future, it should be at a significant loss of credibility.

DEFINITION: X's *apology* to Y for action A is a communicative act from X to Y

3. Philosophy is the discipline that has paid most attention to forgiving, and the account here is most influenced by Haber (1991). His analysis is less religiously oriented than some others, and he looks at forgiving not as a mental state but as a speech act, in line with the general approach of this book. I have modified his treatment in the direction of Downie's definition (1965) and the speech act theory of Searle and Vanderveken (1985).

meaning that X did A, that A caused Y harm or risk and on that account that it was wrong, and that X feels remorse for it.

The definition implies that an apology complies with all the directives in the expression of resentment; it does everything that was called for. Turning this around, an expression of resentment is a demand for an apology. An apology is not defined here as a request for the victim's forgiveness, but it changes the victim's expectations in such a way as to make it more attractive for that person to forgive. If the offender has admitted the fault, there is less chance of recurrence and less need to continue to hold the deed against the offender.

Forgiving

Some writers have defined forgiveness as an expression of one's feelings, a statement that one has overcome the emotion of resentment. In my account it is a commissive, in particular, a promise. When Y *forgives* X for action A, Y is promising to no longer harbor resentment against X because of A. This sounds like a promise to avoid a certain mental feeling, and some philosophers have taken this position, but the interpretation here is different. Y is promising not to use X's misdeed as a *moral reason* for future actions against X, that is, to give up certain considerations as justifications for action against X. In normal circumstances, the victim would owe the offender X fair treatment based on the respect due to other persons, but after the misdeed A, Y's justified resentment allows Y to act otherwise.⁴ For Y to forgive X at some later point is to promise to no longer make X a moral exception on the grounds of the offense A.

A case posed by Haber has John offending his friend Mary. He borrows her book and keeps it even though she continually asks him for it. John finally returns it and apologizes to her, and she tells him that she forgives him. Months later, John asks Mary for help, but she refuses, citing the wrong he did to her before. John reminds her that she forgave him. If forgiving were just an expression of her feeling at the time, Mary could reply, "Well, that was how I felt then, but not now." However, John is right. Refusing him as a moral response to his past offense is breaking her promise.

Forgiving is not forgetting, and Mary did not oblige herself to wipe John's action off the record. If he wanted to borrow another book, she could decline on the grounds that he has a bad habit of not returning books. This would not

4. The next chapter will discuss a concept of norms in which violating a norm obligates others to adopt a response that is usually counternormative.

be breaking the promise involved in forgiving, since her motive for refusing would not be resentment. To forgive something is to waive the past only as a moral justification.

An expression of resentment, it was argued, is a demand for an apology. Is an apology simply a request for forgiveness? Not in this definition, since it can succeed even if it does not generate forgiveness. However, the relationship between the two acts is very close. An apology prepares the ground for the speech act of forgiveness. Certain assumptions are necessary for forgiveness—harm and responsibility—and the apology puts them on the record. This is an important move, since for Y to express forgiveness to an X who has not apologized is in effect to accuse.

A Partial Order for Partial Apologies

To deliver a full apology, one must satisfy all the elements of the definition. However, many international apologies are partial, and the database shows which elements tend to be absent.

Regretting versus Apologizing

An example of a partial apology is Emperor Hirohito's September 1984 careful statement to South Korean president Chun concerning Japan's colonial rule: "it is indeed regrettable that there was an unfortunate past between us for a period in this century, and I believe it should not be repeated" (*Time*, September 17, 1984). A full apology as defined needs an acknowledgment of the harm done to Y, the moral wrong involved in the action, and X's responsibility for it. The emperor's statement did only one of these—it only acknowledged harm. Prime Minister Nakasone's statement on the same occasion was interpreted as going farther, since it moved from impersonality to naming Japan as the actor. It regretted that "Japan brought to bear great sufferings upon your country and its people" during the colonial period (*Economist*, September 15, 1984). It seems like a short step from this to admitting the deed was morally wrong, but both statements appear phrased to avoid doing this, so both fall short of full apologies.

The gap between what was called for and what Japan delivered was the difference between expressing regret and apologizing. In 1988, after a U.S. cruiser shot down an Iranian Airbus in the Persian Gulf, President Reagan sent a note of "deep regret" but not an apology. In 1985, after an EgyptAir 737 carrying hijackers was forced to land by U.S. fighters, U.S. Envoy John Whitehead said, "we

very much regret that developments took the course they did." To regret something is to wish that one had not done it. Mr. Whitehead expressed less than regret, wishing only that it had not been necessary to do it. An apology requires accepting *moral* blame, going beyond lament or regret to remorse.

A Guttman Partial Order

Expressing only regret is one way to semiapologize, and there are others. In fact, partial apologies can be partially ordered, in that performing one element is in effect performing certain others, or implying willingness to do so. A partial order suggested by the data is shown in figure 25. It can be called a *Guttman partial order*, an extension of the standard technique of Guttman scaling, or "scalogram analysis." Regular Guttman scaling applies to a group of actors and a list of behaviors, based on whether each actor engaged in each behavior. A classic study (Stouffer et al. 1950; Coombs 1964) investigated the reactions of soldiers before a World War II battle, as they approached a Pacific island in landing craft. They suffered various symptoms from the ride and their fear of the imminent combat: upset stomachs, dizziness, vomiting, and so on. These symptoms could be ordered top to bottom so that a soldier exhibiting one symptom generally exhibited all the ones below. This pattern was not perfect, in that some soldiers exhibited a more severe symptom but skipped a lesser one. However, an ordering of the symptoms was found that minimized the total discrepancies of this kind. The method simultaneously produced a ranking of soldiers and symptoms. The orders stated which symptoms were most severe and which soldiers were most prone to symptoms, without an a priori judgment by the researcher.⁵

The soldiers correspond to nations engaged in apology incidents, and their fear behaviors correspond to the different elements that appear in an apology act—whether restitution was offered, whether moral responsibility was expressed, and so forth. A full Guttman scale would not work, the data indicate, but the method can be weakened to require that the behaviors follow a partial order. The one shown in figure 25 fits fairly well and indicates, for example, that nations that regretted an action would be willing to acknowledge that they did it or were ipso facto acknowledging that. The difference between this and a full Guttman scale is the existence here of pairs of actions that have no implication in either direction. A nation may be willing to punish the guilty but not offer restitution or vice versa.

5. If one represents the data as a matrix of 0s and 1s, which mean, respectively, engaging or not engaging in the behavior, then a Guttman scale is a reordering of the rows and columns so that all the 1s lie in a triangle in the upper right.




Fig. 25. A partial order on the elements of an apology

Stouffer's rankings of soldiers and symptoms were objectively based, but figure 25 is my perception of the pattern in the data. A formal scaling method would be better, but the data were not systematic enough. They came from news reports and speeches, and the leaders quoted did not lay out their positions completely, unlike the soldiers filling out their questionnaires. Some of figure 25 is based on an intrinsic analysis of the concept—apologizing fully but adding that one did not do the deed, for example, would make no sense. It is also based on the presence or absence of certain cases from the database. Sometimes a country worked its way up the ordering, such as Japan first recognizing simply that the harm had been done to the Korean women and other women forced to provide sex for Japanese soldiers, then admitting that they were indeed coerced, then apologizing, then offering restitution. This narrowed the possibilities for the partial order.⁶

6. A Guttman partial order is a weaker assertion about one's data than a complete Guttman scale since it rules out fewer varieties of apologies. Its strength can be defined as the number of patterns it allows. The weakest claim, saying nothing at all, allows $2^9 = 512$ patterns, since one's apology could include any of the nine behaviors and omit the rest. A complete ordering would allow 10 patterns, from including all nine apology elements to none of them. It can be calculated that figure 25 is somewhere in between, allowing exactly 50 patterns. Another measure of its strength would be

It is hard to find an apology where every element was present and explicit, but one demand for an apology was situated at the top of the partial order. It was in South Korea's speech in the United Nations after the Soviet Union shot down its flight KAL 007 (*UN Chronicle*, November 1983). It called for "a full and detailed account of what exactly had happened. . . . a full apology . . . complete compensation for the loss of the aircraft, as well as to the families of the passengers and crew . . . the Soviet Union must adequately punish all those who were directly responsible . . . guarantee unimpeded access to the crash site to the representatives of impartial international organizations . . . return any remains or debris that might be found . . . give specific, concrete, effective and credible guarantees against recurrence of such violent actions." Almost as complete was Canada's demand for an apology after it discovered that the CIA had arranged for LSD experimentation on Canadian citizens, disguising it as mental health care. It called for every element except punishing the guilty. Apology demands can be strongly felt but still be low on the partial order. The secret Armenian organizations responsible for the continuing assassinations of Turkish officials have generally demanded only an acknowledgment that the massacres happened (Permanent Peoples' Tribunal 1985).

Like a challenge, an apology can be semiforceful in several ways. According to Bean and Johnstone (1994), a frequent use of "I'm sorry" in daily conversation is to initiate an interruption of the speaker. This violates an apology's preparatory condition that the apologizer has already committed the offense. Another common nonapology involves a statement like "I'm sorry that you took offense at what I did." The moral admission must be about something done by the apologizer, not the recipient. International apologies have also misfired and sometimes increased resentment by the wrong choice of the act or the recipient. Japan apologized for its World War II actions, but the apology was directed not to the victims but to the Japanese people.

Symbols and Metaphors in Apologies

An apology can be a symbolic message—a country might apologize to convey friendship. However, this section is concerned with a different connection to symbolism. It discusses symbols that appear in apologies, in their context or their form.

the bits of information it conveys, regarding each pattern as equally likely. The maximum uncertainty about what pattern might be used is $\log_2(512) = 9$ bits. Figure 25 would reduce the uncertainty to $\log_2(50) = 5.64$ bits, and a complete ordering would leave $\log_2(10) = 3.32$ bits. Thus figure 25 goes 59 percent of the way to a full Guttman scale. It is a semistrong theory of what counts as apologizing.

A case where the symbolic form was crucial was the Tampico incident of 1914. Mexican soldiers detained several U.S. sailors who had tried to sail their supply boat down a canal. They were soon released, and President Huerta was ready to apologize verbally, but he balked at a further U.S. demand that Mexico deliver a 21-gun salute to the American flag in the presence of U.S. ships in the harbor. The impasse led to a battle costing several hundred lives and to the U.S. occupation of Vera Cruz (Eisenhower 1993.)

Two important symbolic matters are the individual chosen to make the apology and the occasion chosen on which to deliver it. A statement from a monarch or an emperor has the greatest force, one from a prime minister or president is next, then come a foreign minister and a foreign affairs spokesperson. Transgressions that were committed long ago adhere to the nation rather than its current administration, so the emperor or monarch is the appropriate apologist. Nations calling for a Japanese apology for its World War II actions looked to the emperor. When Queen Elizabeth visited South Africa in March 1995, many Afrikaners wanted an apology for the deaths of thousands of Boer prisoners in British concentration camps, but she rose only to the lowest point on the partial order, referring to the “pain and suffering” felt by the Afrikaner people. In December 1994, she was called on to apologize to Queen Dame Te Atairangikaahu of the Tainui people of New Zealand for the British seizure of their lands in 1865. It was fitting that one queen deliver the apology and another one receive it. Countries that do not have a monarch may be in a worse position for that when they want to rectify an old offense.

Related to the apologies from monarchs is a subtle question about a government’s responsibility for the offenses of its predecessor: Who bears the guilt, the people who live on the territory, the government, or some abstract entity? Does present-day France have a duty to apologize for its World War II participation in the murder of tens of thousands of Jewish citizens? In 1993, when President Mitterand established a National Remembrance Day to recognize anti-Semitic persecution in France, he declined to apologize: “If the French nation had been involved in the unfortunate Vichy undertaking, then such an apology would be due” (*Montreal Gazette*, July 15, 1992). Holding to the position of past governments, he pointed to the Resistance and Charles de Gaulle’s Free French government-in-exile as the keeper of the two-hundred-year tradition of the Republic. At first glance the existence or nonexistence of a government-in-exile would seem to be irrelevant to a French apology, but the COUNTRY-AS-A-PERSON metaphor clarifies Mitterand’s thinking. Continuity is the key—just as people do not disappear and reappear, the “national person” is thought of as continuous. In World War II, France’s national person was in En-

gland, in Mitterand's view. A similar controversy continues around the massacres of Armenians, the worst of which occurred in 1915, before the Ataturk government. The Permanent Peoples' Tribunal (1985) rejected any Turkish argument like Mitterand's: "the Turkish state must assume responsibility without using the pretext of any discontinuity in the existence of the state to elude that responsibility."

International apologies are more public than interpersonal ones. They acknowledge harm and responsibility to the whole world in order to constrain the apologizer's future assertions and behavior. Only rarely are they secret. An exception was the U.S. apology for the Central Intelligence Agency's LSD experiments on Canadian citizens in the 1950s. Even this event supported the general thesis that international apologies are public, since there is an explanation: the offense being apologized for was itself supposed to remain a secret. The public nature of international apologies influences the symbolism of their context. They are usually given at public gatherings and during speeches. They are not conveyed in letters that are only later released to the press. A strong pattern is for the apologizer to travel to the other's turf. Indonesia's foreign minister apologized for the construction of a road that violated the border of Papua New Guinea on the occasion of a speech at an official banquet in Port Moresby. In March 1995, President Brazauskas of Lithuania used a visit to Israel to apologize for Lithuanian involvement in the Holocaust. Emperor Hirohito was visiting South Korea when he made the statement quoted previously.

If an apology is not carried to the recipient's metaphorical home, it should at least be offered face-to-face. In January 1984, after South African foreign minister Rolf Botha apologized to a Zimbabwean trade official who had had his arm broken at a police roadblock, the Ministry's head of protocol personally visited the official. This behavior taps the COUNTRY-AS-A-PERSON metaphor, in which one person visits the other to deliver an apology, to symbolize respect and show the deliberate and significant nature of the act.

What happens when an apology is demanded but not given? International behavior is again guided by the COUNTRY-AS-A-PERSON metaphor and the scenarios around interpersonal quarrels. The aggrieved state often withdraws its hospitality and refuses to meet or communicate. Until 1988, Indonesia had refused to recognize the People's Republic of China without an apology for its complicity in a 1965 coup attempt. In August 1985, Costa Rican president Luis Alberto refused to meet with his Nicaraguan counterpart without an apology for the killing of two civil guards the previous May. In September 1986, Foreign Minister Antoine Ndinga-Oba of Congo, speaking to the United Nations General Assembly, compared Israel to Nazi Germany. According to the *New York Times* (September 22, 1986), Ndinga was soon told that President Reagan might

find it not “convenient” to meet with Congo’s president during the latter’s forthcoming visit to Washington, D.C., unless the matter were cleared up. The foreign minister apologized.

Models of Apologizing Based on Face and Honor

This section suggests some connection of apologies to face and honor. The processes are separate, and one notable consequence of this is that apologizers can lose face but gain honor.

Apologies’ relationship to face is straightforward. To apologize is to grant the other person face, to imply that he or she matters and will get better treatment in the future. To apologize is also to accept blame and possibly lose face oneself. In the model of chapter 9, face rose and fell according to a sequence of encounters where one party imposed and another chose to resist or defer. Apologies can be incorporated into the model by changing the interpretation of some actions in the stage games. Following an imposition, one might add a game between the same players where one can Demand an Apology and the other can Apologize. An equilibrium could be found where apologizing influences the players’ public face levels, and refusing to apologize leads to conflictual relations in future games between that pair.

A model of apologizing based on honor might work as follows. Suppose the person has done some act that is morally blameworthy in many people’s eyes. Blameworthiness would be represented in the model by the likelihood of someone of each degree of honor being willing to do it under those circumstances. The distributions for the individual and the audience are different—the individual has an opinion about how blameworthy the deed is and so does the audience. Honor calls for an apology when one is due and calls for no apology when one is not due. An honorable person who violates either principle loses payoff in proportion to honor. An apology may change the audience’s estimate of the individual’s honor—the audience may feel confirmed in its low opinion of the deed, or it may note that an honorable person would offer an apology when one is clearly due.

The next section will clarify how the connection to honor and face allows international apologies to work even when they violate the normal requirements.

Why Do International Apologies Differ from Interpersonal Ones?

Three features mark international apologies: they can be from and to third parties, they can be blatantly insincere, and they seldom lead to explicit forgiveness.

A straightforward explanation for third-party apologies is the COUNTRY-AS-A-PERSON metaphor. Yeltsin's apology that the Soviet Union had been holding Japanese prisoners in Siberia years after the war was not from one leader to another but symbolically from Russia to Japan.

One factor explains all three differences. International and interpersonal apologies emphasize different illocutionary points of apologizing. Interpersonal apologies are largely messages about the apologizer's feelings, meant to inform the other and give confidence in the future of the relationship, but international apologies are aimed at the management of face and honor. They are more communications to the world than to the offended party: their point is to restore the other's face. Also, similar to the self-commitment war-of-face model of the last chapter, uttering penitent words commits one's face before the whole group that the action will not be repeated. Both purposes, transmitting information about one's feelings and managing face and honor, are typical in apologizing, but international dealings emphasize the latter, and this leads to differences in practice.