### **Trading Blocs**

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# **Trading Blocs**

States, Firms, and Regions in the World Economy

KERRY A. CHASE

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For Steph and Ella

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### Contents

	List of Tables	xi
	List of Figures	xiii
	Acronyms	XV
CHAPTER 1	Introduction: A World of Trading Blocs	1
CHAPTER 2	The Argument: Domestic Groups and	
	Regional Arrangements	15
CHAPTER 3	Interwar Trading Blocs: Japan, Britain, and	
	Germany, 1919–39	51
CHAPTER 4	The United States and Multilateral	
	Trade Liberalization, 1922–67	105
CHAPTER 5	The EU: Fortress or Beachhead?	143
CHAPTER 6	NAFTA: The Politics in the United States	181
CHAPTER 7	Reluctant Regionalism: Japan and Asia	222
CHAPTER 8	Multinationals and the New Regionalism	255
	A 1'	271
	Appendix	271
	References	273
	Index	299

# **Tables**

1.	Typology of dependent variables	17
2.	Industry preferences in the standard trade model	22
3.	Economies of scale and preferences for trading blocs	29
4.	Variables and methods of measurement	47
5.	Scale of production in Japan, 1931	57
6.	MES production and the Japanese market	58
7.	OLS regression results for Japanese tariffs in 1935	67
8.	Scale of production in Britain, 1930	73
9.	MES production and the British market	74
10.	OLS regression results for British tariffs in 1936	86
11.	Scale of production in Germany, 1929	91
12.	MES production and the German market	92
13.	Scale of production in the United States, 1929	112
14.	Relative size of the U.S. market	114
15.	Trade lobbying in large-scale U.S. industries, 1922–45	117
16.	Trade lobbying in small-scale U.S. industries, 1922–45	118
17.	Scale of production in the United States, 1958	120
18.	Trade lobbying in large-scale U.S. industries, 1947–62	122
19.	Trade lobbying in small-scale U.S. industries, 1947–62	124
20.	OLS regression results for U.S. tariffs	132
21.	Marginal effects of scale and returns to scale on U.S. tariffs	132
22.	MES production and the EC market, 1984	147
23.	Scale of production in the EC, 1980–89	149
24.	Import competition in the EC	156
25.	Scale of EC automobile production and trade lobbying	164
26.	Tobit results for EC nontariff barriers	168
27.	Returns to scale and market size in the United States, 1987	188

xii List of Tables

28.	FDI in industries with economies of scale, 1989	194
29.	Intrafirm trade and offshore assembly, 1987	197
30.	Import competition from Canada and Mexico	200
31.	Ordered probit estimates for NAFTA and CUSFTA lobbying	203
32.	Predicted probabilities of NAFTA and CUSFTA support	204
33.	Economic and political characteristics of lobby groups	216
34.	OLS regression results for U.S. tariffs	219
35.	Japanese intrafirm trade	231
36.	Reverse imports and overseas production ratios in Japan	231
37.	Sales of Japan's East Asian affiliates, 2002	233
38.	Intrafirm trade of Japan's East Asian affiliates, 2002	233
39.	Intrafirm trade balances of Japan's East Asian affiliates, 2002	234
40.	Export dependence of electronic and photographic equipment	
	companies	238
41.	Export dependence of automotive companies	241
42.	Automotive policies in Southeast Asia	242
43.	AICO and Japanese companies	245

# **Figures**

1.	The proliferation of regional trade agreements, 1948–2004	4
2.	Average cost with economies of scale	26
3.	Reverse imports in Japanese manufacturing, 1986–2000	230

# Acronyms

ACEA	Association of European Automobile Constructors
AFL-CIO	American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial
	Organizations
AFTA	ASEAN Free Trade Area
AICO	ASEAN Industrial Cooperation
AISI	American Iron and Steel Institute
AMA	Automobile Manufacturers Association
APTA	Automotive Products Trade Agreement
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ATC	Agreement on Textiles and Clothing
ATMI	American Textile Manufacturers Institute
BBC	Brand-to-Brand Complementation
CCMC	Committee of Common Market Motor Vehicle Constructors
CECOM	Committee of European Copier Manufacturers
CEFIC	Conseil Européen des Fédérations de l'Industrie Chimique
	(European Chemical Industry Council)
CUSFTA	Canada–United States Free Trade Agreement
EACEM	European Association of Consumer Electronics Manufacturers
EC	European Community
EECA	European Electronic Component Manufacturers Association
EIA	Electronic Industries Association
ERT	European Roundtable
EU	European Union
EUROFER	European Confederation of Iron and Steel Industries
FBI	Federation of British Industries
FDI	Foreign direct investment
FIRA	Foreign Investment Review Agency

xvi Acronyms

GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP	Gross domestic product
GSP	Generalized System of Preferences
HDTV	High-definition television
IDAC	Import Duties Advisory Committee
IT	Information technology
JAMA	Japanese Automobile Manufacturers Association
JETRO	Japan External Trade Organization
JSEPA	Japan-Singapore Economic Partnership Agreement
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party
MCA	Manufacturing Chemists Association
MES	Minimum efficient scale
METI	Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry
MFA	Multifiber Arrangement
MFN	Most favored nation
MVMA	Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association
NACE	Nomenclature Générale des Activités Economiques (Statistical
	Classification of Economic Activities)
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NFISM	National Federation of Iron and Steel Manufacturers
NIE	Newly industrialized economy
OAP	Offshore Assembly Program
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OLS	Ordinary least squares
R&D	Research and development
RDI	Reichsverband der Deutschen Industrie (Federation of German
	Industry)
RTAA	Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act
SIC	Standard Industry Classification
SOCMA	Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturers Association
TRIM	Trade-related investment measure
UAW	United Automobile Workers
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNCTC	United Nations Center on Transnational Corporations
USITC	U.S. International Trade Commission
USTC	U.S. Tariff Commission
USTR	United States Trade Representative
VER	Voluntary Export Restraint
WTO	World Trade Organization