

After Independence: Making and Protecting the Nation in Postcolonial and Postcommunist States  
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## I. Introduction

## I. Nationalism & Independence

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NATIONALISM WAS ARGUABLY the most powerful force in international politics in the twentieth century.<sup>1</sup> Its ideas revolutionized international politics, affecting everything from trade to the number of states in the international system itself. It aided in the collapse of the central, eastern, and southeastern European empires; it contributed significantly to the events of World War II and its horror; it led to the end of colonialism; and it played a crucial role in the breakup of three federal Communist states: the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. Many politicians in the successor countries to these three states quickly abandoned their Communist Party roots for nationalist movements. Even in the liberal democratic West, nationalists pushing for protection of the homeland and national culture against outsiders had electoral success in the latter part of the century.

Scholars have linked nationalism to everything from the French and American revolutions to the worst atrocities committed against ethnic minorities. The large number of phenomena that have been attached to the label *nationalism* indicates that it is a complex, multifaceted concept. Yet it is possible to define nationalism to allow one to include different events under its heading, while at the same time not defining it in such a broad way as to be meaningless.<sup>2</sup> The definition proposed in this chapter, based in part on a survey of definitions in the nationalism literature, indicates that no matter what variant of nationalism one is discussing, nationalism is about two things: the nation and control over territory—specifically, the perceived national “homeland.”

Because of its emphasis on territorial control, nationalism’s power as a maker (and destroyer) of states is well recognized.<sup>3</sup> And no one can deny

the mobilizing power of nationalist ideas over the last two centuries. Although nationalism is elite driven, the masses have often enthusiastically followed nationalist leaders. But what happens to these nationalists and their ideas after they have achieved their ultimate goal of the creation of a new state? What happens to nationalism after independence? This is the central question of this book, a work that brings together analyses of a variety of postcolonial and postcommunist cases to help us understand how independence affects the ideas of nationalism and the fate of its movements and political parties.

### Nations and Nationalism: What They Are & Are Not

#### Nation

The starting point for any discussion of nationalism is an understanding of the concept of nation. This is especially true of the definition of nationalism in this chapter, since nation is included within it.<sup>4</sup> As discussed in this section, there are a number of different ways that scholars of nationalism have discussed the nation. Yet there is some overlap, and in the case of both nation and nationalism, it is possible to bring together many of these ideas into a single working definition.

There are two particular things that nations are not, which are, unfortunately, associated with the term in everyday language and even by some scholars: states and ethnic groups. The misuse of nation by equating it with “state” or “country” appears in a large number of political science works, including many textbooks, though it is not generally a problem for those who specialize in the study of nationalism.<sup>5</sup> A state is the principal political unit in the international political system corresponding to a territory, a relatively permanent population, and a set of ruling institutions. A country is the territorial component of the state. Nigeria is a state (and a country); it is not a nation.<sup>6</sup>

The second misuse of nation, and one that some nationalism scholars are guilty of, is the intermixing of the term nation with “ethnic group” or “ethnicity.” Nations can evolve from ethnic groups, but a nation is more than an ethnic group. In an era where the effects of ethnic nationalism receive international attention, it is perhaps not surprising that many people would think of ethnic groups and nations in similar ways. This is certainly the case for many journalists, though some nationalism scholars have

also fallen into the trap of defining nations in such a way as to make them indistinguishable from ethnic groups. For Tamir, for example, a nation is a “community whose members share feelings of fraternity, substantial distinctiveness, and exclusivity, as well as beliefs in a common ancestry and continuous genealogy.”<sup>7</sup> While this would be a good definition of an ethnic group, the definition lacks a way to differentiate between nations and ethnic groups. Likewise, Connor’s definition of nation would be better suited as a definition of ethnic group. He uses the two terms almost interchangeably, stating that the only real difference is that a nation must be self-defined, while an ethnic group can be “other defined.”<sup>8</sup> Chinn and Kaiser’s definition, while adding important criteria to distinguish ethnic groups from nations, still indicates that nations only come from ethnic groups.<sup>9</sup> Most scholars, however, understand that, while nations *can* come from ethnic groups, they often do not; they are something more than, and can be something quite different from, such groups.

Even assuming that nationalism scholars generally agree on what nations are not, the nationalism literature indicates that agreeing on what they are is no simple task. As Hutchinson and Smith put it, “Perhaps the central difficulty in the study of nations and nationalism has been the problem of finding adequate and agreed definitions of the key concepts, nation and nationalism.”<sup>10</sup> While the various definitions of nation differ in many ways, arguably the most significant division among nationalism scholars is between “subjective” and “objective” ideas of national identity. The subjective concept of the nation is based on the notion that nations are constructed around ideas, and the key to national identity is that the people have come to believe that they are a nation. Emerson, for example, claims that the most basic thing that can be said about a nation “is that it is a body of people who feel that they are a nation.”<sup>11</sup> Hobsbawm adds, “As an initial working assumption, any sufficiently large body of people whose members regard themselves as members of a ‘nation,’ will be treated as such.”<sup>12</sup> Perhaps the best example of the subjective view of the nation is the statement of Renan that a nation

is a grand solidarity constituted by the sentiment of sacrifices which one has made and those that one is disposed to make again. It supposes a past, it renews itself especially in the present by a tangible deed: the approval, the desire, clearly expressed, to continue the communal life. The existence of a nation (pardon this metaphor!) is an everyday

plebiscite; it is, like the very existence of the individual, a perpetual affirmation of life.<sup>13</sup>

Objective definitions of the nation focus on a list of observable, concrete characteristics, some or all of which all nations share. One such list is contained in Joseph Stalin's definition: "A nation is a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture."<sup>14</sup> For Stalin, all of these characteristics had to be present in order for a nation to exist.<sup>15</sup> Of course, at least some of the traits that Stalin mentions are far from objective, a criticism that those who favor the subjective approach level against all objective definitions.<sup>16</sup>

Yet this valid criticism by subjectivists should not be taken to mean that one should ignore which characteristics tend to be emphasized by nationalist elites. Is it important that nations consider themselves nations? Of course. Is it possible to find a list of easily measurable characteristics that apply to every group considered by scholars to be a nation? No. But it is also important that there are certain characteristics that have a tendency to be used to link members of the nation together.<sup>17</sup> It is inconceivable to think that a nation could exist without shared cultural features, such as common myths, values, and customs,<sup>18</sup> and a prevailing single language is something found in most nations. In other words, to say that nations are groups that consider themselves nations, without considering the kinds of things that make people feel that they are nations, is not a fruitful approach to defining the term. No other concept in the social sciences is defined by saying that it exists when people think it exists.<sup>19</sup>

While shared cultural features are a necessary part of national identity, there is more to being a nation than having such mutual features. Members of a nation are also linked by a belief in the right of the group to territorial self-determination. The importance of this belief for the group is a central part of many definitions of nation in the nationalism literature, and it provides an important criterion for differentiating between nations and other social categories.<sup>20</sup> Nodia, for example, states that "a nation is a community of people organized around the idea of *self-determination*."<sup>21</sup> Some take this idea of self-determination to mean control of an independent state, though not all feel that the nation must pursue its own state. Haas is one who does, defining the nation as "a socially mobilized body of individuals, believing

themselves to be united by some set of characteristics that differentiate them (in their own minds) from outsiders, striving to create or maintain their own state.”<sup>22</sup>

How can one bring together these various ideas about the nation to form a working definition? First, a nation is a collective of people. This is a necessary part of the definition, but obviously one that does not differentiate between nations and other groups in society. What makes nations different from other groups is that they are *collectives united by shared cultural features (such as language, myths, and values) and the belief in the right to territorial self-determination*.<sup>23</sup> Put another way, they are groups of people linked by unifying cultural characteristics and the desire to control a territory that is thought of as the group’s rightful homeland.<sup>24</sup> “Culture” here includes a range of traits and beliefs, and the particular ones stressed by one nation may differ from those stressed by another. Likewise, while the belief in the right to territorial control is common to all nations, the particular type of territory and even the degree of control will vary from case to case.

Both of these elements—culture and the belief in territorial control—play powerful unifying roles in national identity. But the belief in territorial self-determination is the key to understanding the difference between nations and other social collectives. Many groups have shared myths, values, and symbols (e.g., religious groups, ethnic groups, or even professional associations). But nations are not just unified by culture; they are also unified by a particular—and particularly powerful—sense of purpose: controlling the territory that the members of the group believe belongs to them.<sup>25</sup>

It should now be clear why the term nation cannot be used interchangeably with ethnic group. Nations differ from ethnic groups because of a nation’s belief in its right to territorial control, or what Richmond calls its “territorial referent.”<sup>26</sup> Also, nations need not even be based on a certain ethnic identity. The cultural features used to unite the nation may privilege one ethnic group over another, even in civic nations (English-speaking ethnic groups that immigrated to the United States and became Americans, for example). But ethnicity does not necessarily determine national identity. Thus, the words “shared cultural features” in the preceding definition of nation should not be read as “shared ethnic identity.” What are called “civic” or “political” nations in the nationalism literature<sup>27</sup> have shared cultural features but are multiethnic in their makeup.<sup>28</sup>

## Nationalism

As with the term nation, there are differences and divisions in the nationalism literature over the meaning of nationalism itself. But, also like nation, it is possible to bring together certain parts of the definitions of nationalism scholars into a broadly acceptable working definition. Before introducing that definition, it is useful to consider what most nationalism scholars believe nationalism is not.

Just as nations are related to, yet distinct from, states and ethnic groups, there are three things that nationalism is not, yet which some think it to be: patriotism, ethnic politics, and ethnic conflict. The most basic misapplication of nationalism is to equate it with patriotism. Just as a nation is a group of people and not a state, nationalism is first and foremost about the nation, and not necessarily about an existing state. Because nationalism includes the pursuit of territorial control, and because the idea of the nation-state still dominates the international state system, it is easy to fall into the trap of associating nationalism with loyalty to an existing state.<sup>29</sup> While pride in or loyalty to one's state is not a bad definition of patriotism, it is a bad definition of nationalism. Likewise, pride in or loyalty to one's nation is not patriotism and for that matter is, at best, only a part of nationalism.<sup>30</sup>

A second misuse of the term nationalism is to equate it with "ethnic politics." Rutland, for example, defines nationalism as a "statement of claims on behalf of an ethnic group."<sup>31</sup> Ethnic politics—the political mobilization of people based on ethnicity—can be a *starting point* for something that becomes nationalism, but it alone is not nationalism. Richmond makes clear the difference between nationalism and the political mobilization of ethnic groups:

An ethnic group when politically mobilized can have different goals. These may include the right to franchise, the use of the ethnic vote to swing results in marginal constituencies, the achievement of special status for particular languages or religions (especially in education), the removal of injustices and the enforcement of human rights codes, affirmative action programs, compensation for past deprivation, the restitution of property, or the recognition of special treatment such as exemption from military service. "Nationalist" movements may also establish such claims but go further in seeking to achieve self-govern-

ment within a given geographic area. . . . The politicization of ethnicity is not the same thing as ethnic nationalism although it may lead to it where a historical claim to a particular territory can be established.<sup>32</sup>

In addition, the problem with labeling nationalism as something better labeled ethnic politics is the same as the problem with mixing up nations and ethnic groups: it assumes that the nation is ethnic. A definition of nationalism from Gellner, “a theory of political legitimacy, which requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones,” is representative of this problem.<sup>33</sup> Such a definition leaves no room for “civic” nations or nationalism.

What is true of the difference between ethnic politics and nationalism is also true of ethnic conflict and nationalism. Ethnic conflicts, including those that turn quite violent, may emerge over many things (affirmative action policies, language laws, etc.). *National* conflicts, on the other hand, must involve disputes over territory to be truly “national.” While territorial control often emerges as an issue in ethnic disputes, such disputes need not be national at the start, and some do not evolve into territorial-control conflicts at all.<sup>34</sup>

All this does not mean that finding a broadly acceptable definition is an easy task; there may be as many definitions of nationalism as there are nationalism scholars. The main “definitional divide” in the literature is whether nationalism is a belief or a movement. One set of approaches to the definition of nationalism considers it to be a belief, idea, concept, or principle. Ignatieff, for example, sees nationalism as a notion that combines the political idea of territorial self-determination, the cultural idea of the nation as one’s primary identity, and a moral idea of justification of action to protect the rights of the nation against the “other.”<sup>35</sup> Gellner’s definition, “a principle which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent,”<sup>36</sup> is a standard for many people who study the topic. Haas’s definition is even more basic: “a belief held by a group of people that they ought to constitute a nation, or that they already are one.”<sup>37</sup> Armstrong has labeled nationalism a “political doctrine,”<sup>38</sup> while Kohn sees it as an “idea” and “state of mind.”<sup>39</sup>

The other approach to defining nationalism takes it to be a process or movement. It is thought of as the *creation* of the unifying features of the nation or as the *actions that result from* the beliefs of the group. Nationalism defined as an organized endeavor to control the national homeland is com-

mon in the nationalism literature.<sup>40</sup> Brass, for example, states that nationalism “is a political movement by definition.”<sup>41</sup> Dan Smith claims that the nation “is a political idea and nationalism is a political movement.”<sup>42</sup> Mellor’s definition of nationalism—“the *political expression* of the nation’s aspirations,” including control over territory that members of the nation “perceive as their homeland by right”<sup>43</sup>—is an improvement over definitions of nationalism as simply an idea; his definition combines the ideas and activities of nationalists. While the ideas of nationalism are important, ideas of national rights alone should not be thought of as nationalism without at least the open articulation of these ideas to the general population.

Just as it is possible to bridge other definitional divides in the nationalism literature, one is able to reconcile the movement versus ideas debate. One way to overcome the division is to consider nationalism both an ideology and a movement. Hutchinson and Smith take such an approach, claiming, “As an *ideology and movement*, nationalism exerted a strong influence in the American and French Revolutions.”<sup>44</sup> Another way to bring the two ideas together is also found in Hutchinson and Smith: label nationalism an “ideological movement.”<sup>45</sup> Van Evera takes a similar approach, defining nationalism as a movement but with two belief-centered features at its core:

I define nationalism as a political movement having two characteristics: (1) individual members give their primary loyalty to their own ethnic or national community; this loyalty supercedes their loyalty to other groups, for example, those based on common kinship or political ideology; and (2) these ethnic or national communities desire their own independent state.<sup>46</sup>

While the combination of the terms ethnic and national in the definition is awkward, Van Evera’s consideration of nationalism as an idea-based movement is beneficial in bridging the movement/idea divide.

Bringing these visions of nationalism together, *nationalism* is defined here as *the pursuit—through argument or other activity—of a set of rights and privileges for the self-defined members of the nation, including, at a minimum, territorial autonomy or independence*. All nationalisms, therefore, share two important ideas about boundaries of the nation: (1) they define, at least roughly, the *territorial boundaries* that the nation has a right to control, and

(2) they define the *membership boundaries* of the population that makes up the nation—the group that deserves this territorial control and that is entitled to the supreme loyalty of other members of the collective.<sup>47</sup> Put another way, the ideas of nationalism answer two questions: Who is the nation? And what territory does the nation have a right to control?

The membership boundaries are set by members of the nation themselves, generally by an intellectual or political elite,<sup>48</sup> though they may be based on ideas of surrounding groups as well. They establish the *we* that possesses the right to control the homeland (and as a result the *they* that does not share this right). This does not mean, however, that the boundaries are set easily. The development of successful claims over boundaries may involve struggles with another group, serious struggles *within* the nation over competing definitions of the territorial and membership boundaries, and difficulty in transmitting the ideas of national membership boundaries to the masses. One set of answers to the two questions of nationalism often “wins,” and at the time of independence one set of ideas about the nation and its homeland is likely to be dominant. But because of the controversial nature of the nationalism questions, rival ideas of the nation and national homeland (and the movements and parties that espouse them) may exist long after independence.

### Ethnic versus Civic Nationalism & Primordialist, Constructivist, & Instrumentalist Views of National Identity

#### The Problems, and Usefulness, of the Ethnic/Civic Nationalism Typology

For a long time, it was commonplace in the nationalism literature to discuss two types of nationalism, ethnic (where the nation is defined in ethnic terms) and civic (where it is defined in political-territorial terms).<sup>49</sup> Recently, the use of this framework has fallen out of fashion for two reasons. First, scholars have begun to emphasize the ethnic characteristics of purportedly civic states and the apparent civic nation-building policies in what had been considered “ethnic-nation-states.” In other words, they have realized that the world is not so neat and tidy as the ethnic/civic dichotomy implies. Second, scholars have criticized the tendency to associate ethnic nationalism with the negatives of national identity (ethnic conflict, etc.), especially in developing countries and Eastern Europe, while

civic nationalism is seen as a kinder, gentler nationalism associated with tolerance and the overcoming of ethnic divisions, especially in Western Europe and North America.<sup>50</sup>

To an extent, I take exception with both of these criticisms of the ethnic/civic divide. There are many cases in social science where a given typology does not match neatly with reality. This is something of which scholars must be aware, but it is not something that is fatal to the endeavor of creating typologies. Typologies, in particular what are known as “ideal types,” are not only a useful but arguably a necessary step in the development of broader social science theories. Such is the case, I argue, with civic and ethnic nationalism. While the pure ethnic and pure civic types may not be easy to find, thinking of the ideal civic or ethnic national identity is valuable as a way to measure the national identity choices, and their consequences, in real cases. As discussed in the next section, the factors that influence nationalism after independence work very differently in cases of more civic or more ethnic national identity.

In addition, while it is fair to question how tolerant and unifying civic nationalism was in cases like the American nation-building project, it is also fair to acknowledge that reprehensible practices in civic nation-building projects have appeared precisely when the usually civic nationalism has most emphasized ethnic features of the nation.<sup>51</sup> An important part of the power of ethnic nationalism is the concept of the (ethnic) nation as an extended family, linked by blood ties. The result is that the development of a perception of threat to the survival of the nation—and its transmission to the masses—is easier in a more ethnic nationalism than in a more civic nationalism.

Finally, it is important to consider the ethnic versus civic divide because of its implications for democracy. Often, the existence of liberal democratic institutions will not limit the persecution of ethnic minorities. In democratic theory, one of the ways that minorities are protected in majority rule systems is that they will often be more “intense” about an issue than the majority. They will participate more and break apart the apathetic majority. But, when a perception exists that the survival of the ethnic nation is at stake, there is no apathetic majority. Either the minority will be excluded from participating in politics, or it will continually be on the losing end of majority rule decisions. At best, such a system becomes an “ethnic democracy.” At worst, it leads to secessionism and violence.

### Primordialist, Constructivist, and Instrumentalist Views of National Identity

Reflecting a debate in the cultural anthropology literature on ethnic identity, a major divide in the study of nationalism relates to where national identity comes from. The different positions can generally be grouped into three rival theoretical perspectives. As hinted at earlier in the discussion of subjective versus objective definitions of nation, the first two views provide opposing answers to the question of whether nations are natural and objective or constructed and subjective. The other idea relates to the role of nationalist elites in *triggering* national identity—inducing, for example, political mobilization in the name of a particular nationalist “cause” or against a particular “other” that threatens the nation.

The first approach, labeled by most as the *primordial* approach, holds that national identity is natural, based on deep-rooted features such as race, language, religion, and other cultural features. Such features lead us/them national boundaries to form naturally. The primordial view of nationalism has been popular with the media and government officials. While the primordial approach is widely criticized by many scholars today, it has had its supporters within the scholarly community. It is often associated with Anthony Smith, who has argued that nations have “ethnic cores” and that “ethnies” share several common components.<sup>52</sup>

The second major theoretical perspective, and counter to primordialism, is usually given the label of *constructivism*. The constructivist approach argues that national identity—like other group identities, including those that primordialists point to as markers of national identity—is a social construction. Comaroff points to several strands of constructivism (cultural, political, etc.), but argues they are all based on the same idea: that social identities “are products of human agency.”<sup>53</sup>

While not all the authors in this volume would agree with my viewpoint, I take a middle-ground position between the primordial and constructivist positions. In the earlier discussion of definitions of a nation, I mention that both cultural features and a sense of right to control territory are necessary components of national identity. Certainly, both of these elements are “constructed”; elites both shape the cultural features that unify the nation and develop the arguments about territorial control. But while these features of national identity are constructed, they are not constructed out of thin air.<sup>54</sup> Things such as language, religion, and historical events provide

the tools to create nations. While no one element is emphasized in all cases of national identities, many of these elements show up over and over.

The final theoretical approach to understanding national identity formation is labeled *instrumentalism*. As this label implies, national identity is seen as instrumental and manipulated by elites. Some scholars see instrumentalism and primordialism as connected. For Young, primordialism “completed instrumentalism by explaining the power of the ‘affective tie’ through which interest is pursued.”<sup>55</sup> Comaroff agrees that primordialism and instrumentalism can be linked and labels such a hybrid *neoprimalism*.<sup>56</sup> Most scholars, however, argue that instrumentalism is more related to constructivism, and some even use the terms interchangeably.<sup>57</sup>

Again, while emphasizing the importance of elites in the development and triggering of national identity, one must not overlook the importance of existing features of the population, historical events, and current happenings in shaping the actions of elites. Thus, when considering causal factors related to nationalism after independence, one must consider these conditions that limit the choices that elites have in how membership in the nation is defined and, especially, how national identity can be used instrumentally. The opportunities for, and constraints on, elites are an important part of the story about postindependence nationalism.

#### Territorial & Membership Boundaries, Causal Factors, & Five Possible Variants of Nationalism after Independence

Nationalist elites, as with all elites, tend both to believe in their cause and to have a desire to obtain and maintain power. They are, in other words, both “true believers” as well as self-interested “rational actors.” Too often, social scientists fail to understand either the true believer side of nationalist elites or their rational calculations and pursuit of power, leaving these scholars unable to explain apparently contradictory acts of nationalist leaders.

One such paradoxical act, at least on the surface, is the effort to maintain the nationalist movement after its ultimate goal—independence—has been achieved. While nationalist elites will be exhausted, ecstatic, or just pleasantly surprised when independence comes, they will also generally seek to continue the momentum of the nationalist movement. As not only something that they believe in but also their ticket to power, nationalists will search for ways to keep nationalism alive.<sup>58</sup> But since the nationalism can no longer be about achieving independence, it must be transformed. This

transformation can take one or more of several different routes presented in this section.

The various routes that nationalism after independence can take depend, just as independence-seeking nationalism does, on the two central concerns of nationalism: the nation and the territory the nation seeks to control. If the national membership boundaries are well established and accepted, and if the national homeland's territorial boundaries are also well established and accepted *and* correspond to the borders of the new state, and if there is no perceived threat to the national culture or independence of the state, nationalism after independence would be difficult to sustain. While elites play a crucial role in developing and triggering nationalism, nationalist appeals by them will fail to mobilize the general population if the masses do not believe that membership, territorial, and/or threat concerns exist. In such a situation, nationalism and its respective parties and movements may disappear quickly if not quietly.

But one of the fascinating things about nationalism is its resiliency. It has survived long after other ideologies and movements have passed into history. Thus, one should be able to identify causal factors that tend to be associated with the survival of nationalism after independence. The following sections provide an overview of several such causal factors and the resulting forms of postindependence nationalism.

#### Controlling the "Homeland" and Nationalism after Independence

By now it should be obvious to the reader that one cannot understand nationalism without understanding the role of territory, in particular the role of the perceived national homeland.<sup>59</sup> While national identity may or may not be based on ethnicity, it always contains a territorial component. An ethnic group becomes "national" when it recognizes a particular territory that it feels it belongs to and has a right to control politically. The development of a "sense of homeland" and an emotional attachment to that homeland coincides with the development of national self-consciousness, and it is claimed that "for a nation to exist, it must have some place that it can claim as its own"<sup>60</sup> and "nations cannot be conceived without a specific territory or homeland."<sup>61</sup> Thus, understanding a particular group's idea (or ideas) of homeland is necessary for understanding its political and social conduct and its relations with a national "other." As Kaiser puts it, "the national homeland is a powerful geographic mediator of sociopolitical behavior."<sup>62</sup>

The reason that territorial boundaries do not go away as an issue after independence has to do with the failure of state boundaries and national homeland boundaries to coincide. Put simply, these two types of territorial boundaries rarely line up. Either the nation sees its homeland as something more than the existing state, or it sees its new territorial control as threatened by homeland claims of minority groups in the state, claims on its homeland by other nations outside the state, or both. Few nations in the world in control of their own state do not face one of these homeland problems. That perceived homelands of different national groups often overlap helps explain much of the violence frequently associated with nationalist struggles, as well as the persistence of nationalism after independence.<sup>63</sup> This situation of overlapping homelands is common in the former Soviet Union, especially where regions within the existing successor states are named for a particular ethnic minority (Chechnya, Abkhazia, etc.).<sup>64</sup> Thus, when new states are created, border issues are not magically resolved. As the post-Soviet states, Ethiopia and Eritrea, India and Pakistan, and numerous other cases demonstrate, in the minds of nationalists the territory of the state in its present form may not be *the* homeland but a part of a larger homeland still to be pursued.<sup>65</sup>

For nations with their own states, there are two possible relationships between the state of residence and the national homeland. The first is when the state and homeland boundaries correspond. This happens occasionally, especially in the cases of civic nations whose membership boundaries and homeland boundaries developed over time to coincide with the population of the state and the territorial boundaries of the state respectively. The second, found especially in cases of ethnic nations with their own states, is when the perceived national homeland extends beyond the boundaries of the state.<sup>66</sup>

THE FAILURE TO CAPTURE CONTROL OF ALL OF THE PERCEIVED HOMELAND AND  
POSTINDEPENDENCE VARIANT I: NATIONALISM AS "EXTERNAL-TERRITORY-CLAIMING"

This perception that the homeland extends beyond the state leads to the first variant of postindependence nationalism. Here, nationalists look beyond the new state to territory abroad and pursue control over such territory. Since homelands are nearly always geographically contiguous, this desired territory is likely to be in neighboring countries.

The claiming of further territory is most likely to occur in the "core" state of a former empire. In this case, nationalists see the independence of

the new state as a defeat more than a victory, as the symbol of a surrender by, or a general weakness of, the nation. Thus, they pursue nationalism in the form of rebuilding the former state or empire and reclaiming land that the nation is “entitled to.”<sup>67</sup> Again, elites cannot make up the existence of such a past empire. Rather, that such an empire did exist provides them ammunition with which to make further territorial claims.

But this expansive form of territorial postindependence nationalism may not only be about rebuilding a lost empire. It could also develop in the case of nations that possess a strong belief that an emotionally important part of the homeland remains outside the borders of the new state. In such a case, nationalists may pursue control over the missing territory by manipulating history to their benefit. As in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh (in Azerbaijan), they will emphasize arguments and points in time that validate their claims to the territory. In other words, they cannot completely make up that history; the period they choose must be one in which the nation in question had a significant presence. To say historical events are like malleable clay is one thing; to say that one can completely imagine the clay is another.

THE PRESENCE OF INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL THREATS TO TERRITORIAL CONTROL AND  
POSTINDEPENDENCE VARIANT 2: NATIONALISM AS “SOVEREIGNTY-PROTECTING”

When minority groups are present in the new state, they may provoke nationalist responses from the majority. One reason that minorities are so potentially provocative is that they may perceive their homeland to be part or all of their state of residence. There are at least three types of homelands for minorities in relation to the state of residence—labeled here *internal*, *external*, and *mixed*. The first type of homeland, the internal, occurs when part of the minority’s state of residence is perceived to be a homeland. This is a common occurrence, in particular where a given state contains a sizable and concentrated ethnic minority. In such a case, the minority is not just ethnic but national, desiring political control over the territory in the state of residence. Such a situation fuels secessionist drives and is at the heart of various ethnonational conflicts around the world.<sup>68</sup>

The second homeland possibility is the external variant. In this case, members of a minority do not consider any part of their state of residence to be their homeland, viewing some region (or most likely independent state) outside their state of residence as the true homeland for the group. Such a situation would not fuel secessionist claims, though it certainly

could lead the government of the external homeland to intervene on behalf of the minority group. Especially if there is a legitimate basis for claims of discrimination, the external homeland may put diplomatic, economic, or military pressure on the minority's state of residence in an effort to protect the minority from further discrimination.

In postcommunist studies, the idea of an "external national homeland" for national minorities has been presented most forcefully by Brubaker. His "triadic nexus" framework includes the external national homeland as a key component of postcommunist ethnic relations.<sup>69</sup> The external national homeland is part of a "relational nexus" containing three fields, the other two being nationalizing states and national minorities. The triadic nexus concept has been criticized for its assumption of a central role for the external national homeland, its assumption that the minorities are truly national rather than just ethnic, its assumption that minorities actually perceive of the putative external homeland as their homeland, and its failure to incorporate international organizations into the framework.<sup>70</sup> But Brubaker's consideration of an external actor (or "field") in his examination of ethnic relations in the postcommunist states is a valuable contribution. It is certainly the case that some ethnic minorities in central Europe and Eurasia are truly national and that some of these are also attached to an "external national homeland."

The third type of homeland for minorities is best called the "mixed" (or "internal-external") homeland. In this situation, members of a minority in one state see their homeland as made up of both a part of their state of residence and of an external region or state. An oft-mentioned example in the case of the former Soviet Union is the idea of Russians living in Kazakhstan seeing both the northern part of the country and Russia (or Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus) as their homeland.<sup>71</sup> In such situations, nationalist claims would take the form of a desire to break part of the state of residence away from the rest and join with the rest of the homeland group.

Of the three homeland options for minorities, the internal and mixed are the most threatening to the majority national group. In the internal case, the majority national group, having just won territorial control for itself, faces secessionist threats in its new state, and the problem of overlapping homelands moves to the fore.<sup>72</sup> In such a case, the majority group nationalism is *reactive*. It becomes a movement to maintain territorial control for the nation in the face of a perceived threat to state independence, to the hard-fought territorial control that the nation so recently achieved.<sup>73</sup>

In the mixed case of minority group homeland claims, the perceived threat to the independence of state A may come both from the minority and from an external enemy, if, for example, the government of state B accepts the ideas of the minority that its homeland is composed of both state B and all or part of state A. Again, overlapping homelands are at issue, and it is sometimes hard to separate the threat from the external state from the threat posed by the ethnic minority. During the first decade of independence in many of the post-Soviet states, for example, nationalists perceived Russia as posing such a threat to their still-recent independence, and nationalists in Azerbaijan have certainly felt similarly about Armenia.<sup>74</sup> As a result, nationalists also suspect the intentions of ethnic Russians (or ethnic Armenians, or some other ethnonational group with a “mixed homeland”) living within the given state.

“Who Is the Nation?” and Nationalism after Independence

The other part of the story of nationalism’s survival after independence has to do with the question of national membership. If the “Who is the nation?” question has been answered in a relatively civic way, leaders of the newly independent state may work to build such an overarching national identity. Nationalism becomes a nation-building project. However, if the ethnic answer to the “Who is the nation?” question has won, nationalism may turn to using the new territorial control to protect and enhance the national culture, in this case at the expense of national minorities in the state, or to protect co-nationals abroad.

THE NEED TO FORGE A NEW NATIONAL IDENTITY AND POSTINDEPENDENCE  
VARIANT 3: NATIONALISM AS CIVIC “NATION-BUILDING”

Thus, a third potential route for nationalism after independence is that nationalists turn to civic “nation-building.” Nation-building concerns the development of a national identity among the population of a state. A collective of people in a given state becomes self-aware and united, accepts this group identity as its overarching political identity, and develops a feeling of the right of the collective to control politically a given territory. Islam points out that nation-building involves imbuing “discrete communities or groups within a political framework with an understanding and a sense of national consensus or identity.”<sup>75</sup> That *nation-building* and *national integration* are often used interchangeably in the political development literature is a sign that nation-building usually requires the bringing together of

groups with various cultural, economic, or regional identities.<sup>76</sup> Nationalists pursue the further development of national identity among the masses, with the goal of developing an overarching national identity among the entire population of the new state.

While civic nationalism is often portrayed as “good” nationalism, it is not necessarily an easy nationalist project. Myths and symbols that emphasize common experiences and backgrounds are useful to help create unity in a population that may otherwise be quite diverse.<sup>77</sup> But there is likely to be a sense by many groups that not enough of *our* symbols are being emphasized while too many of *theirs* are. This is especially true of ethnic minorities, who often see civic nation-building as more of an assimilation process than a melting pot.

If the membership boundary question (“Who is the nation?”) was answered in a civic way during the struggle for independence, this is the most likely outcome of nationalism after independence. But it is also possible, as a couple of the cases in this book make clear, for a nationalism that began as more ethnic than civic to transform itself into the converse. In ethnically divided states, this may be the only way to hold the new state together and/or to avoid ethnic conflict.

This is especially likely when nation-building is required at the same time as state-building, something that was common in both the postcolonial and postcommunist states. In this situation, leaders are not free only to worry about (ethno-) national identity issues. They must also worry about state-building.<sup>78</sup> This dual role leads to what I have called the “nation-builder’s dilemma” in newly independent states.<sup>79</sup> The dilemma is that while the emphasis on an ethnic approach to national identity makes nation-building easier,<sup>80</sup> it makes state-building more difficult.<sup>81</sup> This dilemma can lead nationalist movements to transform from ethnic to civic when the state-building concerns take precedence over ethnonational ones.

REACTION TO PERCEIVED CULTURAL THREATS AND POSTINDEPENDENCE NATIONALISM  
VARIANT 4: NATIONALISM AS ETHNIC “NATION-PROTECTING”

For many in the ethnic majority group in control of a new state, the independence of the state may not immediately bring the *cultural* security for which they had hoped. As a result, a fourth possible route is for nationalists to reject the civic nation-building approach and continue their struggle against the (ethnic) “other” in the name of protecting the culture of the ethnic group. Here, nationalists emphasize the idea of a threat not to the

state but to the very existence of the group itself. This is a likely approach for those who stressed the ethnic answer to the national membership question in the struggle for independence, especially in the case of small nations such as Estonia and Latvia, even when the state-building concerns discussed in the preceding section exist.<sup>82</sup> This concept of threat to the nation can be a very powerful mobilizing tool for nationalist elites. If leaders can get the masses to believe that the survival of the nation is at stake, ordinary people will suddenly consent to extraordinary actions by their leaders and even themselves.

One obvious arena for this form of nationalism is state policy in the newly independent state. In the minds of nationalists, the state, as a nation-state, exists for the benefit of the nation. As such, if the nation's cultural identity is threatened, state policy must be adopted to protect the culture from the threatening "other." Policy issue areas that nationalists may see as "nation-protecting" include citizenship and naturalization, education, religion, and language.<sup>83</sup> In the case of "ethnic nations," such policies would privilege the majority group at the expense of ethnic minorities. The ideas of the nation as an ethnic nation and the state as a nation-state combine to produce an "ethnic-nation-state." In such a state, there is little place for the protection of ethnic minorities, and in the case of a perceived threat posed by the minority group, discriminatory state policies will likely result.<sup>84</sup>

THE EXISTENCE OF THREATENED MEMBERS OF THE NATION ABROAD AND  
POSTINDEPENDENCE VARIANT 5: NATIONALISM AS "CO-NATIONAL-PROTECTING"

The ethnic answer to the "Who is the nation?" question also opens the door to concern for members of the ethnic nation not living in the new state. Thus, a final possible variant of nationalism after independence would focus on "coethnics" (or, better, "co-nationals") abroad. Nationalists may claim that these co-nationals are in physical danger, that they are being discriminated against, or just that they have been unfairly cut off from their "brothers and sisters" in the new state. Resolving the co-national abroad problem could involve easing restrictions on immigration for the co-nationals, pressuring the neighboring state(s) in question, and even making claims over the territory where these co-nationals live.<sup>85</sup> Again, Russia and the ethnic Russians outside its borders provide an on-going current example. While less volatile to date than some had predicted, the issue of Russians outside the Russian Federation remains one of the most potentially explosive issues in post-Soviet international relations.

### Nationalism as the Combination of the Possible Variants, and the Evolution of Nationalism from One Type to Another

Because several of the causal factors discussed in the preceding sections may exist at the same time, there is no reason why postindependence nationalists would pursue only one of the possible routes mentioned. Different nationalist elites may support different nationalist variants. Even the same elite could support more than one of the previously mentioned routes at the same time. In fact, many of the five routes fit together quite well. The “external-territory-claiming” and the “co-national-protecting” forms, for example, are a natural fit. The claim over territory beyond the new state may be based in part on a desire to protect the co-nationals, especially if there is a sense that pressuring neighbors on their behalf is not working. The “independence-protecting” form of nationalism can exist with nearly any of the variants where nationalism has survived. Even bringing together civic nation-building and ethnic nation-protecting is not impossible. Hutchinson and Smith point out that in India and Africa the anticolonial nationalism was civic, while at the same time ethnic and pancultural movements were common.<sup>86</sup>

Thus, there are numerous possible patterns, given the number of possible variants, their compatibility, and the amount of time one examines a case in question. But this does not mean that comparison is fruitless. Understanding the particular route or routes for nationalism after independence in various cases can tell us not only about those cases but also a great deal about nationalism itself and about how nationalism is likely to evolve, survive, or die out in other newly independent states in the future.

### Conclusion: The Ideas & Movements of Postindependence Nationalism

No matter how much elites believe in their views of the nation, its homeland, and claims to its independence, nationalism will die without the support of the masses.<sup>87</sup> Thus, nationalist elites must transmit their ideas to the masses and make certain that the masses are inspired and willing to act on these ideas. But, as mentioned earlier, while a nationalist elite must mobilize the masses for nationalism to be successful, it is misleading to treat nationalists within a state (or within an ethnic group) as a unitary actor. Nationalists may disagree about the “Who is the nation?” and “What territory does the nation have a right to control?” questions.

Complete independence of an internationally recognized state is generally considered the ultimate nationalist goal. Yet some nationalists may be content to settle for something short of independence, such as territorial “autonomy.” After independence, nationalist elites may disagree about whether the new state is indeed the national homeland or whether there is more territory to pursue, and they certainly may fight over the appropriateness of surrendering control over some of the territory of the new state to an ethnic minority.

Even if contentions over territory are somehow resolved, nationalists may argue over the membership boundaries of the nation. Some may want a national identity based on ethnicity and strict rules for justifying ethnic descent. Others may want to pitch the nation more broadly, with the entire population of a former colony, for example, belonging to the nation and deserving to control the new state as its own homeland.

Thus, the transmission of nationalism to the masses can involve a battle between competing nationalist elites with competing visions of the nation and of territorial control.<sup>88</sup> In this book, the authors focus primarily on these battles and on the transformation of nationalism after those favoring independence have won. How do the ideas and movements of nationalism change? How do nationalists maintain mass support when they have achieved their ultimate goal? We know a great deal about the emergence of nationalism in general and in particular cases. While there is a vast literature on the development of nationalism, this literature has not addressed with the same vigor the question that is the topic of this book: what happens to nationalism after independence? We now turn to the answers to that question in several postcolonial and postcommunist states. The chapters that follow examine the development of nationalist ideas and movements, the factors shaping these ideas and movements in the postindependence period, and the lessons of each particular case for our understanding of nationalism after independence.

#### NOTES

1. Portions of the text of this chapter are similar to text in the following two articles: Lowell Barrington, “‘Nation’ and ‘Nationalism’: The Misuse of Key Concepts in Political Science,” *PS: Political Science and Politics* 30, no. 4 (December 1997): 712–16; and Lowell Barrington, “Examining Rival Theories of Demographic Influences on Political Support: The Power of Regional, Ethnic, and Linguistic Divisions in Ukraine,” *European Journal of Political Research* 41, no. 4 (June 2002): 455–91.

2. Chinn and Kaiser point out that discussions of nation and nationalism portray wider (dichotomized) splits in understanding of the concepts than is actually the case. See Jeff Chinn and Robert Kaiser, *Russians as the New Minority: Ethnicity and Nationalism in the Soviet Successor States* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), chapter 2. I would take this further, arguing that there is an emerging convergence among nationalism scholars over meanings of the two terms.

3. See Shu-Yun Ma, "Nationalism: State-Building or State-Destroying?" *Social Science Journal* 29, no. 3 (July 1992): 293–306.

4. This is not unusual. Smith, for example, also uses the word *nation* in his definition of nationalism. See Anthony Smith, *National Identity* (London: Penguin Books, 1991), 73.

5. For a more detailed discussion of the misuse of both *nation* and *nationalism* by political scientists, see Barrington, "'Nation' and 'Nationalism.'" International relations scholars do better than most political scientists in keeping nation and state separate, possibly because of the importance placed on the nature of states in the study of international politics.

6. *Ibid.*, 713. Nigerians, on the other hand, may comprise a nation, though one could certainly question the degree to which a Nigerian national identity has taken hold at the mass level.

7. Yael Tamir, "The Enigma of Nationalism," *World Politics* 47, no. 3 (1995): 425.

8. See Walker Connor, "A Nation Is a Nation, Is a State, Is an Ethnic Group, Is a . . ." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 1, no. 4 (1978): 377–400. This emphasis on ethnic characteristics leads Connor, in this same work (p. 381), to claim that Americans are "not a nation in the pristine sense of the word." Even Kaiser, whose book focuses on the essential role of territory in the development of national identity, leaves out the reference to territory in his definition of *nation* and, as a result, provides a definition that, again, only distinguishes itself from *ethnic group* by the reference to being "self-defining." For Kaiser, a nation is "a self-defining community of belonging and interest whose members share a sense of common origins and a belief in a common destiny or future together." See Robert J. Kaiser, *The Geography of Nationalism in Russia and the USSR* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 6.

9. Chinn and Kaiser, *Russians as the New Minority*, 19: "Nations thus may be viewed as future-oriented, politicized, and territorialized ethnic groups whose members seek to gain control over their destinies."

10. John Hutchinson and Anthony Smith, "Introduction," in *Nationalism*, ed. John Hutchinson and Anthony Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 3–4.

11. Rupert Emerson, quoted in Walker Connor, *Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 112. Seton-Watson similarly claims that a nation exists "when a significant number of people in a community consider themselves to form a nation, or behave as if they formed one." See Hugh Seton-Watson, *Nations and States* (London: Methuen, 1977), 5.

12. E. J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 8.

13. Ernest Renan, "Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?" in *Nationalism*, ed. John Hutchinson and Anthony Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 17.

14. Joseph Stalin, "The Nation," in *Nationalism*, ed. John Hutchinson and Anthony Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 20.

15. Anthony Smith's definition is very close to that of Stalin. For Smith, the nation

is a “named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths, and historical memories, a mass public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members.” See Smith, *National Identity*, 14.

16. Hobsbawm, for example, mentions Stalin’s definition and states that “all such objective definitions have failed.” See Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*, 5–6. Dan Smith has gone so far as to say that every element in Stalin’s definition is “contestable.” See Dan Smith, “Reconciling Identities in Conflict,” in *Europe’s New Nationalism*, ed. Richard Caplan and John Feffer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 200.

17. Geoff Eley and Ronald Suny, while taking a strongly subjectivist position, admit that features such as territory, language, and culture provide the “raw materials” for national identity, though they add that these characteristics themselves are contested: “Culture is more often not what people share, but what they choose to fight over.” See Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny, “Introduction: From the Moment of Social History to the Work of Cultural Representation,” in *Becoming National*, ed. Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).

18. Kupchan proposes the idea that members of nations share an “imagery that gives definition to a unique and distinctive national grouping.” See Charles Kupchan, “Introduction: Nationalism Resurgent,” in *Nationalism and Nationalities in the New Europe*, ed. Charles Kupchan (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995), 4.

19. *Democracy*, for example, is one of the most contested terms in political science. Yet no serious scholar would propose that democracy exists any time people think their political system is democratic.

20. See Kaiser, *The Geography of Nationalism in Russia and the USSR*, 10–11, however, for a discussion of the way that the national territory itself is also a subjective, constructed concept.

21. Ghia Nodia, “Nationalism and Democracy,” in *Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Democracy*, ed. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 11, italics in original.

22. Ernst Haas, “What Is Nationalism and Why Should We Study It?” *International Organization* 40, no. 3 (1986): 726.

23. Barrington, “‘Nation’ and ‘Nationalism,’” 713.

24. As Schopflin puts it, “Nations may be defined by various characteristics, but crucial among them is their relationship to a particular territory and their claim to exercise political control over that territory in the name of the nation.” See George Schopflin, “Nationalism and Ethnicity in Europe, East and West,” in *Nationalism and Nationalities in the New Europe*, ed. Charles Kupchan (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995), 38.

25. Barrington, “‘Nation’ and ‘Nationalism,’” 713.

26. See Anthony Richmond, “Ethnic Nationalism: Social Science Paradigms,” *International Social Science Journal* 111 (1987): 3–18.

27. See the later discussion on ethnic versus civic nationalism.

28. The idea of political versus ethnic nations is not accepted by all nationalism scholars. Clearly, these are ideal types, with most nations failing to meet either ideal. But as ideal types they are useful ways to distinguish how one nation sees itself and how its nationalism differs from another nation’s.

29. Ignatieff provides an example of the blurred lines, stating that “one person’s patriotism is another person’s nationalism”; he goes on, however, to discuss how the two terms are, in fact, different. See Michael Ignatieff, “Nationalism and Toleration,” in

*Europe's New Nationalism*, ed. Richard Kaplan and John Feffer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 218.

30. Some include this idea of loyalty in their definitions of nations and nationalism. Emerson, for example, states that a nation is the "largest community that, when the chips are down, effectively commands men's loyalty, overriding the claims both of lesser communities within it and those that cut across it." See Rupert Emerson, *From Empire to Nation: The Rise and Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960), 95–96.

31. Peter Rutland, "State Failure and State Building in Post-Socialist Europe: Implications for Theories of Nationalism" (presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, 1994), 4.

32. Richmond, "Ethnic Nationalism," 4–5.

33. Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), 1. It should be pointed out that this definition from Gellner is far less cited than the one presented in the next section, though both come from the same page of Gellner's classic book.

34. See Kaiser, *The Geography of Nationalism in Russia and the USSR*, for a discussion of various "ethnoterritorial conflicts" on the territory of the former Soviet Union. For an excellent overview of the topic of ethnic conflict, see Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).

35. Michael Ignatieff, *Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1993).

36. Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 1.

37. Haas, "What Is Nationalism and Why Should We Study It?" 727.

38. John Armstrong, *Nations before Nationalism* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), 4.

39. Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism* (New York: Macmillan, 1945), 18.

40. One interesting definition along these lines is Kaiser's labeling of nationalism as "activated national territoriality." See Kaiser, *The Geography of Nationalism in Russia and the USSR*, 22.

41. Paul Brass, *Ethnicity and Nationalism* (London: Sage, 1991), 48.

42. Smith, "Reconciling Identities in Conflict," 200. On the next page, however, Smith states that nationalism is both a doctrine and a movement.

43. Roy Mellor, *Nation, State, and Territory: A Political Geography* (London: Routledge, 1989), 4–5, my italics.

44. Hutchinson and Smith, "Introduction," 3, my italics. See also their comment on p. 4 of their work: "Once again, there are important differences in ways of defining the concept, some equating it with 'national sentiment,' others with nationalist ideology and language, others again with nationalist movements."

45. *Ibid.*, 5.

46. Stephen Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and the Causes of War," in *Nationalism and Nationalities in the New Europe*, ed. Charles Kupchan (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995), 136.

47. One might be concerned about the similarity between the proposed definitions of *nation* and *nationalism*. They are closely related (as we would expect them to be), but they are not the same thing. The fact that a nation has a sense of homeland is not the same thing as its pursuit of control over that territory. In addition, by setting the mem-

bership boundaries, nationalism lays out the characteristics of the people considered a nation. It also sets the territorial boundaries of the homeland that, as a nation, the group should control. But unless the people themselves accept these ideas—unless they believe they are a nation—nationalism is doomed to fail. Thus, I would argue that nationalisms (or, better, nationalists) try to produce nations, but they are in no way guaranteed success.

48. Weber believed that intellectuals play the major role in forming nationalist ideas, while political leaders develop the ideas of the state. See Max Weber, “The Nation,” in *Nationalism*, ed. John Hutchinson and Anthony Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 25. But see the discussion in this chapter about constraints on the ability of elites to formulate national membership boundaries.

49. See, for example, Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism*; and Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992).

50. See, for example, the discussion by Stephen Jones in the chapter on Georgia in this volume.

51. The practice of slavery, the treatment of Japanese Americans during World War II, and the persecution and killing of American Indians throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, for example.

52. See the discussion in Soren Rinder Bollerup and Christian Dons Christensen, *Nationalism in Eastern Europe* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 36–38.

53. John L. Comaroff, “Ethnicity, Nationalism, and the Politics of Difference in an Age of Revolution,” in *The Politics of Difference: Ethnic Premises in a World of Power*, ed. Edwin N. Wilmsen and Patrick McAllister (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 165.

54. Likewise, while they pursue territorial control for the nation, nationalist elites cannot pursue any territory.

55. Crawford Young, “Evolving Modes of Consciousness and Ideology: Nationalism and Ethnicity,” in *Political Development and the New Realism in Sub-Saharan Africa*, ed. David E. Apter and Carl G. Rosberg (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1994), 79.

56. Comaroff, “Ethnicity, Nationalism, and the Politics of Difference in an Age of Revolution.”

57. See Hans Vermeulen and Cora Govers, “From Political Mobilization to the Politics of Consciousness,” in *The Politics of Ethnic Consciousness*, ed. Hans Vermeulen and Cora Govers (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 22 n. 2. Yeros claims that “a form of instrumentalism” can be labeled as *constructivism*. See Paris Yeros, “Introduction: On the Uses and Implications of Constructivism,” in *Ethnicity and Nationalism in Africa: Constructivist Reflections and Contemporary Politics*, ed. Paris Yeros (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), 2.

58. Again, some elites will be more successful at this than others.

59. See Anthony Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 163, who states that the necessity of a “‘homeland,’ a national space of one’s own, is a central tenet of nationalism.” Homelands are generally thought of by nationalism scholars as sizable areas, such as a large region within an existing state, an entire existing state, or part or all of more than one state. Yet, historically, most people had a more localized perception of homeland. Typically, homeland meant the village or small region around where someone was born. See Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since*

1780, 15. But nationalists must make the homeland more than one's village for nationalism to succeed. Nationalists have tended to characterize the group homeland in one of three ways, labeled here *internal*, *external*, and *mixed homelands*.

60. Kaiser, *The Geography of Nationalism in Russia and the USSR*, 5, 8.

61. Guntram Herb, "National Identity and Territory," in *Nested Identities: Nationalism, Territory, and Scale*, ed. Guntram Herb and David H. Kaplan (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999), 17. For another discussion of the interaction between territory and national identity, in this case on the Armenian-Azerbaijan conflict, see Nora Dudwick, "The Cultural Construction of Political Violence in Armenia and Azerbaijan," *Problems of Post-Communism* 42 (1995): 4.

62. Kaiser, *The Geography of Nationalism in Russia and the USSR*, 5.

63. The existence of overlapping homelands means two things. First, dividing up existing states cannot be done neatly along "homeland" lines. While the international community increasingly favored the partitioning of existing states to solve ethnopolitical conflicts at the end of the twentieth century, the failures of this approach (in the former Yugoslavia, for example) seemed to outweigh the successes (such as the "velvet divorce" of Czechoslovakia). Second, it means that governments of all new states are likely to perceive threats to their territorial integrity well after independence is established.

64. But, even if the minority succeeds in gaining independence for the (now former) "internal homeland," the overlapping homelands problem does not go away. The creation of a new state, especially one that can be characterized as an "ethnic-nation-state," will likely create a new minority (or minorities) as well as its new majority group. This minority may see part of the new state as its homeland (creating a new internal homeland), or—especially if it was part of the old majority group—it may see the new state and an external area as its homeland, creating a new "mixed" homeland.

65. For a discussion of postindependence Eritrean nationalism, see Fouad Makki, "Nationalism, State Formation and the Public Sphere: Eritrea 1991–96," *Review of African Political Economy* 23, no. 70 (December 1996): 475–97.

66. In principle, a third possibility exists: that the state is larger than the perceived national homeland. This is extremely unlikely in practice, however, since it would imply that the nation does not have a right to control all of the territory of its state. While elites will generally agree that the homeland is *at least* the new state, they may not agree on much else. Because homeland boundaries are open to dispute, nationalist elites in the same national group may, again, argue over the state-homeland relationship. Some may accept the boundaries of the national state as equivalent to the boundaries of the homeland. Others may not only dispute this but argue with each other about how much more than the existing state the homeland comprises.

67. Kaiser mentions this possibility as well for Russia. He discusses the claims over Belarus, Ukraine, and northern Kazakhstan by Russian nationalists. See Kaiser, *The Geography of Nationalism in Russia and the USSR*, 371.

68. Ignatieff makes an amusing comparison between patriotism and nationalism, which is relevant to the discussion of internal homelands here. He states, "Patriotism is love of a country one can take for granted as one's own. . . . Nationalism, by contrast, is love of a country that happens to belong to someone else." See Ignatieff, "Nationalism and Toleration," 218.

69. See Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); and Rogers

Brubaker, "National Minorities, Nationalizing States, and External National Homelands in the New Europe," *Daedalus* 124, no. 2 (winter–spring 1995): 107–32.

70. See, for example, Lowell Barrington, "Rethinking the Triadic Nexus: External National Homelands, International Organizations, and Ethnic Relations in the Former Soviet Union" (presented at the annual meeting of the Association for the Study of Nationalities, New York, April 15–17, 1999).

71. While this is a common view among those writing on Russians outside Russia, there is almost no empirical support for the idea that ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan would think of their homeland in this way. See Lowell W. Barrington and Brian D. Silver, "The External Homeland among Russians in the Near Abroad" (presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April 14–17, 1999).

72. Kaiser mentions this possibility for nationalism in Russia following the collapse of the Soviet Union. See Kaiser, *The Geography of Nationalism in Russia and the USSR*, 367.

73. Admittedly, despite the earlier discussion of the need to separate the two concepts, the lines between nationalism and patriotism are blurred when one is discussing this variant of nationalism after independence. But it is still possible to distinguish actions that are about the nation and its territorial control of the state from a general sense of loyalty to the state by all its inhabitants.

74. See Chinn and Kaiser, *Russians as the New Minority*, 29.

75. M. Nazrul Islam, *Problems of Nation-Building in Developing Countries: The Case of Malaysia* (Dhaka, Bangladesh: University of Dhaka, 1988), 64.

76. *Ibid.*, 1.

77. While the United States had an advantage in the nation-building process because of its relatively homogeneous population, Zelinsky points out the importance of national symbols in the development of American identity: "But, if the presence or manipulation of symbols is not always among the first causes for the creation of nations, and if they may be missing during earliest infancy, one may still argue forcefully for their indispensability during the formative adolescent years, and for their utility during the nation-state phase. All the factual material leads to that emphatic conclusion for the United States." See Wilbur Zelinsky, *Nation into State: The Shifting Symbolic Foundations of American Nationalism* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988), 230.

78. State-building can be defined as the development (or redevelopment) of the capacity of the state in the areas of security and of state penetration into society to extract and distribute economic, social, and political goods. For more on the idea of state-building as security and penetration, see Lowell Barrington, "Citizenship and the 'Nation-Builder's Dilemma': Ethnicity, Nation-Building, and State-Building in Newly Independent States" (presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 1995).

79. *Ibid.*

80. Because all national identities need shared cultural features, the question of which features to emphasize is more difficult in the civic case than in the ethnic case. The existing similar cultural features of the ethnic group, on the other hand, make it generally easier to unify the group and put in place identity-related policies. Specifically, there are fewer disagreements about policies related to language.

81. Performing state functions when minorities have been excluded from the

definition of the nation usually requires coercion or “buying off” these groups by giving them already scarce resources. The exclusion also has obvious implications for the security component of the state-building project.

82. Chinn and Kaiser, *Russians as the New Minority*, 30. Chinn and Kaiser (borrowing from Shantha Hennayake) discuss how many variants of nationalism are “interactive,” responding to the nationalism of others. In the cases of Estonia and Latvia, however, the nationalism of ethnic Russians in the two countries was quite weak, but demographic changes during the Soviet period fed Estonian and Latvian fears that Russians would come to culturally dominate the Baltic nations.

83. As Kaiser points out, language is an especially potent issue for nationalists: “Having one’s native language declared the lingua franca of the entire state or a region therein clearly provides strategic advantages to the ‘native’ speakers.” See Kaiser, *The Geography of Nationalism in Russia and the USSR*, 9.

84. For a discussion of the ways in which the ethnic nation idea and the perception of threat came together in Latvia and Estonia, see Lowell Barrington, “The Making of Citizenship Policy in the Baltic States,” *Georgetown Immigration Law Journal* 13, no. 2 (winter 1999): 159–99. Also see Robert M. Hayden, “Constitutional Nationalism in the Formerly Yugoslav Republics,” *Slavic Review* 51, no. 4 (winter 1992): 654–73, for a discussion of such policies in the Balkans.

85. In such a case, this variant of postindependence nationalism would merge with the previously mentioned external-territory-claiming variant. Many such combinations of the variants are possible.

86. Hutchinson and Smith, “Introduction,” 9.

87. See Walker Connor, “When Is a Nation?” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 13, no. 1 (1990): 92–103.

88. What is involved in making the masses “national” in a particular case is an interesting question, but one that has been discussed elsewhere. See, for example, Eugen Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870–1914* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976).