

Contents

Preface	xiii
Acknowledgments	xix
Part I. Foils and Stories	
1. Three Approaches to Foils	3
1.1. Rational Choice Theory and Its Foils	3
1.2. Social Scientific Theories and Their Foils	4
1.3. Foils in the Academy	7
1.4. My Hope for This Book	9
2. Three Types of Stories	11
2.1. Deep Stories	11
2.2. Exemplar Theorists	14
2.3. Ideal Types	16
2.4. The Rational Reconstruction of Research Programs	18
2.5. The Trouble with Stories: Thin and Thick Research Communities	19
2.6. Typologies and Genealogies	23
Part II. The Rationalist Challenge	
3. Rational/Social Choice Theory	29
3.1. Thin and Thick Rationalists	29
3.2. Rationalist Ontology	32
3.3. Rationalist Methodology	33
4. Rationalism and Hegemony	41
4.1. Why Rationalist Social Science Tends toward Hegemony	41

4.2. The Result: Theoretical Synthesis and Empirical Conciliation	48
4.3. Countertendencies: How Rationalist Social Science Defines Its Baselines and Boundaries	55
4.4. Countertendencies: Why Rationalist Social Science Lowers Its Positivistic Pretensions	64
4.5. Modest Rational Choice Theory	69
 Part III. The Alternatives to Rationalist Hegemony	
5. Cultural/Interpretive Theory	73
5.1. Thin and Thick Culturalists	73
5.2. Culturalist Ontology	78
5.3. Culturalist Methodology	88
5.4. Culturalist Lacunae	90
6. Structural/Institutional Theory	99
6.1. Thin and Thick Structuralists	99
6.2. Structuralist Ontology	102
6.3. Structuralist Methodology	105
6.4. Structuralist Lacunae	111
 Part IV. The Debate about the Debate	
7. The Need for Synthesis: Structure and Action	115
7.1. For Synthesis	115
7.2. Types of Syntheses	117
7.3. Structure/Institution and Action/Process	125
7.4. Methodological Synthesis: The Causal and the Interpretive	129
7.5. The Importance of Synthesis	131
8. The Need for Analysis: Models and Foils	133
8.1. For Models and Foils	133
8.2. Against Synthesis	141
8.3. Conclusion: Synthesis and Analysis	147
 Part V. The Philosophy of Science	
9. The General and the Particular	151
9.1. The Research Programs	152

9.2. Weber's Approach	161
9.3. The General and the Particular in the Social Sciences	166
10. Models and Foils: A Modest Philosophy of Science for Social Science	168
10.1. Theory	170
10.2. Evidence	173
10.3. Theory and Evidence	182
10.4. Evaluation	194
10.5. How a Modest Rationalist Evaluates Theory and Evidence	210
Notes	215
References	281
Index	313